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Abstract 
Overfishing is a worldwide phenomenon and an issue at global scale. It is a problem that 
cannot be solved alone by the efforts of a single country, but it requires a substantial amount 
of efforts from both countries and international organizations to successfully mitigate and 
eliminate overfishing. How can fisheries promote flourishing and sustainable development in 
inadequate institutions, and how is it possible to know that fishing activities are just and fair 
or basic human rights being violated? What are the consequences of overfishing, and who are 
held responsible? In this thesis, the fisheries partnership agreements between the European 
Union and Senegal are the main focus. The theoretical frameworks of ethics and justice, 
human rights, utilitarianism and responsibilities will be used to analyze the case of fisheries 
partnership agreements between the European Union and Senegal. Other West African 
countries will also be taken into consideration. IUU fishing activities, bycatch and discards 
are also problems related to overfishing. These are some of the variables that will be put under 
investigation. The case of fisheries agreement between the European Union and Senegal is 
one of many examples where developed countries may have taken advantage of developing 
countries with weak governance through fisheries agreement. Excessive and irresponsible 
fishing activities have led to overfished waters, which in turn may negatively influence poor 
fishing communities. Institutions are inadequate to prevent people from harm, and basic 
human rights may have been violated, which result in pain and misery.  
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Summary 
The most important source of protein in Senegal is fish, and it accounts for more than 75% of 
the total protein consumption. More than half of the Senegalese population lives below the 
poverty line, and fish is a relatively cheap source of protein. Fish also generates employment 
opportunities and a source of income for the Senegalese population. The fisheries sector 
generates roughly 600,000 direct and indirect jobs in Senegal. This makes the country highly 
dependent on fish. 
The problem of overfishing is negatively influencing the fisheries sector and the people living 
in Senegal. The majority of the fish stocks in West African waters are currently in the state of 
depletion or collapse. Moreover, it may have exacerbated the food crisis, and increased the 
competition between industrial trawlers and small-scale fishing vessels in Senegal. Despite 
the lack of food, the majority of the catch is being exported. The fish price has also increased, 
which keeps people in Senegal from purchasing not only high-valued species but also low 
commercial-valued fish species. Consequently, the Senegalese population was forced to 
migrate to Europe for the lack of fish, food, income and quality of life. In the voyage to 
Europe, many people lost their lives at sea. Around 6,000 people either died or disappeared at 
sea. 
The Senegalese government is driven by corruption and foreign fishing nations (e.g. from the 
EU, Japan, Russia, China) are taken advantage of the weak governance for personal gain. 
Although, there are other fishing nations who contributes to deplete fish stocks from the West 
African waters, the EU is usually criticized by NGOs and the media for their actions in 
developing countries. The case of fisheries agreement between the European Union and 
Senegal is the main focus of this thesis. The European Union is one of the world’s largest 
markets for fish and sea-food products. However, fish stocks in the European Union are 
overexploited (42%) and depleted (7%). For this reason, the EU is not self-sufficient and 
highly dependent on third-countries’ fish stocks to meet the increasing demand. Therefore, it 
is often argued that the EU dispatches their fishing fleets to other developing countries in 
order to transfer their problems of overfishing to developing countries. Fish provided through 
fisheries agreements with developing countries accounts for a quarter of the fish consumed in 
the EU. 
The state of the world exploitation of marine fish stocks had increased significantly in the last 
few decades. In 2008, 28% of the world fish stocks are overexploited, 3% depleted and 1% is 
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in the state of recovering. Conversely, underexploited and moderately exploited world fish 
stocks reducing with 3% and 12% respectively. This gives serious concern to world fisheries 
as the majority of the world fish stocks are moving towards a trend where most fish stocks are 
in the state of collapse. In the EU, catches beyond sustainable levels have increased from 10% 
to 21% in 2000 to 2006. This means that unsustainable catches have doubled. Half of the 
world’s marine and inland fish catch is contributed by small-scale fisheries. Most of these fish 
catches are used for direct human consumption. 80% of fish exports that originates from 
Africa are supplied to the European market, and 66% of the total exports from Senegal are 
supplied to Europe.  
As regard to bycatch and discards; global discards of fish is estimated to be 7 million tons 
annually. Industrial large-scale fisheries tend to have a relatively higher discard rate relatively 
to small-scale fisheries. The EU territorial waters have a high rate of discards in general. Due 
to the lack of information, it is assumed that discards in small-scale fisheries in West-Africa is 
low. In Senegal, the discard rate of some shrimp fleet is estimated to be around 63%. The total 
value of losses worldwide due to IUU fishing is estimated to be between $10 billion and $23.5 
billion annually. In terms of tonnage, it is equal to about 11-26 million tons. This means that 
13% to 31% of the total reported catches in the world are lost to IUU fishing each year. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In this thesis, Senegal and its fishery agreements with the European Union will be the main 
focus of the thesis. The reason is to narrow down the area of study. However, the other 
countries in the Sub-Saharan West Africa will also be taken into account. 
The purpose of the thesis is to find out the consequences of overfishing in the Sub-Saharan 
West African coastal countries, and seek how the European countries have contributed to 
overfish the West African waters through the case of fisheries partnership agreements 
between the European Union and Senegal. Recommendations of how flourishing and 
sustainable practices for the fishing communities in West Africa can be promoted will be 
presented. 
1.1 Study Objectives 
The main study objective of the master’s thesis is to seek key solutions for the problem of 
overfishing in terms of recommendations and suggestions to promote sustainable 
development. Through the case of fisheries agreement between the European Union and 
Senegal, the question of ethics will be put to the test. The European Union is operating in 
jurisdictions where institutions seem to be inadequate to prevent people from harm, to 
promote justice, human rights, flourishing lives and happiness with the absence of pain and 
misery. The consequences of overfishing in the West African coastal waters are devastating to 
the local fishermen and the population in Senegal, which their lives are dependent on fish as a 
main source of food and income. Thus, the main focus in this thesis is also the local 
population who suffers from the consequences of overfishing.  
1.2 Research Question 
The research question of the thesis is expressed as follows: 
“What are the consequences of overfishing in West-Africa, and how can sustainable and 
flourishing fisheries be promoted? West-Africa versus Europe” 
In the attempt to successfully seeking the answer to the selected research question, it is 
believed that there are several variables that may play a major role as driving forces behind 
the question of overfishing or exploitation of marine resources. In the case of the fisheries 
agreements between the European Union and Senegal, it is believed that these factors may 
contribute to explain the phenomenon of overfishing; the international market for fish and 
seafood products, the illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, bycatch and discards, 
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the policies (e.g. the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy), and the law and regulations (e.g. 
UNCLOS), and; the theory of ethics. In order to answer the question of how sustainable and 
flourishing fisheries could be promoted, recommendations will be presented and the theory of 
ethics will be of use. The situation between the European Union and the West-African 
countries is to be tested through the three basic principles for ‘the good’, basic human rights, 
utilitarianism and responsibility to see if the parties are just or unjust and whether institutions 
are adequate or inadequate. The conclusion of the master thesis will be based on 
recommendations and suggested actions for how the problem of overfishing could be 
mitigated or eliminated. 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is structured in such a way that the theory of each variable will be first introduced 
which will then be closely followed by what is happening in practice, i.e. the findings, the 
reality, and the methods. For example, the theoretical part of ‘bycatch and discards’ will be 
first introduced and then the practical part will be immediately presented followed by the 
recommended solutions. A small structural model will be used to guide the reader throughout 
the thesis and at the same time serve as a reminder of where the reader is currently located in 
the thesis. This model will be presented at the beginning of each section. The structural model 
could be found on the next page. 
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2.0 The Case of the European Union and Senegal 
2.1 Basic Facts about Senegal 
The Republic of Senegal covers a land area of 196,722 km
2
 where the coastline is 531 km 
long (CIA, 2012). With such a long coastline, it does not come as a surprise that the sea and 
its resources are the main wealth of the country (Iossa, Niang, & Polack, 2008). The Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States of America estimated the population of 
Senegal to be approximately 13 million in 2012. According to Iossa et al. (2008), over half of 
the Senegalese population lives below the poverty line, i.e. 54% of the total population in 
2001 according to the estimate from the CIA (CIA, 2012; Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 1). Senegal is 
a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS 
consists of a total of fifteen member states. These include Cape Verde, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone and Togo (Lundstedt, 2009). 
2.2 The Importance of Fish 
In Senegal, the most important source of protein is fish (Iossa, et al., 2008; UNEP, 2002). 
According to UNEP (2002), fish accounts for more than 75% of the protein consumption in 
Senegal. While Iossa, et al. (2008) estimated the protein intake of fish to be around 70% of 
the total protein consumption. As a matter of fact, fish is a relatively cheap source of protein 
that is consumed by both the rural and urban population in Senegal (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 2; 
UNEP, 2002). Other source of animal protein, such as chicken, beef and mutton, are relatively 
more expensive than fish and fishery products. By this means a higher purchasing power is 
required, in which the population in Senegal do not have since more than half of the 
population live below the poverty line (Iossa, et al., 2008). Thus, fish is not only essential for 
the Senegalese government’s food security policy, but it is also important for the majority of 
its population (UNEP, 2002). The UNEP (2002) stated that “in view of the importance of fish 
in meeting the population’s protein needs, the threat of resource depletion is thus coupled 
with a threat to food security” (p. 58). Moreover, the fisheries sector in Senegal generates 
around 600,000 direct and indirect jobs for the Senegalese people. 
2.3 The Problem of Overfishing in Senegal 
Although, the fishing sector is no doubt a crucial factor for the survival of many people’s lives 
in Senegal, the country is also influenced by the worldwide issue of fish stock depletion due 
to overexploitation of marine resources that is causing extensive damage to the industry 
today. According to an article from the New York Times (2008), small fleets of industrial 
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trawlers have cleared the West African ocean floor out of fish, and those responsible include 
the European Union, China and Russia (New York Times, 2008). As a result, the majority of 
the fish stocks in West African waters are now in the state of collapse or depletion. The 
consequences that follow are particularly severe in Senegal, since more than half of the 
population lives below the poverty line. Iossa et al. (2008) explicitly stated that “the depletion 
of fish stocks is exacerbating the food crisis in Senegal” (p. 3). This particularly concerns 
high value species or coastal demersals, e.g. lobster, cuttlefish, octopus, shrimp, sea beam, 
threadfin, sole and grouper, as they are in great demand (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 3). Due to the 
high market value of these species, the country is encouraged to export to the European 
market. 
The world’s fish stocks are in decline. One issue of particular concern regarding this is the 
increase of competition between large industrial trawlers and the traditional Senegalese 
fishermen in small pirogues
1
 in which has intensified over the years (Iossa, et al., 2008). 
While this fierce competition has increasing, the earth’s fish stocks have been declining 
(Nordberg, 2003). As a result, marine resources are limited and scarce. Since high value 
species and coastal demersals are in great demand, they account for approximately 25% of the 
total catch in terms of tonnage (Iossa, et al., 2008). Due to these species’ high market value, 
the competition between the  are especially fierce and fishing of these species are mainly for 
export purposes (Iossa, et al., 2008). In addition, the playing field for catching fish is not even 
between the parties as industrial vessels had been frequently spotted in fishing areas that are 
intended for small-scale, traditional fishing (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 7). According to Iossa et al. 
(2008), industrial vessels are not allowed to fish inside the area of 6 miles off the coast, which 
is considered a zone reserved for artisanal fishing only (Iossa, et al., 2008). Thus, jeopardizing 
their own lives, traditional fishermen are then force to sail out to dangerous waters in their 
pirogues, which is only suitable for sailing along the coastline due to their small size, in order 
to compete in what is considered a losing battle against the enormous industrial trawlers 
(Iossa, et al., 2008).  
In addition to the problem of increasing overexploitation of marine resources, malnutrition 
has become another problem that Senegal is currently experiencing (Iossa, et al., 2008). Local 
fish prices have increased due to the increasingly high demand in which encourage fish 
                                                          
1
 A pirogue is a motorized wooden canoe. In this thesis, pirogues and traditional fishermen are terms used 
simultaneously with the term “artisanal fishery”. Generally, these terms are referred as small-scale marine 
fisheries.  In the case of Senegal, “all inland fisheries are small-scale” (See table in “big numbers project”). 
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exports. In turn, the price increase keeps the majority of the Senegalese population from 
purchasing the high value species. However, what is more troubling in the recent years is the 
price increase of the cheaper fish, which is no doubt a factor in worsening the food crisis in 
Senegal as the people can no longer afford to purchase neither the high value species nor the 
cheaper fish species (Iossa, et al., 2008). This particularly affects those people who already 
struggling against poverty and famine. 
As a result from all of the problems in Senegal, such as overexploitation of marine resources, 
food crisis, competition between pirogues and industrial trawlers, and the rising prices of fish, 
many people within the fishing communities that are affected by the depletion of fish stocks 
are in deeply concern for their survival. Due to the increasingly high exploitation of marine 
resources in the Senegalese waters, traditional fishermen catch just enough fish to buy fuel for 
their pirogues, which is difficult to make ends meet (New York Times, 2008). As they are on 
the verge of desperation, many people find themselves in a situation where there are no other 
options than to sell their belongings in order to immigrate illegally (Iossa, et al., 2008). In 
search for a new beginning and a fair chance to survive, they risk their lives by setting sail in 
wooden pirogues to Europe not knowing whether they will reach their destination or not. 
Those who manage to get to Europe are most likely going to be arrested and deported back to 
their home country (New York Times, 2008). In addition, the poor immigrants were fined for 
their illegal voyage to Europe. Due to their circumstances, many of the immigrants would 
have no other choice than to sell their most valuable assets, which in this case is their own 
pirogues, in order to get enough money to pay for the fine (New York Times, 2008).  
According to an article published by New York Times (2008), over 900 pirogues with 
approximately 31,000 West Africans attempted to immigrate to Europe through the Canary 
Islands in 2007. The United Nations estimated that 6,000 of the immigrants died or 
disappeared during their tragic voyage to Europe (New York Times, 2008). According to 
Iossa et al. (2008), the total number of pirogues in Senegal in 1997 was estimated to be 
10,707. However, this number had dramatically reduced nearly by half as there were only 
5,615 pirogues registered in 2005 (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 6). 
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3.0 Overfishing and Sustainable Fishing 
3.1 Definition of Overfishing 
The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) defines a fish stock that is 
overfished as follows; “A Stock is considered “overfished” when exploited beyond an explicit 
limit beyond which its abundance is considered “too low” to ensure safe reproduction” (FAO 
Fisheries Glossary: Overfished, http://www.fao.org/fi/glossary/default.asp, last visited Jan. 
19, 2012). Thus, this means that overfishing is to excessively fish beyond what is considered 
sustainable levels. According to FAO (2010b), the term ‘overfishing’ is defined by three 
different phenomena; (1) the biological overfishing, (2) the economic overfishing, and (3) the 
ecosystem overfishing (p. 1). Hannesson (2004), also divided the term into three degrees. The 
two first degrees of overfishing, which are the biological and the economic overfishing, are 
identical to the classification provided by FAO (2010b). However, Hannesson (2004) did not 
include the third and last classification from FAO (2010b), which is the ecosystem 
overfishing. Instead, Hannesson (2004) included a classification called the ‘extinction of fish 
stocks’, which simply means that one or several fish stocks are, often carelessly and 
irresponsibly, exploited to the extent where the population would not be able to replenish 
itself, and, thus, may become extinct (p. 43). 
FAO (2010b) defines biological overfishing of any exploited fish species, either target or non-
target species, “as a situation in which the fishing pressure exerted on the species is higher 
than the pressure theoretically required for harvesting the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), 
or would, if continued in the medium term, impair the population productivity” (FAO, 2010b, 
p. 1). Maximum sustainable yield (MSY) means that the “fish populations could increase and 
generate more economic output if they were left for only a few years under less fishing 
pressure” (European Commission, 2009a, p. 7). Economic overfishing takes place when the 
level of fishing efforts is considered far too great in order for the fisheries to acquire the 
maximum rent that is obtainable from the catches (FAO, 2010b). Thus, the rent generated 
through the fishing efforts is much lower than what is obtainable, leaving the fisheries in a 
situation that is considered unfavorable, i.e. below the maximum economic yield (MEY) 
(FAO, 2010b). Furthermore, Hannesson (2004) suggested that economic overfishing may 
occur regardless of whether biological overfishing has occurred or not. Finally, ecosystem 
overfishing refers to the given fish specie’s relationship with another, and this type of 
overfishing occurs when “the long-term historical species balance […] have been 
significantly modified by fishing” (FAO, 2010b). This means that if fish predators are heavily 
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fished out to the verge of extinction, then there will be more of those fish species that are 
considered to be preys, given that the chances of them being eaten have been significantly 
reduced. In turn, the ecosystem of the given region will be harmfully unbalanced. Note that in 
this example the predator is assumed to be the only fish species that eat a given fish prey. 
Furthermore, the harmful effects of overfishing to any given ecosystem can either be direct or 
indirect (FAO, 2010b). Direct effects of overfishing are directly related to unreasonable high 
level of fishing activities, which causes harm to the ecosystem by excessively fishing large 
quantities of both targeted and non-targeted species (FAO, 2010b). On the other hand, indirect 
effects of overfishing harm the ecosystem in several ways. The harm caused to a species may 
have an effect on another. Thus, the indirect effects of overfishing may emerge from “(1) 
thinning or elimination of prey populations (bottom-up forcing); (ii) excessive reduction of 
predators (top-down effect); and (iii) altering the size composition or the life history traits of 
the resource” (FAO, 2010b, p. 2). Moreover, the direct and the indirect effects of overfishing 
tend to intensify as the fishing pressures are increasing (FAO, 2010b, p. 2). 
Examples of fishing activities that are related to overfishing include illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing, unreported bycatch and discards, and ghost fishing (FAO, 2010b), 
which will be introduced on the following sections. Ghost fishing is basically lost fishing 
gears that are left uncontrolled at sea, which may eventually unintentionally or accidently 
caught fish on its nets. It is believe that this particular problem is not relevant for the research 
question. Therefore, it will not be included. 
3.2 The Different States of Exploitation 
According to a report from FAO (2005), there are six different levels or stages to characterize 
the state of exploitation of fish stocks; (1) Underexploited, (2) Moderately Exploited, (3) 
Fully Exploited, (4) Overexploited, (5) Depleted, and (6) Recovering. Fish stocks are 
underexploited when the fisheries are either undeveloped or new. Thus, newly founded 
fisheries in a given area will have a significant amount of potential for further expansion in 
their total production (FAO, 2005b). When the fish stocks are moderately exploited, the level 
of fishing efforts are low and fisheries may find some limitations as they attempt to expand 
their total production (FAO, 2005b). A fish stock is considered to be fully exploited when a 
“fishery is operating at or close to an optimal yield level, with no expected room for further 
expansion” (FAO, 2005b, p. 213). Similar to the previous term, overexploitation of fish 
stocks will occur as fisheries are exploited beyond a level “which is believed to be sustainable 
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in the long term” (FAO, 2005b, p. 213). This will give them no room for further expansion in 
their total production. Thus, the stock will be in a high risk of depletion or collapse (FAO, 
2005b). If the fisheries are being exploited even further, the fish stocks will be depleted or 
collapsed. In this state of exploitation, the fish stocks are in danger of extinction and “catches 
are well below historical levels, irrespective of the amount of fishing effort exerted” (FAO, 
2005b, p. 213). If the exploitation is handled in a respectively manner, the fish stocks may get 
a chance to recover (FAO, 2005b). Thus, in order for the fish stocks to increase after being 
depleted, it is required that all fisheries in a given area have to end their fishing activities that 
exploit the sea. 
3.3 Definition of Sustainable Fishing 
According to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, sustainable fishing is 
defined as “fishing activities that do not cause or lead to undesirable changes in the 
biological and economic productivity, biological diversity, or ecosystem structure and 
functioning from one human generation to the next” (FAO Fisheries Glossary: Sustainable 
Fishing, http://www.fao.org/fi/glossary/default.asp, last visited Jan. 8, 2012).  
3.4 Definition of Maximum Sustainable Yield 
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is defined by WWF (2011) as follows; “The maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY) for a given fish stock means the highest possible annual catch that 
can be sustained over time, by keeping the stocks at the level producing maximum growth. 
The MSY refers to a hypothetical equilibrium state between the exploited population and the 
fishing activity” (p. 1). 
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3.5 State of World Fisheries 
The state of the world exploitation of marine fish stocks has since the 1970s increased 
substantially. FAO (2010a) identified that 32% of the marine fish stocks were either in the 
state of overexploited (28%), depleted (3%) or recovering (1%) in 2008 as opposed to 10% in 
1974 (p. 8). Thus, giving the high fishing pressure to most fisheries due to the continually 
increasing demand, the remaining amount of fish stocks would give less maximum potential 
production to the fisheries, as 32% of the fish stocks are either overexploited, depleted or 
recovering (FAO, 2010a, p. 8). This would call for a need for rebuilding plans as the 
overexploited or depleted stocks would be in a dangerous state of extinction if these stocks are 
continuously being exploited. Moreover, the combined percentage in 2008 was the highest 
recorded percentage in the period from the mid-1970s to 2008. While the proportion of 
overexploited, depleted or recovering marine fish stocks have gone up during the period from 
1974 to 2008, the stocks that are either underexploited or moderately exploited have in fact 
decreased from 40% in the 1970s to 15% in 2008 (FAO, 2010a, p. 8). Furthermore, the 
underexploited (3%) and moderately exploited (12%) stocks monitored by FAO in 2008 were 
in fact the lowest percentage ever recorded since the 1970s (FAO, 2010a). 
Despite the considerably decrease of underexploited or moderately exploited stocks and the 
increase of overexploited, depleted or recovering stocks, marine fish stocks that are fully 
exploited have been relatively stable during the same period. Fully exploited stocks in the 
period of 1970 to 2008 accounted for nearly 50% of the world marine fish stocks (FAO, 
2010a, p. 8). In 2008, fully exploited marine fish stocks were monitored as being slightly 
more than 50%, which indicates that the current world catches are imminently close to the 
maximum sustainable production (FAO, 2010a, p. 8). At this point, there will be no room for 
further expansion. The trend of where the marine fish stocks are heading towards to, give 
reasons for serious concern as the percentage of overexploited, depleted and recovering fish 
stocks are continuously increasing, whereas the percentage of underexploited and moderately 
exploited stocks are considerably decreasing over the years (FAO, 2010a).  It is estimated that 
approximately “half the amount of fish available in 1970 would be available by 2015 and 
only one-third in 2050” (UNEP, 2011, p. 87). Unless considerable action is taken, all 
commercial fisheries will share the faith of being collapsed by 2050 as researchers estimated 
(AFP, 2010). 
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3.6 Sustainable Fishing and the European Union 
In the European Union, there has been made great improvements between the period of 2003 
and 2005 as far as fish stocks conservation is concerned (European Commission, 2009d). 
However, in the following year in 2006, it has been reported that the overall fish catch or 
exploitation of fish stocks has been beyond sustainable levels. Catches beyond sustainable 
levels have, according to the European Commission (2009d), increased from 10% to 21% in 
the period between 2000 and 2006. Thus, unsustainable catches have been more than doubled 
in this period despite the efforts that have been made to mitigate overfishing in 2002 and 2005 
(European Commission, 2009d). This raises serious concerns of the state of the fish stocks in 
the EU waters. 
The continuously overexploitation of fish stocks beyond sustainable levels has not only cause 
a significant decline in fish stocks, but it has also caused a decline in employment in the 
fishery sector within the EU (European Commission, 2009d). For a very long time, the 
exploitation and consumption of natural resources (i.e. including fish or marine resources) has 
been a major factor in contributing to the EU’s economic growth and welfare (European 
Commission, 2009d). As fish stocks are overexploited and, consequently, the amount 
diminished, the human welfare in the EU may also be lost in some degree (European 
Commission, 2009d). 
Clearly, the trends in fish stocks conservation in the EU have been unfavorable (European 
Commission, 2009d). Biodiversity is under pressure, and fish stocks are undoubtedly 
threatened. According to the European Commission (2009d), the EU fishing fleet has been 
decreased in order to cope with the decrease in available fish stocks. However, the same could 
not be said for the fishing capacity as it still remains at the same level due to technological 
advancements. Furthermore, assistance to developing countries as in the EU’s international 
commitments have been greatly reduced (European Commission, 2009d, p. 10).  
The EU’s response to the rapidly diminishing fish stocks in their waters is to promote 
sustainable use or consumption of the remaining fish stocks. In addition to the potential 
damage to the ecosystem systems, overfishing may cause substantial economic damage to the 
fishing sector (European Commission, 2009d). According to the European Commission’s 
Green Paper on the Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (2009a), “economic and social 
sustainability require productive fish stocks and healthy marine ecosystems. The economic 
and social viability of fisheries can only result from restoring the productivity of fish stocks.” 
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(p. 9). In the short-term, the ecological, economic and social objectives may be in conflict. 
For instance, there are in some cases where fishing activities have to be reduced for a limited 
time in order for overexploited fish stocks to replenish themselves (European Commission, 
2009a). Some parts of the social objectives could be related to employment. In some cases, 
unemployment may be reduced by granting new jobs opportunities through increasing fishing 
activities for a limited of time. However, such action may bear risks associated with the fish 
stocks concerned as well as all threaten the individuals, groups and communities that may be 
highly depend on the given natural resources in order to make a living and to survive 
(European Commission, 2009a). Thus, in both cases, the fishermen whose lives are dependent 
on fish resources seem to be in a lose-lose-situation due to the fact that further restrictions on 
fishing activities will result in less fish to catch, and the same could be said about an increase 
in fishing activities – the fish stocks may not have enough time to replenish themselves in 
which means that there are less fish to catch at sea. Thus, it is essential to take into 
consideration how minimizing fishing activities may influence the economic and social 
objectives as well. According to the European Commission (2009a), the ecological 
sustainability is “a basic premise for the economic and social future of European fisheries” 
(p. 9). In the long-term one should aim to promote ecological sustainability, which is to 
ensure catches stay within the MSY, mitigate IUU fishing, reduce bycatch and discards, and 
minimize the overall ecological impact (European Commission, 2009a). 
3.7 Sustainable Development and Human Rights Approach 
In the global conference on small-scale fisheries in Bangkok in 2008, Dr. Edward H. Allison 
suggested that there is a need to adopt “a human rights approach to sustainable development 
of small-scale fisheries” (FAO, 2009b, p. 15). The terminology “rights based approach” is 
used by analysts in economic and social development. Analysts in the fishery sectors have 
been adopting the same terminology as well. The aim of the human rights approach is to 
establish cross-sectoral partnership in order to addressed social development issues in 
developing countries. The sectors that needs to be included are non-governmental 
organizations, international organizations, various of government departments and bi-lateral 
agencies (FAO, 2009b). According to FAO (2010a), “the human rights approach stresses the 
importance of removing obstacles, such as illiteracy, ill health, lack of access to resources, 
and lack of civil and political freedoms, that prevent people from doing legitimate activities 
that they want to do” (p. 72).  It was further suggested that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and its supported legal framework may have the potential to contribute to 
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guide both “investment and development action in securing sustainable small-scale fisheries” 
(FAO, 2009b, p. 15).  
Given the circumstances of those who work as fishers and as workers in the post-harvest 
sectors in small-scale fisheries in developing countries, these people often have to face daily 
challenges and subsequently have to deal with many uncertainties in their lives (FAO, 2009b). 
Thus, the concern for overfishing and the potential of fish stock decline or even collapse may 
not be perceived as an immediate threat to their livelihoods and well-being (FAO, 2009b, p. 
15). As a result, the concerns from these communities may rather be directed towards issues 
related to their immediate or basic needs. These include issues such as “rights to food, justice 
representation, health (malaria and other common illness), decent work and dignified lives” 
(FAO, 2009b, p. 15). Therefore, unless these issues are addressed first, then there may be a 
lack of incentive and effort from the local fishermen to participate in resource management. 
By establishing a cross-sectoral partnership, there is a belief that the well-being of the people 
and the fishery communities will be improved (FAO, 2009b). This may lead to the increase 
support and contribution to responsible fishing in which may further lead to poverty reduction 
and food security (FAO, 2009b). Thus, according to FAO (2009b), in the order that the 
agenda is based on is to first of all strengthen the human rights, secondly the access or 
property rights need to be reinforced, and, thirdly, the markets need to be invested in. It is 
argued that by adopting the “human rights based framework for these efforts would 
strengthen the ability of government fishery departments and other fishery organizations to 
support fishing communities in securing their development, including their role in sustaining 
the contribution of fisheries to the wider economy” (FAO, 2009b, p. 15). 
During the Global Conference on Small-Scale Fisheries in 2008, Sharma (2008) also stressed 
the importance of adopting the human rights approach. However, her point of view is rather 
towards securing social, economic and cultural rights of fishworkers and fishing communities 
(Sharma, 2008). According to Sharma (2008), “given the international consensus on 
achieving human rights, the […] committed action to realizing the human rights of fishing 
communities, as indeed of all vital, yet marginalized groups and communities, is really not a 
matter of choice. It is an obligation” (p. 1). There is in strong belief that the adoption of a 
human rights approach may significantly improve the life and livelihood of the fishing 
communities, i.e. including marginalized groups and communities (Sharma, 2008). 
Furthermore, Sharma (2008) suggests that it may contribute to strengthen the development in 
a given country in terms of establishing “a strong basis for citizens to make claims on their 
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States, and for holding States to account for their duties” (p. 1). Thus, in order to successfully 
implement the human rights approach, it is required from both the given State (the duty 
bearers) and the fishing community as well as the fishworkers (the citizens) “to be aware of, 
and to claim and exercise their rights effectively, and of duty-bearers to fulfill their human 
rights obligations” (Sharma, 2008, p. 1). In his work titled ‘A human rights approach to 
development: Primer for development practitioners’, Tomas Amparo (2005) defined, in 
general, a human rights approach as follows: “a framework for the pursuit of human 
development that is normatively based on, and operationally directed to, the development of 
capacities to realize human rights” (Tomas, 2005, as cited in Sharma, 2008, p. 4). Thus, 
UNDP (2000) stated that human rights and human development may “share a common vision 
and a common purpose – to secure the freedom, well-being and dignity of all people 
everywhere” (p. 1). Thus, the challenge is to figure out how and what is needed in order for 
small-scale fishing communities to secure their freedom, well-being and dignity. By freedom, 
UNDP (2000) means “freedom from discrimination – by gender, race, ethnicity, national 
origin, religion; freedom from want – to enjoy a decent standard of living; freedom from fear 
– of threats to personal security, from torture, arbitrary arrest and other violent acts; freedom 
from injustice and violations of the rule of law; freedom of thought and speech and to 
participate in decision-making and from associations” (p. 1). According to UNDP, “human 
freedom is the common purpose and common motivation of human rights and human 
development” (UNDP, 2000, p. 2). 
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4.0 International Market 
4.1 International Market for Fish 
One of the world’s most important renewable resources is fish. This renewable resource plays 
an important role to a significant portion of the world’s population for both their survival and 
health (UNEP, 2011, p. 84). According to United Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP) 
Green Economy report (2011); “Marine fisheries provide nutrition and livelihoods for 
millions of people in coastal communities, notably in South and South-East Asia, West Africa 
and Pacific Island states” (p. 84). However, the fisheries managers and policy-makers often 
find themselves in trade off situations where they are “under pressure to sacrifice the long-
term health of marine fish resources in favour of perceived short-term economic benefits to 
the fishing industry and consumers” (UNEP, 2011, p. 85). 
As many of the international commercial fish stocks are fully exploited, overexploited or are 
in the state of collapse, the worldwide demand for fish and fish products continues to increase 
which has led to an increase in the international fish trade as well. This resulted in a global 
crisis which will have a major impact on the whole industry in the nearest future. From the 
report of UNEP (2009), it clearly stated that “action undertaken by governmental and 
intergovernmental institutions has fallen short on redressing the crisis” (p. 6). They argue 
further that this situation was driven by numerous factors related to unsustainable 
consumption and production patters (UNEP, 2009, p. 6). These factors include “increasing 
consumption levels, over-fishing and unsustainable aquaculture, as well as the contribution of 
pollution and climate change” (UNEP, 2009, p. 6). 
The estimates provided from the report stated that “38% of fish production (capture and 
aquaculture combined) enters international markets” (UNEP, 2009, p. 15). According to 
FAO (2007b), fish captures in the wild are estimated to be 95 million tonnes a year where 9.2 
million tonnes are captured by inland fisheries and 85.8 million tonnes are captured by marine 
fisheries. It is further stated that fish captures in the wild has reached a new record. Moreover, 
including the marine and inland capture fisheries and fish farming, the global fisheries 
production has reached a total of 141.6 million tonnes annually (FAO, 2007b). From this 
total, 75% or 105.6 million tonnes are produced for direct human consumption, while the rest 
is used for non-food products, e.g. the manufacture of fishmeal and fish oil, culture, bait, 
pharmaceutical uses, direct feeding in aquaculture, and fur animals (FAO, 2007b, 2010a; 
UNEP, 2009, p. 17). The most recent report from FAO shows that the global fisheries 
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production has increased to 144.8 million tonnes annually in 2009 and it is expected to 
increase to around 151.7 million tonnes by the end of 2011 (FAO, 2011b). Approximately 
81% (118 million tonnes) of the total world fish production was used for human consumption 
in 2009, whereas the rest of the total production (26.8 million tonnes) was used for non-food 
products (FAO, 2011b). Thus, there has been a significant increase in the percentage of the 
total production used for direct human consumption. 
In the 1970s the world per capita consumption of fish and fishery products increased from 
11.5kg to 14.8kg in the 1990s, which is considered a steady growth (UNEP, 2009, p. 15). 
According to FAO (2007a), the global per capita fish consumption has continued to grow over 
the years. In 2001-2003 the per capita of fish consumption grew to an average of 16.4kg 
(FAO, 2007a, p. 42).  Furthermore, it has increased to 17.4kg in 2007 and 17.8kg in 2011 
(FAO, 2007a; FAO, 2011). However, FAO (2007a) stated that the high growth of the per 
capita consumption of fish at the international level is “strongly influenced by China’s 
dominance” (p. 42). Given their population of approximately 1.3 billion people in 2007 
(UNEP, 2009, p. 15), China’s domestic consumption of fish and fishery products per capita 
went from less than 5kg in the 1970s to a per capita consumption of 26kg in 2007 (FAO, 
2007a, p. 42). Thus, the Chinese population has contributed considerable to the high growth 
in the global per capita fish consumption (FAO, 2007a). According to UNEP (2009), it is 
rather logical that China’s domestic consumption of fish and fishery products per capita has 
risen so rapidly in a short period of time, since fish is an important protein source for people 
living in the Asian countries and it accounts for 54 per cent of their total amount of protein 
intake. 
FAO (2007a) argues that there are some large differences across regions when it comes to fish 
consumption per capita (p. 43). South America and Africa have consumption levels which are 
considered below-average or stable. However, the major concerns are in the region of Africa 
where there are low absolute levels of consumption and at the same time having a strong 
growth in the population (FAO, 2007a, p. 43). Europe is one of the regions that are facing a 
situation of having high consumption levels while their fish stocks are rapidly decreasing. 
Thus, they are “looking towards regions like Africa, where consumption and production are 
currently low, to source their fish” (UNEP, 2009, p. 17). UNEP (2009) further argues that 
“this adds dangerously to the increased pressure caused by local population growth” (p. 17). 
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The majority of the fish and fishery products that come from aquaculture are often intended 
for human consumption (FAO, 2010a). Over the past four decades, there has been rapidly 
increasing growth in the international production of fish that comes from aquaculture (Huang, 
Xu, & Qiao, 2007). In 2008, as much as 45.7% of the world’s food fish production destined 
for direct human consumption was contributed by aquaculture alone (FAO, 2010a), and the 
growth in aquaculture is expected to increase further more over the years (Huang, et al., 
2007). Thus, aquaculture is considered to grow faster than other food producing sectors in the 
world, i.e. when it comes to the quantity produced from aquaculture and its relatively 
contribution to the world fish supply (UNEP, 2009, p. 17). According to Huang et al. (2007), 
the contribution from aquaculture is expected to increase to 50% by 2015. This means that the 
quantity of the world’s food fish supply contributed by aquaculture will be equal to the 
world’s supply of food fish that comes from capture fisheries.  The amount of fish supplied 
through aquaculture for direct human consumption would be equal to the supply of the 
world’s food fish production that comes from capture fisheries. According to UNEP (2009), 
aquaculture only supplied 9% of the fish that was produced for direct human consumption in 
1980. However, in the recent years, these numbers have changed significantly as aquaculture 
accounted for approximately 38% of the total fish production and around 47% of the fish 
consumed by humans in 2009 (FAO, 2011b). 
As the food fish production provided by aquaculture in 2008 has reached 52.5 million tonnes 
worldwide, aquaculture currently remains one of the most important production sectors that 
supply high-protein food (FAO, 2010a). In comparison to the production from aquaculture in 
2008, the annually production from aquaculture in 1950 only accounted for 1 million ton 
(FAO, 2010a). Thus, FAO (2010a) reported that the growth of world aquaculture production 
from 1950 to 2008 was tremendous as it increased with “three times the rate of the world 
meat production […] in the same period” (FAO, 2010a, p. 18). On the other hand, there has 
not been any significant growth in the world production of capture fisheries since the 1980s 
(FAO, 2010a). According to FAO (2010a), “in the period 1970-2008, the production of food 
fish from aquaculture increased at an average annual rate of 8.3 percent, while the world 
population grew at an average of 1.6 percent per year” (p. 18). This means that the food fish 
produced from aquaculture for human consumption increased by ten times in the period 
between 1970 and 2008, i.e. 0.7kg in 1970 to 7.8kg in 2008 (FAO, 2010a). According to 
UNEP (2009), “the increasing fish consumption in a context of over exploitation and 
dwindling fish stocks has encouraged the rise in aquaculture” (p. 17).  
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According to UNEP (2011), there are two major issues regarding the total world fish supply 
from aquaculture; (1) the fish supply from aquaculture increases as the supply from capture 
fisheries decreases; and (2) the aquatic plants have contributed to the increase of aquaculture 
supply (p. 90). According to an impact assessment from the European Commission (European 
Commission, 2011a), “aquaculture has negative environmental sustainability impacts related 
to water pollution by farms, use of antibiotics, the problem of escapees (farmed animals, 
usually genetically modified, escape from farms and mix and breed with wild stocks) and the 
fact that feeding the farmed (mostly carnivorous) species requires catching wild fish” 
(European Commission, 2011a, p. 16). 
According to UNEP (2009), one of the main issues that concerns the fishing industry 
internationally is “the condition of stocks of fish species in high seas areas, outside national 
jurisdictions” (p. 14), i.e. outside the economic exclusive zone (EEZ). The report from UNEP 
(2009) further stated that over half of straddling stocks and migratory species (e.g. sharks) are 
overexploited or depleted (p. 14). In this context, straddling stocks means those fish species 
which “migrate between, or occur in both, the economic exclusive zone (EEZ) of one or more 
States and the high seas” (UNEP, 2009, p. 14), e.g. Pollock.  
According to the European Commission (2011a), fish processing was mostly performed 
locally after the catch has been landed. This is called the primary processing. However, in 
modern times, fish are processed with the usage of imported raw materials. This is called the 
secondary processing, which had made aquaculture increasingly more important. The 
secondary processing activities have created “new opportunities in areas where the catching 
sector and primary processing are in decline” (European Commission, 2011a, p. 16). 
4.2 Employment in Small- and Large-Scale Fisheries 
According to the preliminary results provided by the joint activity of FAO and World Fish 
Center (2008), which was sponsored by the World Bank, employment in the fisheries sector 
accounted for approximately a total of 30 million people worldwide. This estimate included 
both fulltime and part-time fishers. Furthermore, this study showed that 90 % of the fishers 
employed worldwide in the fisheries sector are from developing countries (FAO & World 
Fish Center, 2008). Another estimate provided by the joint-effort of the World Bank, FAO 
and the WorldFish Center (2010) shows that there are overall 35 million fishers in the world 
that are working both fulltime and part-time. Small-scale fisheries account for 32 million 
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fishers, whereas the large-scale fisheries sector only represents 3 million fishers worldwide 
(World Bank, et al., 2010).  
As far as the global postharvest employment is concerned, the World Bank, FAO and the 
WorldFish Center (2010) estimated that the global postharvest sector supports around the total 
of 84 million people in addition to the global number of fishers. The postharvest activities 
include fish processing, marketing and distribution and other related and supporting activities 
(World Bank, et al., 2010). At a global level, the number of jobs in the postharvest sector in 
small-scale fisheries accounts for a total of 76 million jobs, while there are around 8 million 
jobs in the postharvest sector that are generated from large-scale fisheries (World Bank, et al., 
2010). These estimates are based on both developed and developing countries, and 
incorporate both fulltime and part-time workers. 
Thus, the total workforce at the global level is around 119 million, both fulltime and part-time 
workers (World Bank, et al., 2010). This means that “119 million people are directly 
dependent on capture fisheries for their livelihoods” (FAO, 2010a, p. 71). Furthermore, 90% 
of these people are working in the small-scale fisheries sector, and 97% of the total workforce 
is from developing countries (FAO, 2010a). Moreover, according to the World Bank, FAO 
and the WorldFish Center (2010), the total percentage of women working in the fisheries 
sector is about 47% worldwide. That is almost half of the total global workforce. FAO 
(2010a) argued that the total number of people employed as fishers and as workers in the 
post-harvest sector may be even higher than what has been estimated. It has been suggested 
by FAO that this number may have reached remarkably 170 million people in the whole 
fishery industry (World Bank, et al., 2010). This estimate incorporates both full and part time 
workers and additionally includes employment in aquaculture. Most of these may have been 
working as seasonal fishers, mostly in Africa and Asia. However, FAO (2010a) further argued 
that these people who are hired occasionally “are not recorded as “fishers” in official 
statistics” (p. 70). 
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4.3 International Trade 
According to Sharma (2008), very few small-scale fishers and fishworkers have benefited 
from the growing international trade in fish and fish products (p. 11). In fact, the development 
in small-scale fisheries has led to export-oriented fisheries (Sharma, 2008). This means that 
small-scale fisheries may have been pressured to export fish and fish products due to the 
growth of the international market. In addition, there is a lack of effective fisheries 
management and conservation measures that are planned or implemented in some countries. 
In this respect, Sharma (2008) argues that the combination of these elements may have led to 
overexploitation of marine resources. Furthermore, these factors may have negatively 
influenced the livelihoods of small-scale and artisanal fishers, fishworkers and the fishing 
communities as a whole (Sharma, 2008).  
The fishers’ and the fishworkers’ economic and social rights need to be secured. In order to 
achieve this, sustainable management of marine resources is essential and need to be ensured 
by all means necessary (Sharma, 2008). This may in turn serve as a countermeasure against 
those countries that are subject to export pressure from the international demand for fish and 
fish products. Moreover, Sharma suggests that the rules of trade need to be “structured so as 
to bring concrete benefits to fishing communities, through, for example, higher prices for fish, 
and greater employment opportunities, including in fish processing” (Sharma, 2008, p. 11). 
Additionally, Sharma (2008) proposes that the livelihood and nutritional rights of small-scale 
and artisanal fishing communities should not be affected by policies and practices that are 
related to promotion of international fish trade. This proposal may be consistent with the Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) Article 11.2.15. It states as follows: 
“States, aid agencies, multilateral development banks and other relevant international 
organizations should ensure that their policies and practices related to the promotion of 
international fish trade and export production do not result in environmental degradation or 
adversely impact the nutritional rights and needs of people for whom fish is critical to their 
health and well-being and for whom other comparable sources of food are not readily 
available or affordable” 
 (FAO, 2011a, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF), Article 11.2.15). 
It is further argued that negotiation of bilateral, multilateral and other trade agreements should 
also be exercised with caution (Sharma, 2008). This is to avoid any form of adverse impacts 
on the small-scale and artisanal fishing communities (Sharma, 2008). This is especially in 
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regard to the case of EU-Senegal fishery partnership agreements. Sharma (2008) suggests that 
there is a need to place much greater emphasis on removing obstacles to local, national and 
regional trade and markets. This is important for food security and to secure economic rights, 
especially to women in the fishing communities.  
4.4 Export Growth in Senegal 
FAO (2010a) argued that “small-scale fisheries contribute more than half of the world’s 
marine and inland fish catch” (p. 70). The majority of these fish are mainly used for direct 
human consumption (FAO, 2010a). The Senegalese fisheries sector’s increase in export 
growth is, according to the UNEP (2002), “largely linked to the trade mechanisms aimed at 
boosting exports in an adjustment context” (p. 5). It is argued that the Lomé Agreement, 
which was concluded in 1982, is one of these trade mechanisms. Furthermore, it is an 
agreement in which binds the ACP countries with the EU. The Lome Agreement was the core 
reason for why there was a custom duty exemption regime for fish and fish products that 
originated from the ACP countries and were exported to the EU (UNEP, 2002). Thus, the 
Lomé Agreement was responsible for the contribution of the expansion of the Senegalese 
piscatorial exports (UNEP, 2002). It is argued that the Senegalese products benefited from the 
customs duties exemption regime of the European market by becoming even more 
competitive (UNEP, 2002).  
In 2002, the exports of fish and fish products from the ACP countries to the European market 
had increased substantially. As a matter of fact, 80 % of the African exports of sea products 
are supplied to the European market (UNEP, 2002). Furthermore, around 66 % of the total 
export of Senegalese fish and fish products is supplied to Europe (UNEP, 2002). The 
Senegalese exported volumes of fish increased from roughly 90,000 tons in 1982 to as much 
as 125,000 tons in 1990 (UNEP, 2002). Thus, the volumes of fish exported by Senegal 
between 1982 and 1990 accounted for an increase of about 39 %. This increase in export from 
Senegal was mostly absorbed by the European market (UNEP, 2002). Although, Senegal has 
become export-oriented due to the contribution of the Lomé Agreement, UNEP claims that it 
did at the same time “created a dependency on the European market” (p. 6). 
Export of Senegalese piscatorial products in 1980 – 1989 (in tons) 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Volume 84,036 90,204 91,742 93,344 9,4102 95,449 93,975 110,808.6 111,125.5 118,326 
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Export of Senegalese piscatorial products in 1991 – 1999 (in tons) 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Volume 124,672.6 118,850.6 86,110.65 83,822.79 93,674 103,463 107,080 112,157 109,448 124,338 
 
Source: DOPM, “Résultats généraux de la pêche maritime Sénégalaise, année 1980 à 1998”, in 
UNEP (2002), “Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalization and Trade-related policies: a 
country study on the fisheries sector in Senegal”, New York and Geneva, United Nations 
Publication, pp. 5 & 18. 
According to UNEP (2002), the EU is the main importer of the Senegalese piscatorial 
products. The European market receives approximately two-thirds of total piscatorial exports 
each year under the fisheries access agreements with Senegal (UNEP, 2002). In 1999, the 
Senegalese total exports of piscatorial products accounted for 125,000 tons. From this 
estimate, Europe received about 79,000 tons (UNEP, 2002). This means that the EU received 
roughly 60 % of the total piscatorial products exported by Senegal alone, i.e. not including 
any other ACP countries (UNEP, 2002). According to UNEP (2002), the Senegalese exports 
of fresh fish products to the European market only increased from 9,415 tons to 9,938 tons in 
1993 to 1999 respectively. In the same period, the exports of frozen fish products from 
Senegal to the European market increased significantly. In 1993, the export of frozen fish 
products accounted for 21,000 tons, while in 1999 this number has increased to as much as 
58,000 tons (UNEP, 2002). Furthermore, in this period the number of companies in Senegal 
was doubled (UNEP, 2002).  
4.5 Employment in Small-Scale and Large-Scale fisheries in Developing 
Countries 
The total number of fishers employed in developing countries alone, both in small-scale and 
large-scale fisheries, accounts for around 26-29 million people (FAO & World Fish Center, 
2008). From the estimated total number of employment in developing countries, 1-2 million 
people were employed in the large-scale fisheries, whereas small-scale fisheries accounted for 
around 25-27 million people (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). From the latter estimate of 
small-scale fisheries, approximately 11-12 million people are employed as fishers in the 
marine fisheries, while more than half of the people (14-15 million) working as fishers that 
are employed in small-scale fisheries are working in inland water fisheries (FAO & World 
Fish Center, 2008). Thus, inland fisheries are in particular more important than marine 
fisheries in developing countries (FAO, 2010a; FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). 
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Furthermore, employment in large-scale fisheries is significantly lower than in small-scale 
fisheries.  
Based on its case studies, the FAO and the World Fish Center (2008) argued that fishing in 
the global context is unquestionably an important source for employment. However, related 
and supporting activities, such as in marketing and processing, may be an equally important 
source of employment - if not even more important than the actual fishing itself. According to 
FAO and the World Fish Center (2008), “for each person employed as a fisher, on an 
average, there are 2-3 people employed in post-harvest activities” (p. 24). In developing 
countries, the number of jobs generated in the fisheries processing and marketing sector 
accounts for around 68-70 million in small-scale fisheries (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). 
Thus, the total number of jobs generated in small-scale fisheries in developing countries is 
estimated to be about 93-97 million (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008), i.e. the total number 
of people working as fishers and those who work in the processing and marketing sector 
combined. However, this number is significant lower in large-scale fisheries as it only 
represents 6-8 million people (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). The combined total 
workforce in the fisheries sector in developing countries is around 99-105 million people 
(FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). Thus, this means that as much as around 99 to 105 million 
people are dependent of fisheries for their livelihoods in developing countries (FAO & World 
Fish Center, 2008). 
Considering that the fisheries sector not only generates employment in marketing, processing 
and fishing itself, it is worth mentioning that there are jobs being generated upstream on the 
supply chain as well (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). These jobs are often related to input 
supplies to the fisheries sector itself. However, the employment generated from these related 
and supporting activities is significantly smaller compared to the enormous workforce in the 
fisheries sector (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). These jobs include “boat building, engine 
and gear manufacturing and repairs, as well as providing various support services in 
harbours and at landing sites” (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008, p. 24). In the case of 
Senegal and Ghana, employment generated upstream accounts for 5-10% in addition to the 
total number of people employed in there fisheries sector (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). 
4.6 Employment in Senegal 
The fisheries sector in Senegal is indeed important as it does not only provide a considerably 
amount of fish to satisfy the population’s protein needs, but it also generates employment 
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opportunities and a source of income for the local population (UNEP, 2002). Thus, many 
people’s livelihoods depend on fishing due to its importance in the country. It is stated by 
Iossa et al (2009) that on the average of “one in six of the active population works in the 
fishing industry” (p. 2). More than 600,000 direct and indirect jobs are created through the 
fisheries sector in Senegal, where it is estimated that 7.1% of the total population and 17% of 
the working population are directly employed in the sector (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 2). 
According to UNEP (2002), small-scale fishing accounts for 90% of the 100,000 direct jobs 
generated through the fisheries sector in Senegal. However, the most recent country study 
from FAO and the World Fish Center (2008) shows that the total employment in small-scale 
fisheries in Senegal has reached 117,356 people (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). Based on 
the total number of people employed in the small-scale fisheries, 42,107 of the fishermen are 
employed in the marine fisheries, while fishermen employed in inland fisheries account for 
around 39,962 people (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). However, whether these estimates 
include only fulltime or both fulltime and part-time workers remain unclear at this point. 
Furthermore, the number of other jobs, such as in marketing and processing, that are 
generated from small-scale fisheries in Senegal accounts for around 35,287 people (FAO & 
World Fish Center, 2008). From this total, 33,561 and 1,726 people are employed in marine 
fisheries and inland fisheries respectively (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). According to 
FAO and the World Fish Center (2008), the latter estimates mostly include employment in the 
marketing and processing sectors, and both fulltime and part-time workers. In Senegal, 
employment in large-scale fisheries represents about 9,828 people (FAO & World Fish 
Center, 2008). Thus, the preliminary results from FAO and the World Fish Center (2008) 
show that the total amount of people employed in the fishery sector in Senegal is estimated to 
be around 127,184 people. 
Moreover, Iossa et al. (2008) claim that the number of women working in the fishing sector in 
Senegal is estimated to be around two thirds of the total people employed in the sector. These 
women work in areas such as processing, marketing and sales of the catch. However, there are 
very few studies that could confirm these estimates. According to FAO (2010a), there are 
around 56 million women working in fisheries in developing countries. In Senegal, 32,456 
people working in marine fisheries are women, while there are about 1,622 women working 
in inland fisheries (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). Thus, the total amount of women 
working in small-scale fisheries has reached to about 34,078 people in both marine and inland 
fisheries combined (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). The number of women working in 
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large-scale fisheries is considerably lower than small-scale fisheries, as employment in large-
scale fisheries only represents 4,861 people. The total number of men working in small-scale 
fisheries in Senegal is estimated to be around 83,270, while there are only 4,967 men 
employed in the large-scale fisheries (FAO & World Fish Center, 2008). Thus, in accordance 
to these estimates, the number of women that works in the fisheries sector in Senegal is 
roughly around one third of the total amount of people employed in the sector. However, 
these estimates and assumptions may be subject to change further down the line as this study 
conducted by FAO and the World Fish Center is still in progress. The fisheries sector is no 
doubt important for the Senegalese national economy and the society as a whole, since it 
plays a crucial role to secure food for the majority of the population and serves as a solution 
to unemployment in the country (Iossa, et al., 2008; UNEP, 2002). 
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5.0 Bycatch and Discards 
5.1 Definition of Bycatch and Discards 
Bycatch and discards may have different meanings in a different context, and they may be 
interpreted differently in different parts of the world (Clucas, 1997). Particularly the term 
bycatch has caused a lot of confusion since it is not available in many published literatures 
(Alverson, Freeberg, Murawski, & Pope, 1994). Therefore, it is essential to clarify these terms 
before proceeding ahead. 
In the context of fisheries, the term “discarded catch”, or in short “discards”, means the 
portion of the fish catch that is thrown away or released back to the sea for whatever reasons 
(e.g. economic, legal, or personal reasons) (Alverson, et al., 1994; Clucas, 1997), i.e. after the 
catch has been “taken aboard the fishing vessel or slipped from the net in the water” (FAO, 
2010a, p. 84). It is further necessary to clarify and specify that the discarded portion of the 
catch is not retained in any form or shape. As most fishing gears are not guaranteed to catch 
whatever targeted fish species, non-fish species or sizes of fish that are desired by fishers, a 
large portion of the catch will be discarded, whether the catch is still alive or dead (FAO, 
2010c). However, the reasons are many for why discards occur. It could be due to the lack of 
value in the markets, the lack of space onboard or due to the regulations in a given country’s 
waters. The several of reasons for why discards occur will be introduced in more detail later 
in this chapter. 
While it is relatively easier to understand the term discards, the term bycatch appears to be 
more complex and has caused the most confusion to both managers and scientists as it is 
difficult to characterize even in the context of fisheries. In fact, the term is defined differently 
depending on the nation, region and fishery. According to Alverson et al. (1994), the term 
bycatch may be defined in at least three different ways. Firstly, bycatch, which is also called 
“by-product”, is a term that is used to differentiate catches of target species from non-target 
species which are retained and sold (Alverson, et al., 1994). Secondly, the term could be used 
to refer to species, sizes or sexes of fish that are discarded for whatever reasons (e.g. result of 
economic, legal or personal considerations) (Alverson, et al., 1994). Finally, the term may be 
used to describe all non-targeted species that are retained and sold, in addition to the 
discarded catches (Alverson, et al., 1994). According to Alverson et al. (1994), the second 
definition of bycatch is used by scientists in the Northeast and Western pacific, whereas other 
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scientists in other parts of the world use the third definition. The word ‘bycatch’ is quite often 
used interchangeably with ‘dead discards’ (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002).  
In order to clear up the confusion of the many variations of how bycatch is defined in the 
world, FAO (2010c) has in their search for a standard international definition developed one 
of their own definition of bycatch. Thus, bycatch may be generally defined as follows; “Catch 
that a fisher did not intend to catch, did not want to catch, did not choose to use, or which 
should not be caught for whatever reason” (FAO, 2010c, p. 12). However, the other different 
variations of the definition are still viable as they are still being in use for some scientists and 
managers in certain parts of the world, i.e. it all depends on the different jurisdictions. 
In order to simplify the terminologies even further, Alverson, Freeberg and Murawski (1994) 
defines discarded catch as “the portion of the catch returned to the sea as a result of 
economic, legal, or personal considerations” (Alverson, et al., 1994, pp. Operational 
Definitions section, para. 4). Bycatch is defined as the discarded catch plus incidental catch. 
The incidental catch is the portion of the non-targeted catch in which is retained and landed 
(i.e. with the targeted catch). Thus, this also means that the incidental catch is unintentional. 
As Alverson, et al. (1994) suggested, one may list the terminologies as follows: 
Terminology Description: 
Discarded Catch The portion of the catch that is returned to 
the sea due to economic, legal or personal 
considerations. 
Incidental Catch The portion of the catch of non-targeted 
species which is caught unintentionally, but 
is retained and landed. 
Bycatch Discarded Catch + Incidental Catch 
(Source: Alverson, D. L., Freeberg, M. H., Murawski, S. A., & Pope, J. G. (1994). A global assessment of 
fisheries bycatch and discards. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. No. 339. Rome, FAO, Online at: 
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/003/T4890E/T4890E00.HTM) 
5.2 The Reasons for Discard 
People who work in the fishery sector are just like any other people who work in other types 
of occupations; they would all want to make a living. It may be reasonable to believe that any 
individual or groups of people would want to maximize their earnings while at the same time 
minimizing their costs. As far as the thematic of discards is concerned, there will be a lot of 
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decisions to be made, e.g. decisions related to whether to land or not to land a catch, or to put 
it into other words: “to discard or not to discard?” Horsten and Kirkegaard (2002) stated that 
there are many fisheries and management arrangements or scenarios which may have the 
potential to generate bycatch and discards significantly. Whether a fishery would generate 
high or low bycatch and discards levels depends on the fishing gears and how selective they 
are (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). Thus, this means that some fishing gears may discriminate 
the catch (i.e. high selectivity) to some extent while others may be indiscriminate (i.e. low 
selectivity). However, fishing gears alone are not the cause of high levels of discards and 
bycatch. The discard rates may also be dependent on several other factors, such as the place 
and time, the skill of the fishermen and conditions of the weather (Alverson, et al., 1994; 
Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). While the reasons for why incidental catches are kept is easy to 
understand, the reasons for why some portions of the bycatch is discarded may be relatively 
unclear. Clucas (1997) proposes several reasons for why some of caught fish are not landed 
and instead discarded or wasted at sea. This is shown in the table below. 
# Discard Reason: Description: 
1 Fish of wrong species Not of the target species for the particular 
operator. 
2 Fish are of the wrong size Command too low a price on the market to be 
worth landing or outside the limits imposed 
by management for capture or landing of that 
particular species. 
3 Fish are of the wrong sex Usually where gender is important from the 
processing and marketing point of view. 
4 Fish are damaged Caused by gear or predation in nets or mis-
handling etc. 
5 Fish are incompatible with rest of catch Slime or abrasion could cause damage to 
target species. 
6 Fish are poisonous Or otherwise considered inedible. 
7 Fish spoil rapidly Causing problems with the rest of the catch. 
8 Lack of space on board Where fishing operations are successful and 
target species take precedence over lower 
value or non-target species. 
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9 High Grading Certain attributes of a fish make it more 
marketable and therefore more valuable than 
another and the less valuable is discarded – 
this is often related to size. 
10 Quotas reached This may involve discarding of small 
specimens of the target of the target species 
to make way for more valuable specimens of 
the same species for instance – which is often 
a reason given for high grading. 
11 Prohibited Species Where quotas are species-based fish may be 
discarded from one vessel although another 
vessel with a quota related to the errant 
species may have been able to land that same 
fish legally. 
12 Prohibited Season Where time bound constraints are made on 
catching particular species, specimens may 
be discarded if caught in the wrong season. 
13 Prohibited Gear A quota may be given for capture of a 
particular species by a particular type of 
gear – if the wrong gear catches the wrong 
fish then fish may be discarded. 
14 Prohibited fishing grounds Fishing ground may be closed for capture of 
one species but open for others – if the wrong 
type is caught it can be discarded. 
(Source: Clucas, I., 1997, “A study of the options for utilization of bycatch and discards from marine capture 
fisheries”. FAO Fisheries Circular, No. 928, Rome, FAO, Online at: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/W6602E/w6602E04.htm)
2
 
According to Hall, Alverson and Metuzals (2000), the majority of the discarded fish may have 
been already dead. While most of the remaining discards of the unwanted caught fish, in 
which are still alive, may have a very low survival rate after they have been released back into 
the sea. There is no doubt that the outcome of bycatch may possibly be either life or death, i.e. 
the fish caught could either survive or die under the capturing process. Of course, this may not 
                                                          
2
 The list over reasons for discard was not originally a table. It has been remade for viewing purposes. However, 
the content is in its original form. 
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necessarily mean that such assumptions would only concern bycatch alone, but it could be 
applied to any other regular catches for that matter – even the catch of targeted fish species. 
According to Breen and Cook (2002), fishing mortality could be divided into three categories; 
1) landings; 2) discard mortality; and 3) escape mortality. If the captured fish has a high 
commercial value, the chances of it being kept are high. Thus, bycatch of certain fish species 
may lead to landings given that they hold any values.  
Sometimes when fish are caught by certain gear types, they may, as a result of the capturing 
process, either survive or die. If the caught fish does not hold any commercial value, i.e. they 
are non-targeted species or non-targeted animals, the chances of them being discarded are 
high regardless of their condition of being either dead or alive (Breen & Cook, 2002). Thus, 
one of the causes of death could perhaps be due to the fishing gear currently in use, in which 
could temporally or permanently damage different kinds of fish species or other animals 
caught in the gear (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). Thus, whether the catch would survive or 
die could be dependent on the fishing gears (Hall, et al., 2000). In other words, the rate of 
discard mortality may depend on the type of gear being used under the capturing process. 
However, due to its nature, it proves to be difficult to assess and/or to observe whether the 
fish would die when coming in contact with the fishing gear or if they would survive the 
encounters (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002).  
As far as escape mortality is concerned, Breen and Cook (2002) argues that traditional stock 
assessments have for too long assumed that all fish species will survive a capture process with 
certain gear types
3
. While there are sometimes the case that certain fish species may survive 
after they have escaped from the given fishing gear (i.e. escape survival), one cannot ignore 
the fact that some may die after the escape (i.e. escape mortality). The escape survival or 
escape mortality of certain fish species may depend on several factors, such as the “size, age 
and physical condition of the fish” (Breen & Cook, 2002, p. 1). Moreover, it may also depend 
on how the fish is caught, i.e. the type of fishing gear being used. This is referred to the table, 
which was introduced earlier in this section. 
5.3 The Problem of Bycatch and Discards 
Why is bycatch a problem? According to Horsten and Kirkegaard (2002), “bycatch is not only 
a question of economy but just as important are the question of sustainability and the ethnical 
acceptance” (p. 2). However, some bycatch may be sustainable, but it does not necessarily 
                                                          
3
 This is especially the case when it comes to the fishing gear called “towed fishing gear” (Breen & Cook, 2002). 
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mean that it is accepted by the general public. Bycatch simply exist due to the fishing 
operators inability to select what to be harvest from the sea (Hall, et al., 2000). As already 
introduced, bycatch may either be discarded or retained and landed (i.e. incidental catch). 
Thus, this also means that not all bycatch is undesirable (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). What 
is not undesirable from the catch is retained and sold (i.e. incidental catch), while the 
undesirable catch is discarded back to the sea. In some cases, incidental catches may even 
make the trip to the sea worthwhile for the fishermen, i.e. given that the catch holds 
commercial value and that profit covers costs (Clucas & Teutsher, 1999, in Horsten & 
Kirkegaard, 2002, p. 4).  
Although, many researchers and practitioners have put a lot of efforts to reduce discards for 
nearly three decades, e.g. through conducting studies and developing technologies 
respectively, the concerns regarding the consequences of bycatch and discards still remains. 
The consequences of bycatch and discards include capturing and killing of threatened and 
endangered species as well as “discarding huge quantities of juveniles of economically 
valuable fish species” (FAO, 2010a, p. 84). In general, practices of discards are considered to 
generate waste due to its nature of ‘dumping’ unwanted catches into the sea. Thus, the 
exploitation of fishery resources in such a way may prove to be poor and damaging. 
Bycatch and discards are undoubtedly an issue of great significance that is still present even to 
this day, and it needs to be addressed as quickly as possible to avoid more damage to the sea 
and various fish species. As a matter of fact, bycatch may contribute to exacerbate the global 
issue of overfishing and threatens effective management of fisheries around the world (FAO, 
2010c). According to FAO (2010c), “bycatch is of concern when it comprises a significant 
proportion of the capture in a specific fishery, or when, across all fisheries, it comprises a 
large proportion of the catch in a fishery” (p. 12). Horsten and Kirkegaard (2002) stated that 
discards seem to be more common in fisheries that catch fish for the purpose of human 
consumption rather than those which provide for the purpose of producing fishmeal or fishoil. 
This is because fish caught for fishmeal and fishoil production seems to be less selective when 
it comes to product quality, which results in a higher proportion of the catch being retained 
(Gislason, 1994, in Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). For example, the animals that eat the 
fishmeal are indifferent to the quality of the fish caught. Therefore, there are no reasons to 
discard the fish caught for the purpose of producing fishmeal or fishoil. However, when the 
fish caught is intended for human consumption, there are some factors that the fishers have to 
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consider in order to sell their catch. One of these is product quality. If the fish does not hold 
the standard or if it is by any means damaged, then it would most likely be discarded. 
The problem of discards has multiple related issues. Kelleher (2005) suggests that such issues 
may include: 
 the moral problem of responsible stewardship of marine resources;  
 designing a management regime that limits or prevents discarding while meeting 
multiple social, economic and biological objectives;  
 the practical problem of enforcing regulation designed to prevent or minimize 
discards, particularly as discards occur at sea where enforcements is most difficult; 
 the technical problems of gear selectivity and utilization of species with a low market 
demand through transformation or adding value; and 
 the economic problems posed by efforts to reduce bycatch, increase landing of bycatch 
or increase utilization of bycatch. 
Source: Kelleher, K. (2005), “Discards in the World’s Marine Fisheries: An 
Update,” FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 470. Rome, FAO, p. xvii. 
Kelleher (2005) identifies four related issues derived from the ‘discard problem’: 1) Policy 
and ethical issues; 2) Fisheries management issues; 3) Ecological issues; and 4) Technical and 
economic issues (Kelleher, 2005). First, discards appear to be often seen as the reverse of 
responsible stewardship, a waste of natural resources and an unsustainable way to utilize 
marine resources (Kelleher, 2005). The second issue identifies the difficulties in fisheries 
management. How can fisheries prevent discards or limit the potential discarded catch while 
at the same time implement a management regime in which focuses on the social, economic 
and biological objectives? (Kelleher, 2005, p. 53). The third issue recognizes the potential 
negative impact discards may have on the marine ecology. The fourth issue deals with the 
technical and the economic problems. Technical problems are problems related to gear 
selectivity while the economic problems are related to bycatch reduction while at the same 
time increase the utilization of bycatch by increasing the bycatch landings (Kelleher, 2005). 
The following sections will examine these topics in a more detailed level. 
5.3.1 Policy and Ethical Issues 
It is claimed by Kelleher (2005) that there are a number of societies and religions (e.g. in 
Islam and Buddhism) that follow a general moral principle when the utilization of natural 
resources is concerned. Basically, this principle conveys a message to all human beings that 
38 | P a g e  
 
they should to the best of their ability make efforts to seek the best possible way to utilize 
natural resources, and to ensure that the minimization of waste should be seen as a moral 
obligation (Kelleher, 2005). In other words, all individuals and groups of people should take 
responsibility for how they treat the environment, i.e. the state of nature. In the concept of 
stewardship, it is believed and perhaps required that natural resources should be protected 
against harm and the utilization should be with caution. However, what is done in practice 
may prove otherwise. 
In some cultures, it seems to be morally wrong to discard or waste natural resources 
(Kelleher, 2005). Dumping non-targeted fish or other marine animal species back into the sea 
is, therefore, seen as a wrongful act. As Horsten and Kirkegaard (2002) have stated it; “there 
is a growing perception that discarded portions of fishery catches are a wasteful use of 
natural resources” (p. 3). The fact that the fish caught would not be utilized for the purpose 
of food production (i.e. for human consumption), but rather thrown back (i.e. discarded) into 
the sea is one of the reasons why it may be unacceptable among the general public. The 
question of wastage could also be seen from the economic point of view. It may be considered 
a waste if a fishery has retained or discarded non-targeted catches, and by this very act may 
have prevented other fisheries to generate greater value to society. According to Horsten and 
Kirkegaard (2002), it is important to stress that the majority of the discarded catch is non-
targeted species without any or little economic value. Thus, this means that there is no market 
for such catches. As previously introduced, there are many reasons for why fishing operators 
(i.e. fishermen) would want to discard a catch. But the most common reason could be that 
operators tend to replace less valuable catches with more valuable catches – which is 
reasonable in their point of view considering their goal is to maximize the profits. In this case, 
Horsten and Kirkegaard (2002) argue that then “the concern is not about economic waste, but 
about conservation of potentially sensitive individuals or assemblages” (p. 3). In this regard, 
the general public’s awareness on the issue at hand is widespread. The concern lies at the 
bycatch of sensitive or endangered species. However, even though bycatch of endangered 
species may to some degrees contribute to threaten the certain fish stocks, the actual amount 
of these species caught is insignificant (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002).  
In a response to such problems, the CCRF have several occasions stressed the importance and 
the need to reduce discards (Kelleher, 2005). As a way to solve bycatch and discard problems, 
many major fishing nations prohibit discards, i.e. they enforce a so-called ‘no-discard’ policy 
(Kelleher, 2005). Such policy is enforced by major fishing nations such as in Norway, 
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Namibia and Iceland. By enforcing a ‘no-discard’ policy, the main focus of fisheries 
management measures has shifted “from landings to catches and from fish production to fish 
mortality” (Kelleher, 2005, p. xviii). In the long term, an implemented ‘no discards’ approach 
may be regarded as a norm in certain jurisdictions. Thus, discards of catches may no longer be 
tolerated or accepted in a given fishing area, and; therefore, anyone responsible of discarding 
practices needs to adequately justify their acts (Kelleher, 2005). 
Technology improvements and other means to reduce bycatch are mandatory in certain 
countries (Kelleher, 2005). This could be found in fisheries areas in Australia, Europe and 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organizations (NAFO). The United Nations stressed the 
importance of “the need to monitor and reduce discards and unwanted bycatch, in order to 
assess the impact of discards on marine resources and promote technologies and other means 
of reducing them” (Kelleher, 2005, p. xv). 
In general, discards may tend to be closely related to wasteful acts. Such assumptions may 
sometimes be correct, i.e. if it is the case that the fishing activity itself is responsible for the 
deaths of the discards or if the discards are already dead before the given fishing process has 
even started. However, one may also argue that not all discards die. Some discards may have 
a chance of survival. Kelleher (2005) distinguishes between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ discards. Good 
discards are those acts in which correspond with specific guidelines and criteria, which again 
may be considered ‘responsible’ discarding. Most importantly, the discarded or the released 
live animal species have to actually survive the discarding process in order for it to be 
regarded as a ‘good’ discard. Thus, ‘good discards’ are discards of species that have a high 
probability of survival (e.g. crabs or starfish), or in some cases even discards of egg-bearing 
females (e.g. lobsters). On the other hand, ‘bad discards’ are discards of dead animal species 
that may have had potential commercial values if they were still alive (Kelleher, 2005). This 
may include endangered species both with and without commercial values and juveniles of 
commercial species (Kelleher, 2005). In short, ‘bad discards’ are bad fishing practices. 
In theory, this differentiation of discard practices may appear to be very simple. However, the 
same could not be said in practice. Kelleher (2005) believes that the assessment of discard 
practices in terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ practices may be difficult  in practice due to its impact 
on biodiversity and ecosystem. Thus, it is suggested that the development of guidelines on 
how to promote best practices (i.e. based on responsibility and ethics) should be directed 
towards the bycatch management rather than the discard practices themselves (Kelleher, 
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2005). These guidelines may be different between different countries, region or fisheries, and 
the discard practices could potentially be dependent on several factors. It could be, for 
instance, differences in national discard policies and/or objectives, fishery economics, markets 
and food preferences (Kelleher, 2005, p. 56). All of these factors may influence the discard 
practices either directly or indirectly. 
In some circumstances, one may have to assume that discards of catches may sometimes be 
difficult to avoid. Sometimes it may be completely unavoidable. Thus, there is a need to find 
an acceptable level of discards (Kelleher, 2005). In theory, it may seem reasonable to find an 
acceptable level of discards in order to limit and/or reduce the overall discard (Kelleher, 
2005). However, bearing in mind that most the interest groups would naturally tend to argue 
and negotiate in their own favor, the question of sustainability may not be considered under 
these deliberations in practice. 
5.3.2 Fisheries Management Issues 
As far as the ‘discard problem’ is concerned, the aim for any given fishery manager could be 
to design a management regime in which limits discards while at the same time meet the 
“social, economic and biological objectives” (Hall, et al., 2000; Kelleher, 2005, p. 59). In 
order to succeed in designing such management regime and effectively doing so, Kelleher 
(2005) suggests that there is a need to assess how discards may impact the biological, 
ecological and the economic factors. Implementing such assessments may yet to prove to be a 
tremendous challenge. In fact, it may be even more difficult to assess the impact of bycatch 
and discards than to assess the quantity of the discards (i.e. the level of discards) (Kelleher, 
2005). However, the assessment of the latter is still a struggling matter even to this very day. 
Thus, little is known of how bycatch may impact the populations of interests or the current 
achievable level of bycatch and discard reduction is even enough to ensure the populations 
that are in a critical state by today’s technological advancements (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 
2002). As far as bycatch is concerned, the main issue is that the mortality of caught fish is not 
recorded. Consequently, scientific advice to manage fisheries may be one that underestimates 
the current stock size and its catch potential (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). Therefore, the 
lack of data may be one of the main concerns when it comes to the issues of bycatch and 
discards. Moreover, bycatch may in some circumstances perceived “as though it were 
biologically different from catch” (Wallace, 1996, p. 79), i.e. the direct or regular catch of 
targeted commercial species. Thus, this means that problems related to bycatch should not be 
treated any different from those emerging from direct catch (i.e. regular catch of targeted 
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species), and the methods to manage bycatch should be the same as for direct catch (Wallace, 
1996).  
There are several management frameworks or approaches to bycatch and discards. One of 
these is related to the so-called “no-discard” policy. But what is actually meant by a ‘no-
discard’ policy? The policy of ‘no discards’ means that fishing operators are not allowed to 
discard anything from the catch itself. Moreover, it is an obligation to land all bycatch (i.e. 
catches of non-target species that are not wanted or intended). According to Kelleher (2005), 
a no-discard policy is regarded as the best practice in the area concerned. The most important 
leading countries in fisheries management tend to adopt the no-discard policy. Some countries 
choose to follow such policy while others may even take it to the next level by prohibiting 
discards through law and regulations (Kelleher, 2005). Norway is one of the countries which 
may have adopted a ‘no-discard’ policy and made it into law. Thus, it means that it is illegal 
to discard anything caught at sea. However, the extent to which the law and regulations may 
be enforced depends on the social, economic and biological factors. For instance, if such law 
and regulations may have prevented fisheries from maintaining their own economic 
performance or competitiveness with other corporations, then some exceptions to the 
prohibition of discards must be brought to light (Kelleher, 2005). Thus, the enforcement of 
such law and regulations must be in several degrees depending on the circumstances. 
Applying bans of discard should be fair, and it should also consider all the interest groups. 
That is probably why there is a wide support for this policy among fishers (Kelleher, 2005). 
In the discussion of ‘no-discard’ policies, a question may arise as of whether or not a ‘no 
discard’ policy would actually work in practice. According to Hall, Alverson and Metuzals 
(2000), it may be possible to avoid discards by fishing selectively. This means that by 
avoiding fishing activities in certain periods, areas or times of the day, fishers may also avoid 
unanticipated catches, i.e. by-catches, in which may lead to discards (Hall, et al., 2000, p. 
207). Technological developments and advancements within the area of bycatch and discards 
may also serve as an essential contribution to reaching that objective (i.e. the goal of no-
discards). However, the success would not be in reach without the data collection of bycatch 
and discards. The collection of data itself could be done in two separate ways, either by the 
fishermen themselves or by hiring ‘observers’ to do the job (Hall, et al., 2000). The former 
may be too dependent on the efforts and contributions made by the fishers while the latter 
approach seems to be very costly. Regardless of the costs that may follow, having observers 
onboard fishing vessels may come with benefits. Some immediate benefits may involve better 
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monitoring and assessments of the commercial fishing operations due to the fact that these 
observers are trained agents (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). This should be considered, if 
extensive coverage of the fishing activity is required. However, Hall, Alverson and Metuzals 
(2000) suggests that it may also involve long-term benefits: “(a) encourage research on by-
catch reduction gear and techniques with a clear economic disincentive, which is to fill the 
boat with low-value fish; (b) encourage behavioural changes in fishers with regard to 
avoiding areas and seasons of high by-catches; (c) help reduce the waste of life and protein 
caused by the fishery, by forcing the utilization of what was already harvested” (p. 207). Due 
to the high costs, some observer programs may be unable to go the extra mile to cover the 
fishing activities entirely (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). This is where the cost constraints 
may become a problem for some fisheries. Apart from the high costs, a problem may arise 
from utilizing the already harvested catch (i.e. (c)). That is to nourish or establish markets for 
undersized fish, egg-bearing fish, juveniles etc. (Hall, et al., 2000), which a course of 
development that needs to be avoided. Thus, there is a clear contradiction to the immediate 
problem and the solution to it, which may have the potential to carry the risk of new 
problems. Furthermore, it is believed that seeking the level of bycatch may not be sufficient to 
answer the question of how bycatch may impact on the fish stocks, the ecosystem or the 
fisheries (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). In other words, it is not possible to measure the 
impact of bycatch based on the level of bycatch. For instance, the effects of bycatch could be 
smaller in fisheries with high bycatch rates than those with low bycatch rates (Horsten & 
Kirkegaard, 2002). Other measures need to be implemented, such as to “compare the level of 
bycatch of different areas and historical periods and analyse the result” (Horsten & 
Kirkegaard, 2002, p. 4).  
According to Kelleher (2005), the allowable landings of undersized fish are limited in Iceland. 
Landing of undersized fish will result in a deduction from the fisher’s assigned quotas. Since 
the Icelandic fishers are not allowed to land more than a certain quantity of undersized fish, 
and in doing so may result in less fish to catch, the Icelandic fishers are presented with the 
opportunity to trade their quotas freely (Kelleher, 2005). Thus, unanticipated landings, such as 
landings of undersized fish, may be covered through the procurement of additional quotas. 
Such quota system could also be found in Norway. 
According to FAO (2010b), reports of discards are often not required nor included by most 
fishery management systems (p. 2). Thus, incomplete information may have caused 
difficulties in quantifying the total amount of global bycatch and discards (FAO, 2010a). 
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However, a global assessment of fisheries discards has been conducted in 1994. From this 
assessment, the results of discarded fishes were estimated to be between 17.9 million tons and 
39.5 million tons each year, and the average estimation of discarded catch was 27 million tons 
annually (Alverson, et al., 1994). A more recent assessment of the global fisheries discards 
has also been conducted in 2005. With a global weighted discard rate of 8%
4
, the results from 
this assessment are estimated to be 7.3 million tons annually (Kelleher, 2005). However, due 
to the lack of accurate information and data, these estimates display only fractions of the total 
amount of the global discards. Examples of fish producing countries that are not represented 
in the latter estimation include “the Democratic Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea (no 
discard information), the Russian Federation, New Zealand and the Philippines” (Kelleher, 
2005, p. 17). In addition, a range of small, unspecified fish producing countries are not 
included, as well as only a few of the countries in the European Union and partially of India 
were included in this assessment (Kelleher, 2005). Even though, FAO (2010b) and Kelleher 
(2005) pointed out that discarding practices may have declined in the recent years, these 
issues still causes serious concern due to the potential inflicted damage by the practice and 
especially the unreported and unregulated nature of bycatch. 
According to Kelleher (2005), it is impossible to conduct “an empirical assessment of global 
trends in discards” (p. 17). However, he further argues that the discard data of developed 
countries may have indicated that there has been a reduction in bycatch and discards in most 
fisheries, i.e. relatively to fisheries in developing countries. With regards to developing 
countries, Kelleher (2005) argues that the utilization of bycatch has increased while discards 
have reduced. The reduction of bycatch in many fisheries was a result of several factors. 
These include the “decrease in effort and change of target species in some major trawl 
fisheries” (Kelleher, 2005, p. 17) and changes made in regulatory regimes. The latter 
encourages selective fishing and prohibits discards of catches through legislation (i.e. the no-
discards policy). 
5.3.3 Ecological and Biological Issues 
The effects of bycatch and discards could be many. According to Horsten and Kirkegaard 
(2002), the impact of bycatch and discards on the ecosystem is usually ignored by the 
fisheries. Only what is directly affected by bycatch and discards on the populations is actually 
considered in fisheries management. 
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 A weighted discard rate means the proportion of the catch which is discarded (Kelleher, 2005). 
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Conflicts between industrial and artisanal fishing vessels may arise from discarding practices, 
especially when there is a large quantity of discards involved (Kelleher, 2005, p. 73). These 
discards may have been observed by the artisanal fishing vessels either floating dead on the 
surface or washed into shore. Of course, this does not help to change the public perception of 
bycatch when the local fishermen are arguing and complaining about the wastage of resources 
(Kelleher, 2005). In some cases, it may even be perceived as these industrial trawlers are 
pollution the sea with dead fish, in which many of the local fishermen depend on in order to 
make a living and provide for their families. 
5.3.4 Technical Issues 
According to Kelleher (2005), the gear technology is not the sole reason why discard and 
bycatch reduction is limited, but the willingness to modify the gears may be the main 
constraint. This could be due to the economic burden that may follow of such gear 
modifications. Of course, selective gears are preferred over non-selective gears, i.e. non-
discriminate catch. Gradually, selective gear should be adopted by fisheries in order for the 
fishing activities to be more sustainable. This means that fishing activities would not catch 
more fish than the given fish population may reproduce themselves. Furthermore, Kelleher 
(2005) suggests that bycatch reduction devices (BRD) should be introduced and in 
successfully doing so may require a close partnership within the industry. According to 
Kelleher (2005), particularly there has been evidence that some trawl fisheries
5
 in Australia 
and United States have managed to reduce bycatch by using the BRDs. However, 
implementation of BRDs is not successful in developing countries in general. The reason 
appears to be due to the fact that implementing BRDs could lead to substantial economic 
losses. Take, for example, the shrimp trawl fisheries in developing countries. Most of the 
reduction of discards in developing countries seems to be due to the increase in utilization of 
bycatch and not the reduction of bycatch in itself (Kelleher, 2005). Since these countries 
utilize the bycatch, then it means that the usage of BRD would not work in favor for these 
countries. It would inevitably reduce the bycatch, which would lead to an economic loss. 
5.3.5 Economic Issues 
Discarding practices do not come without substantial economic losses. Kelleher (2005) 
derives two different economic issues that may occur due to discards of catch: “(1) the costs 
associated with discards at the level of the fisher, the fisheries authorities and society in 
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 The trawl fishery referred to is called “Penaeid Trawl Fishery”. 
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general; and (2) the use of economic measures to reduce discards”6 (Kelleher, 2005, p. 72). 
In general, fishermen or operators are often in situations where decisions have to be made. 
This is especially when it comes to whether or not to discard a proportion of the catch. Thus, 
the economic decisions may be determined by weighing the costs and the benefits of discards. 
Some of the factors that need to be considered are such as inventory space or the freezer 
capacity, wage that needs to be paid to the crew, landing costs and/or taxes, the price of the 
caught fish, the bycatch quotas etc. (Kelleher, 2005). In most cases, fishing techniques used 
by the fishermen have to be adapted due to discard regulations imposed by the government. 
Thus, the fishing operations may be less efficient, and the returns could be lower. In situations 
like these, the operators have to decide whether or not to adopt BRDs or similar measures to 
reduce the discards. According to Kelleher (2005), “BRDs introduced in New South Wales 
resulted in a decline of 90 percent in discards and employment of one less crew per vessel” 
(p. 72). This may be served as evidence and proof that the use of BRDs may significantly 
reduce bycatch and discards. 
The costs at the level of fisheries and the administration are related to monitoring, 
surveillance and control. These costs could be significant. The acquisition of bycatch and 
discard information as well as information about the impact on the stock and ecology may 
also involve substantially high costs. For instance, the given fisheries that have decided to 
implement observer programs have to take the costs of implementing such programs into 
consideration as well.  
The costs of bycatch and discards may also influence the society as a whole. According to 
Kelleher (2005), there are very few comprehensive studies in this area. Therefore, it may be 
difficult to understand and identify what the costs of discards may have on the society as a 
whole as well as who may be responsible to bear those costs (Kelleher, 2005). Furthermore, 
losses of endangered species and the ecosystem may be seen as a cost to society. This is, of 
course, a consequence from discarding the proportion of the catch. Thus, acquire such 
information would only benefit the fisheries in designing management programs.  
According to Revill (1999), an annual estimation of the total loss of landings due to 
discarding in the European Crangon
7
 fisheries is approximately 16,069 tonnes of Cod, 
Whiting, Plaice, and Sole. More precisely there were discards of 1,890 tonnes of Cod, 1,525 
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 These points were originally put up as bullet points and not as numbers in the original document of Kelleher 
(2005). 
7
 Crangon is a type of shrimp 
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tonnes of Whiting, 12,066 tonnes of Plaice, and 588 tonnes of Sole. In monetary value, these 
discards are worth a total of 25.7 million euros (Revill, et al., 1999, p. 60). As previously 
pointed out, these kinds of studies do not take into consideration non-commercial species, and 
how bycatch and discards may impact the ecosystem. In this case, the aim of this particular 
study was only to find the costs of discards on commercial species (i.e. Cod, Whiting, Plaice 
and Sole). 
According to Kelleher (2005), the total discards of the Bering Sea Aleutian Islands (BSAI) 
groundfish fisheries were estimated to be  around 162,161 tonnes of ground fish species in 
1994. The total value of the discarded catch was more than US$92 million (Kelleher, 2005). 
The reason for discard was due to the total allowable catch (TAC) had reached its limit. 
However, there were also retained catch which was estimated to be 1 699 500 tonnes. The 
retained catch was valued at US$925 million (Kelleher, 2005). Based on these numbers, 
Kelleher (2005) argued as follows: “the ratio of the value of retained catch to discards 
(retained/discard value ratio), weighted by fishery across BSAI groundfish fisheries, was 
10:1” (Kelleher, 2005, p. 73). Thus, this means that for every dollar lost due to bycatch and 
discards, about 10 dollars are gained as an output of the retained catch.  
Kelleher (2005) suggests that there are some economic measures that can be used to reduce 
discards. One of such measures is to impose taxes for discards. If the whole regular catch and, 
additionally, the discards are charged through license fee or royalty payments, then the fishing 
vessels and the operating crew would be forced to find the best use of the already charged 
bycatch (Kelleher, 2005, p. 75). However, by use of BRDs the license fee and royalty 
payments may be reduced. Thus, this would encourage fisheries to make use of BRDs. 
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5.4 International Bycatch and Discards 
According to the World Bank, FAO and the WorldFish Center (2010), the total amount of 
discarded fish in a global context has declined in the past few years. There are several reasons 
for why there has been a reduction of discards. These may include the utilization of bycatch 
has increased (in Asia); fishing efforts are reduced if high levels of unwanted bycatch are 
observed; the efficiency of bycatch management; and the usage of selective gear (World 
Bank, et al., 2010). In spite of this recent reduction of discards, global annual discards are still 
estimated to be around 7 million tons (Kelleher, 2005; World Bank, et al., 2010). On the 
average of all discards, 8 % of the catch is being discarded before they are landed. According 
to Kelleher (2005), the discard rate of tropical shrimp trawl fisheries accounts for more than 
27 % of the total estimated discards. This is considered to be the highest discard rate 
compared to other finfish and shrimp trawl fisheries (Kelleher, 2005; World Bank, et al., 
2010). While small-scale fisheries tend to have a lower discard rate in general, industrial 
large-scale fisheries have relatively higher discard rates (Kelleher, 2005).  
Due to its nature, the range of discards of marine resources may be very broad. Additionally, 
most discards are not properly recorded or, in most cases, they may not be recorded at all. 
Subsequently, it may prove to be difficult to find out which species are actually discarded. 
According to Kelleher (2005), studies conducted in this area tend to focus mostly on the 
discards of commercial species rather than non-commercial species. Sometimes reports of 
discards is provided, but essential information about the discards is left out, such as the 
quantity of discards, which of the discards are non-commercial species or whether the 
discards are juveniles or not (e.g. juveniles of commercial or non-commercial species) 
(Kelleher, 2005). Instead, what tends to be reported is the information about the weight of 
only the commercial discarded species. Little or no information of the weight of the non-
commercial discarded species are provided. As a result, quantitative information on discards 
is indeed rare. Thus, under-reported discards are a major problem to the industry even today.  
5.5 Bycatch and Discards in the EU  
As far as the EU territorial waters are concerned, Kelleher (2005) claims that there are high 
discard rates in general. There are certain factors that contribute to in high discard rates. Some 
of these are for instance the dominance of demersal trawl gear, which appears to be the cause 
of overfishing of demersal stocks, and high discard rates observed in the shrimp and flatfish 
trawl fisheries (Kelleher, 2005).  
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According to Kelleher (2005), “discards are rarely estimated on a systematic and continual 
basis in most EU fisheries and as EC fisheries legislation does not require mandatory 
recording of discards, most of the studies are based on limited seagoing observer coverage” 
(p. 25). While it is optional for the EU fishing operators to report discards, studies conducted 
by the EC only focus on discards of commercial targeted species rather than the total volume 
of discards (Kelleher, 2005). Even though, it is important to include discards of commercial 
targeted species, these studies seem to neglect to include non-targeted fish species as well as 
non-targeted animals and non-living material.  
Normally, stock assessments of the EU territorial waters do not normally include estimates of 
discards (Kelleher, 2005). There are several factors for why the estimates of discard mortality 
are excluded from the stock assessments. Kelleher (2005) suggests that these factors include 
“low level of observer coverage, which may not meet the requirement of a statistically 
significant sampling protocol, and the concern that inclusion of the lower quality of discard 
data would simply detract from the (higher) quality of the catch and other data used in stock 
assessments” (p. 25). Although discarded catch is not included in the stock assessments of 
certain member states in the EU, the exclusion of it may not significantly affect the stock 
assessment as a whole (Kelleher, 2005). However, Kelleher (2005) argues that estimates of 
discards may be relevant as regard to recruitment projections and fisheries management 
advice. Examples of the inclusion of discard estimates in the fishery stock assessments could 
be found in the United States, the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC) or 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), and those who conducts stock 
assessments for the North Sea (Kelleher, 2005). In their research paper, Breen and Cook 
(2002) concluded that the “exclusion of discard mortality would lead to very significant 
biases in all aspects of the stock assessment process” (p. 8). 
Although, most of the discard information includes targeted species exclusively, the overall 
discards in the EU waters are indeed high. This includes the deep-sea fisheries as well. If non-
targeted species are also included in the discard information, then the estimate of discard 
would probably be even higher. According to Kelleher (2005), the Nephrops trawlers are 
observed to have high discard rates. The discards of demersal finfish trawl
8
 represent 62 % of 
the total catch, while Nephrops and deep-water shrimp trawl account for 70 % of the total 
catch (Kelleher, 2005). Other European fishing vessels that are responsible for high discards 
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 The demersal finfish trawl targets e.g. hake and seabream (Kelleher, 2005). 
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are e.g. the Irish razor shell dredge and the French Bay of Biscay hake trawl with discard rates 
of 60 % and 56 % of the total catch respectively (Kelleher, 2005). 
5.6 Bycatch and Discards in Senegal and West Africa 
In general, the artisanal fisheries in Africa and the Red Sea are assumed “to have low or 
negligible discards unless information to the contrary is available” (Kelleher, 2005, p. 30). In 
West Africa in particular, the discards are also low or negligible. This could be explained 
through the high population in these coastal states combined with a high demand for fish and 
fish products (Kelleher, 2005). Moreover, the lack of food security may have resulted in most 
of the catch being retained. However, low discard rates do not necessarily mean that the 
waters of West Africa are not overfished. It is important to stress that industrial fishing fleets 
from either foreign or national are not taken into account in the above statement from 
Kelleher (2005). Only the artisanal fisheries in Africa are considered. Furthermore, the 
African artisanal fisheries’ post-harvest losses are not included in the discard assessment 
(Kelleher, 2005). 
When licensed distant water fleets and national flagged fishing vessels are concerned, there 
are high level of observer coverage. As a matter of fact, there are some countries which have 
established what is considered 100 % observer coverage
9
 for some of their industrial fishing 
fleets (Kelleher, 2005). However, the main focus of these observers is not necessarily to 
collect information of discards, but rather the quantity of the retained catch (Kelleher, 2005). 
Thus, systematically collected information on discards is sometimes absent in these fishing 
vessels, despite the fact that they are placed on these ships to collect scientific information 
about the fish stocks. These observer programs do not only need a great amount of effort to be 
implemented, but the costs associated with them are substantial (Kelleher, 2005). Although 
the costs and effort are high to run these programs, Kelleher (2005) claims that these reports 
and their valuable information are not being utilized as much as they should have in practice. 
Moreover, Kelleher (2005) suggests that this could be partly explained through “staff and 
funding shortages in the research institutes, or because these reports are retained by the 
enforcement agency and not accessed by the researchers” (p. 30).  
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 For example, Namibia has two observers on some of their fishing vessels (Kelleher, 2005). 
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Along the coastline from Morocco to Angola
10
, discard rates vary from region to region, i.e. 
each state’s EEZ may vary in discard rates even though they have fishing activities in the 
same area. In Moroccan territorial waters, the discard estimate of the cephalopod trawl fishery 
is around 45 % of the total catch (Kelleher, 2005). The discard estimate in Guinea is 33 % of 
the total catch while Guinea-Bissau had a discard rate of as much as 87 % of the total catch 
(Kelleher, 2005). In Mauritania, the foreign deep-water shrimp fleet has an estimated discard 
rate over 80 % (Kelleher, 2005). In a similarly type of fishing fleet in Senegal, the discard rate 
is estimated to be around 63 % (Kelleher, 2005). While the deep-water trawl fisheries has a 
high discard rate, the Senegalese shallow-water trawl fisheries have managed to reduce its 
discards to around 34 % (Kelleher, 2005). This could be explained through bycatch of finfish 
in the shallow-waters, which has increased tremendously in terms of quantity. Bycatch of 
these species are often retained and sold in African urban markets due to its high value 
(Kelleher, 2005). In Sierra Leone, it is required from all industrial fishing trawlers to land 
their bycatch (Kelleher, 2005). The retained bycatch will then be available for local 
consumption (Kelleher, 2005). Thus, since fish species with low or no commercial value are 
not discarded at sea but instead retained and sold at the local markets, the end result seems to 
be a significant reduction in discards. It appears that the importance of the relation between 
bycatch and food security is not stressed enough in this context. While certain West African 
countries struggles to ensure food to their own population, the discard rates are high in some 
countries due to discards of bycatch. Instead of discarding unwanted bycatch, the catch itself 
could have been retained and sold in local markets in order to combat famine in certain 
countries in West Africa. This is of course given that all bycatch are edible and that they 
could potentially play a crucial role in food security.   
5.7 Bycatch and Discard Reduction 
Many major and small fisheries have contributed to increase the discard volume globally. 
However, efforts have been made to reduce bycatch and discards for some fisheries. 
Typically, these fisheries’ attempts to reduce the discards by introducing different measures 
and methods, such as reducing unwanted bycatch, utilize selective fishing gears or just simply 
reduce the fishing efforts of local fisheries (Kelleher, 2005).  
                                                          
10
 African coastline and the Red Sea are divided into three areas; 1) Area 34; 2) Area 47; and 3) Area 51. Area 34 
stretches from Morocco to Angola, area 47 from Angola to South Africa, and, lastly, area 34 consists of East 
Africa and the Red Sea. Here, a large part of area 34 is actually the West African coastline. 
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According to Kelleher (2005), “there are two principal approaches to addressing the 
“discard problem”” (p. xviii). These two principal approaches or harvest strategies are 1) to 
reduce bycatch, and 2) to increase the utilization of bycatch (Kelleher, 2005). Since bycatch 
could either be kept (i.e. to be retained and sold) or discarded, it seems logical to address the 
issue of bycatch in order to address the problem of discards. Another problem related to 
bycatch and discards is discard mortality. In order to reduce discard mortalities of unwanted 
or non-targeted fish species, Kelleher (2005) suggests that there is a need to reduce discard 
mortalities for bycatch that are caught alive in which are to be returned to the sea. In other 
words, the aim is to improve the survival of discarded species, i.e. given that the concerned 
fish species are still alive after the fishing process. This is not only important for non-targeted 
fish species and other marine animals, but it is also important for protected or endangered 
species.  
With respect to discards and bycatch, there are several other principles and guidelines for 
responsible fishing operations proposed by Kelleher (2005). These principles may include 
acts such as to simply making efforts to avoid unwanted catch, as well as making the best uses 
of unwanted catch if catching them are unavoidable (Kelleher, 2005). By taking measures to 
avoid unwanted catch (or bycatch), some of the endangered species may be spared, and one 
may at the same time avoid to disrupt the functionality of the ecosystem (Kelleher, 2005). In 
some cases, it appears to be difficult to avoid catching unwanted species, sizes or sexes. Even 
with the best fishing gear, one cannot, with 100 % certainty, guarantee that the catch of the 
given target species would have the right size or sex. For instance, the majority of the catch 
may be undersized, or many of the caught fish are female-bearing-eggs. One should always 
ensure to make the efforts to seek other methods or measures in order to promote the best 
practices at sea. However, sometimes it is unavoidable to catch these co-called unwanted 
species. Thus, it is essential to find the best possible way to make use of such species, i.e. 
given that the probability of survival after the release of the unwanted catch back to the sea is 
very low. Furthermore, methods of reducing discard mortalities by increasing the survival of 
unwanted catches are also important, and there is also a need to keep records of all discards 
(Kelleher, 2005). 
As far as reports of discards are concerned, Kelleher (2005) purposes that the estimation of 
discards may be more useful if it is to be split into three different categories: 1) always 
retained species; 2) always discarded species; and 3) partially discarded species (p. 51). 
Presumably, such data would be relevant to seek better utilization of ‘always discarded 
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species’ as well as ‘partially discarded species’. In addition, scientific advice may become 
even more trustworthy and reliable as this information will be available, and one may get a 
better understanding of how discards and bycatch may have an impact on the marine 
ecosystems and biodiversity.  
Kelleher (2005) claims that fisheries tend to apply a number of regulations in which may have 
a direct consequence to the discard rates. For instance, minimum landing size (MLS) may 
encourage discard of catches as the fish caught may not always be in the required size. In 
other words, it is not possible to guarantee that the right fish in the right size is caught every 
single time. Most of the time catches may consist of undersize fish species or even juveniles, 
and this may prove to be inevitable in most cases. Similarly, with respect to fishing quotas, 
excessive catches may also result in encouraging discards. Other types of regulations that may 
contribute to encourage discards may be, for example, closed seasons or closed areas. 
(Kelleher, 2005). In some corners of the world, one may also find different regions in which 
try to bypass the MLS regulations, e.g. in several Southeast Asian countries or the waters of 
West Africa. The latter often sell unsorted fish, which is called the ‘African mix’, or even at 
sea to collection vessels. This may serve as a mechanism to avoid the MLS regulation. 
Bycatch is a phenomenon that has existed for a very long time in fisheries. The importance 
does not lie in the incidental catch, but the discarded catch and its impact on the marine 
resources and the ecosystem. Thus, bycatch that leads to discards are by all means 
undesirable, since discards are basically ‘a waste of resources’. In order to limit discards, 
Horsten and Kirkegaard (2002) suggest that fisheries need to assess its impact on a local level 
(i.e. micro level). However, the measures to limit discards cannot be standardized for all 
fisheries, but it needs to be tailored to the specific fishery (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). That 
is given that all fisheries operate differently due to culture, norms, management, policy, 
regulations etc. 
In order to ensure a sustainable usage of fisheries resources, Horsten and Kirkegaard (2002) 
suggest that management strategy and actions need to be based on what kind of information 
that have been received. For instance, this could be information about the bycatch level, the 
type of bycatch, the bycatch impact on fish stocks, and the bycatch impact on the ecosystem. 
It is worth noting that there is a general lack of information in the area of bycatch and 
discards. Thus, it may prove to be difficult to base any management actions on some 
information that do not exist in the first place. The first recommendation is, therefore, to 
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collect information and data about bycatch and discards before any management actions and 
strategies are implemented. After the gathering of information, one may evaluate the bycatch 
and then implement management measures accordingly.  
Based on the classification system developed by Hall (1994), Horsten and Kirkegaard use 
these criteria to evaluate bycatch: 
Classification of Bycatch 
Critical Bycatch - Bycatch of endangered species. 
Non-Sustainable Bycatch - Bycatch of populations not currently at 
risk, but which would decline under noted 
bycatch rates. 
Sustainable Bycatch - Bycatch rates that do not lead to 
population declines. 
Non-Biologically Significant Bycatch - Bycatch so low as to be considered 
negligible to the populations involved. 
Bycatch of Unknown Levels - When there is lack of data on abundance 
on mortality to determine whether bycatch 
is sustainable or critical. 
Ecosystem-Level Impacts - When bycatch removes a complex of 
species. 
Charismatic Bycatch - Takes into consideration that different 
societies value species differently, and that 
some are perceived to be special, having a 
value that is independent of the level of 
effect exerted on the species, or the 
conservation status of the same. 
 
(Source: Horsten, M. B., & Kirkegaard, E. (2002), “Bycatch from a Perspective of Sustainable Use”. IUCN – 
European Sustainable Use Specialist Group (ESUSG)/Fisheries Working Group, pp. 4-5) 
 
Horsten and Kirkegaard (2002) have developed a model which illustrates how to evaluate 
bycatch as well as implementing management measures: 
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Horsten and Kirkegaard - Evaluation of Bycatch 
 
(Source: Horsten, M. B., & Kirkegaard, E. (2002), “Bycatch from a Perspective of Sustainable Use”. IUCN – 
European Sustainable Use Specialist Group (ESUSG)/Fisheries Working Group, pp. 14) 
First and foremost, the question of sustainability in bycatch should be brought into light; are 
these bycatch sustainable or unsustainable? If it is the case that the bycatch is unsustainable, 
the bycatch should be limited or reduced immediately (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). The 
given population concerned may be exposed to excessive fishing pressure and may be in a 
critical state. Thus, it calls for an immediate action. If the bycatch is considered sustainable, 
which means that the bycatch may be insignificant both in terms of the ecosystem and the 
population, then the model suggests that no action is needed (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). 
This means that bycatch does not have to be limited nor reduced. However, some actions may 
be needed if the bycatch is biologically and economically significant or if it is ethically 
unacceptable. The latter could be the general public’s disapproval due to their perception of 
unnecessarily wasted resources (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). An external factor in which 
fisheries need to take into consideration. As Horsten and Kirkegaard (2002) have suggested; 
what kinds of actions need to be taken depends on whether the bycatch is sustainable or 
unsustainable (Horsten & Kirkegaard, 2002). 
5.8 Discussion and Recommendations 
So what should have been done? What are the solutions to the bycatch and discards problems? 
First of all, there is a great need to quantify the amount of discards in order to find a suitable 
management plan for a range of different fisheries. Despite the financial burden of observer 
programs, it may be essential to consider implementing such programs in order to retrieve 
accurate information about the quantity of discards. The lack of information on bycatch and 
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discards is an important issue that needs to be addressed before management strategy and 
plans may be implemented. However, Kelleher (2005) claims that “the impacts of discards 
are not easily quantified and the methods for such impact assessment require further 
development” (p. 76), i.e. with not only regard to the impacts on various marine resources and 
animals but also to the ecological impacts of bycatch and discards. The importance of 
acquiring information on bycatch (i.e. both incidental catch and discards which may also 
include endangered species) is not stressed enough. Such information may help fisheries to 
find the best possible practices as well as measures to mitigate bycatch and discards (Kelleher, 
2005). Thus, under the assumption that the information is accurate, the decision-making 
process of future actions, plans and strategies may be even more precisely adapted to the 
current situation. 
According to Kelleher (2005), “the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution, the 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) and the International Plans of Action 
(IPOAs) are valuable starting-point for public policy on discards” (p. 76).  Fisheries should 
probably attempt to adopt some of these policies. However, Kelleher (2005) suggests that a 
“no-discard”-policy may be the best approach when fisheries management is concerned. 
Furthermore, the “no-discard” approach may share similarities with the CCRF and the 
resolution of the UNGA (Kelleher, 2005). Thus, adopting such approach may be the most 
sustainable solution for fisheries management in the long-term. However, it is suggested that 
one cannot simply adopt the approach without carefully taking into consideration the required 
complementary measures in order for it to work effectively (Kelleher, 2005). It could be that 
by adopting such approach may turn out to be not as beneficial or practical for some fisheries, 
in terms of the ecological and social aspects. In order to optimize bycatch and discard 
management, there is a need for every single fishery to find what measures are the most 
suitable. Given that every fishery is different from one another, fisheries management 
measures cannot be standardized, but it has to be customized to each fishery and their strategy 
and management style.  
In order to reduce bycatch and discards, selective fishing should be promoted. This is 
especially concerning overexploited fisheries where it is important to reduce discards. 
However, Kelleher (2005) argues that “selective fishing is likely to alter ecosystem balance” 
(p. 76). If this is the case, then scientific advice and further assessments are required. 
Scientific advice provided by experts may aid fisheries to seek the best practices when it 
comes to bycatch and discards. 
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Normally, industrial- or large-scale fishing tends to be associated with non-selective fishing 
(i.e. due to trawling and non-discrimination of catch), while small-scale fishing are considered 
more selective (Kelleher, 2005). Thus, small-scale fishing may be regarded as more 
sustainable than industrial large-scale fishing. However, this assumption may not always be 
correct. As a matter of fact, Kelleher (2005) claims that fishing activities of small-scale 
fisheries may also damage the ecosystem. This is due to “their ability to exploit most habitats, 
niches and trophic levels” (Kelleher, 2005, p. 77). Other ways to reduce bycatch and discards 
are through economic measures. Fundamentally, there is a need to reduce bycatch and 
discards, but that could also be achieved through the increase of discard survival. It appears 
that the higher the rate of discard survival, the lower is the impact of discards on biodiversity 
and ecosystem. Technological development and other measures to promote discard survival 
should therefore be highlighted.  
Although, it is essential to reduce bycatch and discards due to their negative impact, one may 
also consider increasing the utilization of bycatch and discards as well (Kelleher, 2005). 
Basically, it is a way to reduce discards since the unintentional or unwanted proportion of the 
catch is retained instead of being discarded back into the ocean. According to Kelleher 
(2005), utilization technologies should not only be transferable between fisheries to fisheries 
but also between countries. Sharing such technology may contribute to reduce discards as 
well as to increase food security (Kelleher, 2005). However, extensive bycatch should be 
avoided if possible. This is under the assumption that extensive bycatch may lead to 
overfishing of fish stocks.  
Many fisheries in developing countries tend to utilize bycatch more than fisheries in 
developed countries. Thus, Kelleher (2005) suggests that fisheries in developing countries 
need to find a balance between the utilization of bycatch and the reduction of bycatch and 
discards. Further development of guidelines for how this could be achieved in the most 
sustainable way should be in accordance to the CCRF.  
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6.0 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU) 
6.1 Definition of IUU Fishing 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2002a) defines IUU in three parts; (1) illegal-, 
(2) unreported-, and (3) unregulated fishing activities. The following descriptions of the three 
different terms are taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ 
technical guidelines for responsible fisheries, (2002a), pp. 4-5: 
Definition of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing 
Illegal fishing refers to fishing activities: 
(1) conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, 
without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations; 
(2) conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional 
fisheries management organization but operate in contravention of the conservation 
and management measures adopted by that organization and by which the States are 
bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or 
(3) in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken 
by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management organization. 
Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities: 
(1) which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national 
authority, in contravention of national laws and regulations; or 
(2) undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management 
organization which have not been reported or have been misreported, in 
contravention of the reporting procedures of that organization. 
Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities: 
(1) in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization 
that are conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a 
State not party to that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not 
consistent with or contravenes the conservation and management measures of that 
organization; or 
(2) in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation 
or management measures and where such fishing activities are conducted in a 
manner inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine 
resources under international law. 
 
(Source: FAO. (2002a). Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries: No. 9. 
Rome, FAO. 2002, pp. 4-5) 
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According to the High Seas Task Force (2006), IUU fishing could be simply described as 
fishing vessels that engaged in certain acts that is “in violation of the laws of a fishery” (p. 1). 
Any given fishery is “under the jurisdiction of a coastal state or […] regulated by regional 
organisations” (High Seas Task Force, 2006, p. 1). The latter is especially referred to high 
seas fisheries. A significant proportion of the IUU fish catches comes from the EEZs of 
coastal states, but they also comes from the high seas as well (High Seas Task Force, 2006). 
6.2 The Problem of IUU Fishing 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2002), the illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has become a serious threat to “effective 
conservation and management of many fish stocks, causing multiple adverse consequences for 
fisheries and for the people who depend on them in the pursuit of their legitimate livelihoods” 
(FAO, 2002a, p. 1). Thus, IUU fishing may serve as a hindrance to the recovery of fish stocks 
as well as the ecosystem (Agnew et al., 2009). Basically, IUU fishing is a threat to the 
achievement of sustainable of fish stocks worldwide and the world fisheries (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2007; High Seas Task Force, 2006). IUU fishing may also 
contribute to overfishing or overexploitation of fish stocks (Agnew, et al., 2009). In general, 
the issue of IUU fishing does not take place in only a few countries in the world, but it is, in 
fact, a worldwide phenomenon that may virtually occur in all capture fisheries, i.e. including 
the high seas and within the Exclusive Economic Zone (FAO, 2010a, p. 93). Moreover, IUU 
fishing activities are to be found in different sizes, shapes and types. They could be small-
scale or industrial-scale, and the harmful practices that follow are carried out by both foreign 
and national vessels (FAO, 2010b). According to the High Seas Task Force (2006), IUU 
fishing “thrives where weak governance arrangements prevail and is further encouraged by 
the failure of countries to meet their international responsibilities” (p. 1). Thus, all the areas 
that are unable to combat IUU fishing, and letting these activities thrive may have to face the 
catastrophic consequences of potential fishery collapse and resource depletion (FAO, 2002a). 
This will, in turn, prevent fisheries from reaching their objectives, both short-term and long-
term national and global economic objectives as well as social and environmental objectives 
(FAO, 2010a, p. 93). FAO (2002) further argues that such activities may also threaten the 
efforts to secure food. If there are no efforts being made to reduce IUU fishing and to ensure 
sustainable and legal fishing practices, IUU fishing may have the potential to “completely 
negate the benefits of effective fisheries management” (FAO, 2002a, p. 1).  Thus, in order to 
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combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, it is essential for developing countries to 
actively participate as well (FAO, 2010a, p. 93).  
Combating IUU fishing has proved to be difficult in the last few decades. This is mostly due 
to their persistence, and the economic incentives involved, which may have been driven by 
weak governance, increasing demand and overcapacity (High Seas Task Force, 2006). There 
are many different factors that may have contributed to make IUU fishing thrive. The High 
Seas Task Force (2006) has provided an extensive list of what the root causes of IUU fishing 
might be. 
 
The cause of IUU fishing still remains an issue because there is a general lack of an 
international political resolve to carry through the agreed measures to combat it (High Seas 
Task Force, 2006). The framework of international measures to combat IUU fishing is already 
developed, but there are too many coastal states that still are unwilling to adopt these 
measures which are provided. Furthermore, according to the High Seas Task Force, there are 
some coastal states that have adopted these measures (High Seas Task Force, 2006). 
However, the enforcement of such measures still remains in question. 
Due to the nature of IUU fishing, it is hard to detect these kinds of harmful activities for the 
reason that it is difficult to measure the total amount of landed catches in IUU fishing. Thus, 
Key Motivators of IUU fishing 
Some of the key motivators of IUU fishing are: 
 high value of catch relative to low capital and running costs of IUU vessels; 
 higher cost of legitimate business compared with the ease of IUU; 
 association with other illegal activities such as smuggling and money laundering; 
 limited access to often overcrowded legitimate fisheries; 
 extreme remoteness of resources where policing is difficult; 
 flag states are not party to or ignore international agreements; 
 flag states unwilling to control their own vessels; 
 ineffective policing and fisheries management institutions; 
 ineffective inspection of fish landings and poor traceability; and 
 penalties that are insufficient and often fail to deter. 
Source: High Seas Task Force (2006), “Closing the net: Stopping illegal fishing on the high seas. Summary 
recommendations”, Governments of Australia, Canada, Chile, Namibia, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom, WWF, IUCN and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, pp. 2. 
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fully reliable data are not common in this area of study (FAO, 2002a). However, according to 
the recent conducted study, the total value of losses worldwide from illegal and unreported 
fishing is estimated to be between $10 billion and $23.5 billion a year, which is about 11-26 
million tonnes (Agnew, et al., 2009, p. 4). In terms of percentage, IUU fishing accounts for 13 
to 31 percent of the total reported catches in the world (Agnew, et al., 2009; FAO, 2010b). As 
available information is constantly in conflict with one another, the question of whether IUU 
fishing activities have increased or decreased over the past few years remains, however, 
unclear (FAO, 2010b, p. 12).  
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6.3 IUU Fishing in the World 
One of the first studies on illegal and unreported fishing in a worldwide context was 
conducted by Agnew, et al. (2009). Case studies of 54 countries, including the high seas, 
showed that annual losses of IUU fishing worldwide were estimated to be between $10 billion 
and $23.5 billion (Agnew, et al., 2009). A quantification of this estimate will be between 11 
and 26 million tonnes of fish lost to IUU fishing each year (Agnew, et al., 2009). The period 
in which is considered to be worst when considering illegal and unreported fishing in a global 
context is around the mid-1990s (Agnew, et al., 2009). In this period, illegal fishing activities 
increased substantially due to a range of factors. These are, for instance, the growth in world 
demand for fish and fish products and the increase of the world’s fishing fleet which may 
have caused overcapacity (Watson & Pauly, 2001). This result in less fishing opportunities as 
there is a less amount of fish left in the sea. In the 1990s, global catches is expected to remain 
at a level of stability for a relatively long period of time, which is mainly due to major fish 
stocks in the world have been recognized as overexploited or depleted (Watson & Pauly, 
2001). This means that it is impossible for the global catches to increase when the fish 
population cannot replenish itself fast enough. An overexploited fish stock needs time to 
reproduce itself. If this time is not given to the fish stocks that are classified as overexploited, 
it will most likely be depleted or collapse, which will bring even more harm to an already 
disturbed ecosystem. 
According to Agnew, et al. (2009), there is “a significant correlation between governance 
and the level of illegal fishing” (Agnew, et al., 2009, p. 1). As a matter of fact, developing 
countries may be more exposed to illegal fishing than developed countries. This is under the 
assumption that most developing countries may have weaker governance than developed 
countries. According to the High Seas Task Force (2006), “IUU losses are borne particularly 
by developing countries that provide over 50 per cent of all internationally traded fishery 
products” (p. 1). The costal countries in the sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. including West-Africa, 
bear a significant amount of economic losses. In fact, the annual losses due to IUU fishing are 
valued at US$1 billion each year (High Seas Task Force, 2006). The annual amount of loss 
equals a quarter of the total fisheries exports in Africa (High Seas Task Force, 2006). Thus, 
the poorest countries in the world are most affected by IUU fishing activities. In addition to 
the economic losses, these countries also bear the loss of highly-dependent source of food and 
a potential source of income. Agnew, et al. (2009) estimated that the illegal catch in West 
Africa is much higher than the reported landed catch. In fact, illegal fishing is estimated to be 
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40% higher than the reported landed catch (Agnew, et al., 2009, p. 1). However, with such 
high level of illegal fishing does not come without consequences. Not only does high level of 
illegal fishing serve as a hindrance for sustainable development and management, but it is also 
harmful for the ecosystem and the environment as a whole. In turn, this would affect the lives 
of many people who depend on fishing to make a living. In the United Nations’ publicized 
magazine called Africa Renewal, Kimani (2009) stated the following; “Illegal fishing is not 
the only threat to African fish stocks” (p. 12). Moreover, they stated that “even legal fishing, 
if not adequately controlled, poses a long-term threat” (Kimani, 2009, p. 12). This means that 
inadequate institutions would be as much as a threat to the fish stocks as illegal fishing. 
In addition, global food security may be at stake. Especially when taking into account the 
current growth rate in the world population, which is naturally followed by an overall increase 
of worldwide demand for food (Agnew, et al., 2009). In this case, the artisanal fishermen 
would most likely suffer from a reduction in food security (MRAG, 2005a). Coastal 
communities in countries, particularly those in West Africa (Senegal, Guinea Bissau, 
Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Angola etc.), which are extremely dependent on fish as a main 
source of protein, would be significantly affected by a reduction in marine resources in which 
in turn will lead to a reduction in food security (MRAG, 2005a). Fish and fish products would 
be an important contribution to supply food for the world population. However, the task of 
meeting the worldwide demand for fish and fish products may prove to be difficult. The 
reason is simply because of the current state of the world fisheries, which could be described 
as mostly depleted. Many fish stocks are “exploited at or beyond their maximum sustainable 
levels” (FAO, 2007c, p. 32). This means that the fish stocks may be in a state where they 
appear to be unable to reproduce or replenish themselves. According to Putt and Nelson 
(2008), foreign and domestic demand for fish and fish products seem to be the driving force 
of both legal and illegal fishing (i.e. the suppliers of fish and fish products), which the aim is 
to meet the growing market demand. Thus, there is a great need to promote sustainable 
harvesting as well as management (Putt & Nelson, 2008). 
It is evident that illegal and unreported fishing may significantly impact the fish stocks of high 
valued commercial targeted species in general. This means that low-volume fish stocks with 
high value are often vulnerable to both legal and illegal fishing activities. The European 
Union is a very good example of how failure in controlling unreported catches may have led 
to severe depletion of fish stocks, which again may have served as a hindrance towards 
replenishment of various of overexploited fish stocks (Agnew, et al., 2009). According to 
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Agnew (2009) and ICCAT (2008), the majority of Bluefin tuna catches in the Mediterranean 
may not have been reported. In 2006, unreported catches were estimated to be roughly 19,400 
tons. The following year (in 2007), the unreported catches have increased to 28,600 tons 
(ICCAT, 2008, p. 75). The increase in IUU fishing may therefore rapidly decrease the given 
fish stock at stake, which may again contribute to overfishing or overexploitation of fish 
stocks.  
Based on their studies, Agnew, et al. (2009) claimed that there is a high correlation between 
the level of illegal and unreported fishing and the given countries’ quality of governance. For 
instance, countries or regions with poor governance seem to be associated with organized 
crime that is related to IUU fishing (Gianni & Simpson, 2005; Vaisman, 2001). This means 
that improvements of governance is unquestionably crucial in order to mitigate IUU fishing 
(Agnew, et al., 2009). However, it is further argued that it does not necessarily mean that 
developing countries with poor governance are held responsible for illegal fishing. They are 
rather considered more vulnerable than most developed countries, which may have ‘better’ 
governance (Agnew, et al., 2009). Presumably, areas with good or higher quality governance 
relative to areas with poor governance are most likely to have better management of fish 
stocks. Mitigation of IUU fishing may prove to be relatively less difficult in such areas as 
there is better control, surveillance and management of fishing activities. Even though, 
countries with poor governance are often more vulnerable to illegal fishing activities than 
most countries with proper governance, it does not necessarily mean that organized crime 
would only occur in countries with poor governance (due to e.g. corruption, weak governance, 
or weak executive powers from the given state). As a matter of fact, organized crime may also 
occur in countries with good governance, such as in the case of Australia (See e.g. Putt & 
Nelson, 2008). Sometimes countries with good governance may not have an adequate 
regulatory environment in order to mitigate or prevent organized criminal activities, such as 
the IUU fishing (Putt & Nelson, 2008).  
It is important to stress the nature of illegal fishing. Basically, illegal fishing does not comply 
or respect any form of national or international policies or actions intended to promote 
sustainable development (Agnew, et al., 2009; High Seas Task Force, 2006). In the context of 
bycatch and discards as previously discussed, illegal fishing is contributing to hamper the 
national and international actions towards bycatch and discards reduction as well as “mitigate 
the incidental mortality of marine animals such as sharks, turtles, birds and mammals” 
(Agnew, et al., 2009, p. 5). Every effort to manage marine resources is undermined by IUU 
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fishing activities (High Seas Task Force, 2006). Thus, these activities also undermine the 
efforts to promoting growth and welfare for a range of countries (High Seas Task Force, 
2006), especially when it comes to developing countries.  
Illegal fishing activities could either be executed by the local fishers or it could be engaged by 
licensed fishing vessels from other countries. According to MRAG (2005a), most of the 
countries in the North Western region of Africa tend to form fishing agreements within the 
West African countries as well as with other fishing nations, such as Korea, China and the 
EU. Take for instance the case of Senegal and the EU countries. There is no guarantee that 
these foreign fishing vessels will report all of their catches. As a matter of fact, “there is an 
incentive to under report, for example when agreements specify a ceiling on the catch amount 
and a supplemental fee per tonne for catches above this limit” (MRAG, 2005a, p. 39). 
Watson and Pauly (2001) agree with this point of view and, thus, also assume that most 
countries would under-report their catches if it is the case that the fishers tend to under-report 
their catches. Given that mange countries may tend to under-report their catches, scientific 
data, studies and advices may be in some part inaccurate or incorrect. In turn, this may 
prevent international fisheries’ effective management, those who promote sustainable 
development and force the given high-value but low-volume fish stocks at the point of 
depletion or collapse. Take for instance the previous example of the catches of Bluefin tuna in 
the Mediterranean. The reported catch of Bluefin tuna in the Mediterranean was 30,647 tons 
in 2006 and 32,398 tons in 2007 (ICCAT, 2008). However, the Standing Committee on 
Research and Statistics (SCRS) estimated the actual amount of catch to be 50,000 tons and 
61,000 tons in 2006 and 2007 respectively (ICCAT, 2008). Thus, the actual amount of the 
catch was much higher than the reported catch, which means that the catches were 
substantially under-reported. Moreover, the discard rate from these foreign vessels is assumed 
to be quite high (MRAG, 2005a)., et al. (2009) argue that this must be a severe failure of 
control on both the coastal state and the flag state, i.e. the state that allows other foreign 
fishing nations to fish in its EEZ (e.g. through fishing licenses), and the foreign fishing 
nations that dispatch their fishing fleets to other countries to exploit their resources.  
Gianni and Simpson (2005) estimated in 2005 that more than 1,200 industrial fishing vessels 
operate by flying Flags of Convenience (FOCs). Most of these vessels are, according to 
Gianni and Simpson (2005), attempting to “deliberately register with FOC countries to evade 
conservation and management regulations for high seas fisheries” (p. 3). Moreover, in the 
period of 1999 to 2004, the growth of ‘unknown flagged’ industrial vessels listed has 
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increased by 50%. Although, one cannot simply assume that all of these industrial vessels are 
involved in illegal fishing, a good proportion may seek their riches in IUU fishing. According 
to Gianni and Simpson (2005), roughly 15% of the worldwide large-scale industrial fishing 
fleet may either be registered with a FOC country or listed as unknown flagged. The 
development of such illegal activities calls for serious concerns for the industry as a whole. 
Thus, it may appear that the FOC system could be a useful tool in order to cover up the illegal 
and unregulated fishing activities. By purchasing a FOC, which may not cost more than a few 
hundred dollars, the companies that own these fishing vessels could then in return acquire 
catches that are valued at millions of dollars (Gianni & Simpson, 2005). It is a thriving 
business. Consequently, this may threaten the given fish population, other effected 
populations (i.e. given excessive bycatch), endangered species and other marine animals. As 
far as fisheries management is concerned, IUU fishing may serve as a hindrance to effective 
monitoring, surveillance and control. 
Gianni and Simpson (2005) argue that “the countries which issue FOCs are ultimately 
responsible for the activities of these vessels on the high seas, but turn a blind eye and 
exercise little or no control over the vessels concerned” (p. 3). Their findings showed that 
particularly four countries held responsible for issuing FOCs. These are Honduras, Panama, 
Belize, and St Vincent and the Grenadines (Gianni & Simpson, 2005). Together, these 
countries alone represent approximately 75% of all fishing vessels that fly flags of FOC 
countries in the period of 1999-2005 (Gianni & Simpson, 2005, p. 4). Although, the fishing 
business of FOC may generate many billions of dollars, the countries that provide FOC to 
fishing fleets only get a small proportion of the actual worth of the catch. In fact, the countries 
that issue FOC only charge for license fees and/or registration fees each year (Gianni & 
Simpson, 2005), i.e. what they earn from the whole FOC fishing business. These license fees 
only cost a few million dollars which in itself may only be considered ‘pocket money’ 
compared to the actual value generated from the illegal catch. Thus, the registration fees are 
inexpensive or come at a very cheap price for the fishing fleet that is flying FOCs. Hence, the 
benefits considerably outweigh the costs. The result may be further encouragement of IUU 
fishing due to the enormous profits. Of course, this is at the expense of those countries that are 
either making small or substantial efforts to promote responsible and sustainable fisheries. 
Another method to reduce costs is through transshipment. This is especially the case when it 
comes to high seas fishing vessels that are fishing tunas of high value (Gianni & Simpson, 
2005). Transshipment is a method where a given fishing vessel transfers its catch to another 
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cargo vessel to transport the same catch to a given destination. In that way, the fishing vessel, 
which is mainly responsible for fishing high valued species, would not have to transport the 
catch to its destination, but instead it could continue to operate by catching more fish. 
Naturally, the given fishing vessel could not have continued for infinity into the future. Thus, 
it is dependent on resupplying as well as refueling fleets to continue its fishing activities 
(Gianni & Simpson, 2005). Resupply and refuel take place at sea which means that the given 
fishing vessel would not have to travel back to land. The transshipment, refueling and 
resupplying fleets may appear to be operating illegally as well. However, Gianni and Simpson 
(2005) claim that these fleets are not operating illegally. Some vessels may provide services 
only to legitimate fishing fleets while others may provide for IUU fishing fleets. A few may 
even provide services for both. Whether or not these vessels are operating legally or illegally, 
the reality is that they do contribute to IUU fishing. Some vessels may either intentionally or 
unintentionally providing services to IUU fishing vessels, but it does not change the fact that 
they are involved. Furthermore, most of transshipment, resupplying and refueling fleets are 
unregulated.  
Many large-scale fishing vessels are built only for the purpose of IUU fishing. For example in 
Taiwan, there were 51 industrial fishing vessels built in the period between 2001 and 2003 
(Gianni & Simpson, 2005). By the end of year 2003, all of these fishing vessels turned out to 
engage in IUU fishing by flying the flag of FOC countries – except one single fishing vessel 
(Gianni & Simpson, 2005). Thus, the total number of fishing vessels involved in IUU fishing 
was 50. According to Gianni and Simpson (2005), the companies that profit the most from 
FOC fishing come from the EU or Taiwan. In the case of the EU, it is stated that all of 
member states combined may have top the list over companies that either “own or operate 
fishing vessels flagged to one of the top 14 FOC fishing countries” (Gianni & Simpson, 2005, 
p. 4). Furthermore, Spain and/or the Canary Islands represent a significant involvement in 
FOC fishing countries. In the case of countries such as Panama, Honduras, Belize and St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, the true owners of the companies or the true culprit, which own 
FOC fishing vessels and the respective corporations, may be unknown or intentionally hidden 
(Gianni & Simpson, 2005). Thus, these owners may reap the benefits of IUU fishing while 
being in secrecy. Stopping these companies may therefore not necessarily mean that IUU 
fishing will end. The hidden and true owners may establish new companies elsewhere. Thus, 
mitigating IUU fishing may prove to be an enormous challenge and a difficult task, since the 
illegal acts are masked behind a network of firm structures (Griggs & Lugten, 2007). 
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Another reason why it is important to mitigate IUU fishing is not related to the fish stock, the 
ecosystem, or fisheries management. In fact, IUU fishing may abuse human rights (Gianni & 
Simpson, 2005). This is due to e.g. “abandonment of crew members in foreign ports, forced 
labour and safety issues” (Gianni & Simpson, 2005, p. 4). In a particular case presented by 
Gianni and Simpson (2005), a fishing vessel sank with its crew in the Sub-Antarctic waters
11
. 
However, due to failure of some life-saving equipment, many people lost their lives (Gianni 
& Simpson, 2005). It is believed that this could be easily prevented if proper life-saving 
equipment was installed. Thus, such abuses may in some extreme cases result in death or loss 
of human lives. 
Illegal fishing may also have social impacts. Some of the major social impacts of IUU fishing 
have been already discussed, i.e. the issue regarding the high-valued commercial fish stock 
and the ecosystem as well as the issue of food security. Another social impact of IUU fishing 
appears to be taken form in a more direct way. According to MRAG (2005a), “direct conflict 
between IUU and other fishery users can often occur” (p. 57). According to FAO (2007c), 
IUU fishing is undermining the work and efforts of regional fisheries management 
organizations (RFMOs). Not only does IUU fishing having conflicts with other fishing 
vessels and their owners, but some of the criminal organizations also respond with threats to 
RFMO secretariats in an attempt to drive them away and disturb their efforts in combating 
IUU fishing (FAO, 2007c). 
6.4 Discussion and Recommendations 
According to Agnew (2009), there has been made some progress in eliminating IUU fishing 
in the recent years. As a matter of fact, a total of 11 areas have successfully reduced their IUU 
fishing activities since the beginning of the 1990s (Agnew, et al., 2009). Although, IUU 
fishing activities in some degrees have been reduced and much effort and work have been 
made to eliminate them, there are still much more work left to do in order to further prevent, 
deter and eliminate these criminal activities (Commission of the European Communities, 
2007). IUU fishing activities will not simply cease to exist. They will continue as long as 
there is fish in the sea and as long as it is beneficial. 
By its nature, IUU fishing activities are not regional problems that only occur in a few places 
and at a specific time. It is a global issue. Thus, the different measures and recommendations 
to combat IUU fishing may be viable to all countries that are affected by the criminal acts. 
                                                          
11
 This fishing vessel was called “the Amur” and it was operating in the waters of Kerguelen Island (Gianni & 
Simpson, 2005). 
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According to Agnew (2009), the recommended solution to combat illegal fishing is often one 
that is related to promote an improved governance, i.e. the law, rules and regulations (See e.g. 
High Seas Task Force, 2006). Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) and 
monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) play an important role to successfully mitigate 
IUU fishing activities (High Seas Task Force, 2006). Moreover, the economic incentives to 
take part in IUU fishing are quite high (Agnew, et al., 2009). Thus, there is a need to 
implement measures that may reduce these economic incentives, e.g. by increasing sanctions 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007; WWF, 2008). According to Agnew 
(2009), all of the above mentioned factors have contributed to the most recent success stories 
as far as mitigating IUU fishing activities are concerned. One of these success stories is 
provided by WWF (2008).  
The two most important fishing nations in the Barents Sea are Norway and Russia as their 
EEZ covers most of the fishing grounds (WWF, 2008). The main target species of the 
whitefish fisheries in the area are the Alaska Pollock and Atlantic cod (WWF, 2008). The 
annual legal catch of the cod stock is approximately 450,000 tonnes, while the illegal catch of 
the cod stock is estimated to be over 100,000 tonnes in 2005 where the amount is valued at 
US$350 million (WWF, 2008, p. v). Since 2005, IUU fishing of cod in the Barents Sea has 
been significantly reduced as the illegal landings have been estimated to be reduced by as 
much as 50% (WWF, 2008). Thus, it seems that there is a positive trend towards mitigating 
IUU fishing.  
The industry’s supply chain is very complex, and, therefore, efforts to combat IUU fishing 
need to be directed to each single stage that brings together the whole complex and dynamic 
supply chain network (WWF, 2008). These stages in the supply chain network include 
“harvesting, transportation, storage, distribution, processing and marketing” (WWF, 2008, 
p. 25). However, this will require a tremendous amount of efforts to establish an international 
cooperation between governments, organizations as well as consumers (WWF, 2008). 
Furthermore, it may be required that whole supply chain network has to be transparent and the 
products traceable. In this way, fish and fish products that originate from IUU would most 
likely be stopped before they could enter the international markets (WWF, 2008), and it may 
serve as a hindrance for those responsible for engaging in such criminal acts to benefit from it. 
As regard to traceability of fish and fish products, WWF (2008) suggests that an 
establishment of a mandatory traceability system is essential. On each stage of the value 
chain, legal documentation should be controlled as proof that the traded fish and fish products 
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do not originate from IUU fishing (WWF, 2008). According to WWF (2008), “without a 
market for products derived from IUU fishing, the incentive for IUU fishing will be gone” (p. 
25). An isolation mechanism of IUU fish and fish products from the market may therefore 
contribute to eliminate the criminal activities. By enhancing the control at the port state, 
illegal fishing and trading could be prevented. It is suggested by WWF (2008) that a global 
port state agreement is needed. In this way, only those states that have “registered and 
compliant ports can be involved in legitimate and sustainable seafood trading” (WWF, 2008, 
p. 26).  
One issue of particular concern is the so-called high seas and FOC transshipment of illegal 
catches. Such acts tend to take place on the high seas, and the catches are often stolen from 
other countries’ coastal waters (i.e. the EEZ) (WWF, 2008). However, the illegal catches 
could be transported by FOC vessels. Thus, transshipment could either be done through 
transfers on the high seas or it could be done by transferring the catches to FOC vessel to 
transport the illegal catches. The recommended solution to the problem of transshipment (i.e. 
both high seas and FOC transshipment) is to ban such acts through making them illegal under 
international law and the given affected costal states’ national legislation (WWF, 2008, p. 26). 
It may appear very simplistic to just recommend an overall ban of transshipments on the high 
seas and to FOC vessels in order to mitigate IUU fishing activities. However, one should keep 
in mind that there are many other factors that may play major roles in limiting or preventing 
IUU fishing, which will be discussed further in this section (e.g. port state controls and 
increased sanctions). 
According to the WWF (2008), “states need to recognize that it is in their best interest to 
meet obligations under UN Law of the Seas to manage their EEZs and stop IUU fishing” (p. 
26). It should rather be a moral obligation to promote sustainable ecosystems and act against 
IUU fishing. Any efforts directed towards promoting and maintaining sustainable 
development is undermined by IUU fishing activities (WWF, 2008). Therefore, any given 
governments affected or threatened by IUU fishing should contribute to control its own 
fishing activities in their own waters or EEZs. Reducing any efforts to mitigate IUU fishing 
activities would mean that those engaged in such activities may be giving a chance to get 
away and reap the benefits. WWF (2008) suggests that both the government and corporations 
could cooperate in order to form more robust institutional frameworks.  
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In the area of combating IUU fishing activities, the High Seas Task Force (HSTF) (2006) has 
contributed with a range of different proposals that may be useful to find solutions to IUU 
fishing, which will most likely continue if no actions are taken in order to combat it. The 
recommended action is first and foremost to “improve the quality of information and 
intelligence on IUU fishing activity and access to it” (High Seas Task Force, 2006, p. 4). 
Similarly to bycatch and discards, there is a general lack of information about IUU fishing 
activities. Thus, it seems to be reasonable to suggest that information must be gathered and 
data collected before any decisions on how to take action is made. Scientific advices and 
assessments of stocks may be more accurate if they are based on a high quality information 
source on the IUU fishing. Not only should information be collected, but it also has to be 
shared between countries and national control authorities, which include custom and tax 
agencies, police, fisheries agencies etc. (WWF, 2008, p. 25). Moreover, it is believed that 
better understanding and knowledge will lead to better decision-making on strategies for 
developed and developing countries to overcome IUU fishing in terms of monitoring, control 
and surveillance (MCS) activities as well as to form suitable policies against IUU fishing. In 
this case, developing countries may be more vulnerable than developed countries, and good 
informed plans and actions may support these countries as well. Thus, some special required 
needs are to be met in order to combat IUU fishing in developing countries (High Seas Task 
Force, 2006). The key to combat IUU fishing is to seek and secure good information about 
this criminal activity in order to address the issue at hand. It is important to stress that one 
cannot simply adopt standardized methods and apply them to every single region and country. 
However, the available tools should be adopted as countermeasures against IUU fishing. 
Moreover, one may have to consider to adapt and improve the tools to gather information as 
well as the methods in order to assess and monitor IUU fishing activities (High Seas Task 
Force, 2006). This must be prioritized. If IUU activities are detected in any fisheries, 
precautionary stock management measures should be adopted (WWF, 2008). Available 
estimates of IUU activities is recommended to be included as the total allowable catch (TAC) 
is decided and it should be included in the stock assessments as well (WWF, 2008, p. 27). 
Another action to be made is to aid the currently existing international monitoring, control and 
surveillance (MCS) network with much needed resources (High Seas Task Force, 2006). As 
the network becomes larger, it may be able provide developing countries training and support 
in the future (High Seas Task Force, 2006). However, it is not enough to only gather 
information and support networks. A global system has to be developed and established with 
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the information on high-seas fishing vessels (High Seas Task Force, 2006). Furthermore, 
encouragement to implement e.g. the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement is also essential to 
secure proper governance as well as long-term sustainable development (High Seas Task 
Force, 2006). In such a broad task, it is essential to include a broader collaboration between 
governments and organizations. However, an effort at a national level would not suffice, but 
there is a global need for an international collaboration and effort. 
As far as Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) are concerned, the High 
Seas Task Force (2006) proposes that the performance and collaboration need to be improved. 
A reform of the RFMOs may be necessary in order to improve their performance. Other 
aspects that need to be improved are information sharing. According to the High Seas Task 
Force (2006), the RFMOs may play an important role in strengthening governance in areas 
where high-seas fisheries are rapidly establishing in to. These fisheries are often expanding in 
an unregulated and uncontrolled manner. Furthermore, the FOC system needs to be 
eliminated. Thus, countries that provide and countries that utilize such services need to seek 
to promote long-term sustainable development instead of bringing more harm to the sea. This 
means that both the provider and the utilizer of the FOC system need to change their 
behaviors in order for IUU fishing to be somewhat reduced (High Seas Task Force, 2006). In 
this case, the source of the problem appears to be the countries that issue FOCs. Without a 
country that provides FOCs, there would not be any countries that could take advantage of 
these countries or FOCs providers. However, this does not mean that coastal states that take 
advantage of such system are not responsible for their acts at all. They are, in fact, as much 
responsible for contributing to encourage IUU fishing as the countries that issue FOCs to 
foreign fleets. Thus, measures to improve controls over IUU fishing needs to be implemented 
in both the flag state and the port state (High Seas Task Force, 2006). The state that takes 
advantage of the FOC system needs to be controlled. More specifically, the import of IUU 
products from flag state to port states need to be controlled by strengthening the given port 
states’ domestic legislation (High Seas Task Force, 2006, p. 6). There are often multinational 
corporations that could be behind the imports of IUU fish and products.  
Further measures to mitigate IUU fishing could also be contributed by consumers and 
retailers. They could demand for some kinds of confirmation of where the fish and fish 
products originates from or whether the end-products could be traced through the complexity 
of the value chains (WWF, 2008). In this case, eco-labeling the products, which originate 
from legitimate sources, by the retailers could be convenient to certify the products and at the 
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same time increase the consumer-awareness of the existing IUU fishing in the market. The 
retailers (e.g. supermarkets or restaurants) may then have the opportunity to “demonstrate 
social responsibility by promoting the fact that they serve only certified fish” (WWF, 2008, p. 
27). Public identification of organizations engaged in IUU fishing may also be a solution to 
establish awareness among consumers as well as governments. 
As far as imposing sanctions to whoever may be involved in IUU fishing activities is 
concerned, the WWF (2008) suggest that individuals and corporations responsible for such 
criminal actions should be subject to a substantial amount of fines as well as penalties that 
may involve imprisonment. The levels of penalties should match the gravity of the criminal 
acts, and, in accordance to WWF (2008), it should be high enough to prevent IUU fishing 
from thriving. According to Griggs (2007), “only by removing profits out of the transaction, 
and increasing the potentiality for being caught (and punished) will we see a true reduction 
on this type of behaviour” (p. 168). In this case, the costs and risks of being caught should 
outweigh the benefits that could potentially be gained from engaging in IUU activities. 
Basically, if the benefits or the profits outweigh the cost of being caught, then it seems to be 
the same as to allow IUU fishing activities to thrive. By increasing the costs of being caught, 
the economic incentives in engaging in IUU fishing may be reduced to some extent as it may 
appear to be not as much appealing or encouraging as in the past. WWF (2008) even goes as 
far as to recommend governments “to start dealing with IUU fishing in the same way they 
approach cross-border crime issues such as drug trafficking, illegal immigration and 
trafficking in persons” (p. 27). This is a reasonable suggestion considering the magnitude of 
the problem of IUU fishing, which should not be taken lightly. Furthermore, public aid should 
not be provided to anyone that engages in IUU fishing activities (WWF, 2008). This could be 
e.g. individuals, groups, corporations, fishing vessels etc. By forming an international legal 
basis for countries through encouraging compliance with the UN FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries (CCRF), there are possibilities to reach the goal of long-term 
sustainability and at the same time discourage IUU activities (Agnew, et al., 2009). According 
to Agnew, et al. (2009), certain countries in the world have already adopted some portions of 
the CCRF in their legislation. These countries include Norway, Malaysia, South Africa, 
Australia, Namibia etc. (Agnew, et al., 2009). Furthermore, the EU appears to be heavily 
committed to implement measures in order to prevent IUU activities. The goal is to stop trade 
of IUU fish and fish products by increasing import controls as well as raising higher sanctions 
for those who engage in IUU fishing (Agnew, et al., 2009). 
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According to WWF (2008), there is a constant threat of overfishing which in the long-term 
may bear significant problems to the future of the fishing industry. Given that the world 
population is increasing, there is a trend of increasing demand for food and sources of protein 
(e.g. protein from fish in this case). More people would mean that there are more mouths to 
feed. Agnew, et al. (2009) argue that the currently available fish stocks will have to face a 
tremendous amount of pressure in the next 50 years. If it is the case that the problem of 
overfishing extends over a long period of time, then the progress of mitigating IUU fishing 
may be at risk. It is crucial that the issue of IUU fishing is effectively addressed by the 
international community. It is argued by WWF (2008) that “IUU fishing can take new shapes 
and IUU products can find new ways to the market” (p. v). Thus, this means that there is 
undoubtedly much more work to do despite the fact that there is actually some progress being 
made in a broader perspective.  
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7.0 Institutions 
7.1 Definition of Institutions 
Institutions are a set of formal and informal rules that are governing individual and firm 
behavior. An institution may differ from another, and some are written down in the form of 
laws and regulations, while others are imprinted in given cultures in the form of norms and 
values (Falkenberg, 2007). In other words, institutions are “rules of the game” in a given 
society, which members of a community have to obey or act in accordance to what is 
acceptable. Douglass C. North defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction. In consequence, they structure incentives in human exchange, 
whether political, social, or economic” (North, 1990, p. 3). According to Falkenberg (2007), 
“institutions consist of norms, values, regulations and laws that constitute framework for 
behavior; a set of traffic rules for what we can- and cannot do” (p. 1). 
Peng (2009) suggests that the institutional framework could be divided into formal and 
informal institutions. Formal institutions consist of rules, law and regulations and informal 
institutions consists of norms, cultures and ethics (Peng, 2009). Moreover, the formal 
institutions’ main supportive pillar is the regulatory pillar while the informal institutions’ 
main supportive pillars are the normative and the cognitive pillars (Peng, 2009). According to 
Peng (2009), the regulatory pillar is “how formal rules, laws, and regulations influence the 
behavior of individuals and firms” (p. 93). The normative pillar is “how the values, beliefs, 
and norms of other relevant players influence the behavior of individuals and firms” (Peng, 
2009, p. 93), and the cognitive pillar is “the internalized, taken-for-granted values and beliefs 
that guide individual and firm behavior” (Peng, 2009, p. 94), i.e. our cultural values.  
7.2 Inadequate Institutions 
The institutions in emerging and developing economies are often very different from the 
institutions in the developed western economies. The developed economies are in general 
often perceived as having superior institutions than those institutions in emerging and 
developing economies. Thus, one may say that institutions in emerging and developing 
countries may be inadequate. For instance, according to Falkenberg (2004), institutions may 
be inadequate as the “legal and regulatory framework may be incomplete and fail to 
adequately protect people and the environment from harmful practices” (p. 20). Emerging 
and developing countries may in some cases lack democratic governments. In this respect, 
these institutions may only be “designed to serve those with political and economic power” 
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(Falkenberg, 2004, p. 20), and, thus, fail to serve the local culture. In this case, one may 
assume that least developed countries (LDCs) may have corrupted officials and judges. 
Falkenberg (2004) explains that this may “disrupt the proper functioning of markets, 
competition, property rights and due process law” (p. 20). Since these institutions are 
designed to serve those in power, the end result this particular action may lead to poor social 
conditions. Many people would then fail to cover their most basic needs, which are food, 
nutrition for the children, education, health care etc. (Falkenberg, 2004). 
Moreover, many poor countries seek to attract foreign skills, technology and investment into 
their countries, and they often have to negotiate with multinational corporations which are 
much larger than themselves in economic terms. Consequently, the poor countries often find 
themselves in a position of weakness or at a position considered disadvantage when dealing 
with major multinationals, and, thus, they are often forced to agree to unreasonable terms 
(Falkenberg, 2004). The circumstances of poor countries are in many ways different from one 
in developed countries. Thus, Falkenberg (2004) argues that the “concern for basic survival 
may override concerns for the environment, safe products, pollution and the like” (p. 20). 
Moreover, due to the poverty, they are not able to cover basic needs, e.g. in education, health 
care and nutrition for the children (Falkenberg, 2004). Furthermore, cultural differences in 
emerging and developing countries may “permit practices which are in clear violation of 
basic human rights, such as differential treatment based on political beliefs, religion, 
nationality, race, ethnicity or gender” (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 20). However, this is considered 
to be a problem in developed countries as well.  
Falkenberg (2004) argues that many emerging and developing economies may lack adequate 
institutions “when it comes to providing a framework for the operation of economic 
organizations” (p. 20). Quite often when MNCs operate overseas, in particular developing 
countries, they may encounter problems which may relate to ethics. Ethical dilemmas may 
occur when MNCs find themselves in a situation where they have a choice whether to act 
accordingly to ethical principles or engage in unethical practices and reap the benefits. Some 
MNCs may have chosen the latter. This is because the chances of getting caught are much 
lower than the chance to get away with it and gain a substantial amount of revenues. Thus, 
unethical practices may for some MNCs be beneficial. The reasons why these developing 
countries allow such practices are “because there is no law or regulation against it, or it is 
not objectionable according to the local convention or local cultural values” (Falkenberg, 
2004, p. 21). In some cases, the developing countries may not have the resources or 
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knowledge of how to stop such actions, or they simply cannot afford to make use of their 
resources to control and manage all of the MNCs’ activities. In other cases, corruption may 
have been the reason. Thus, the MNCs that engage in unethical practices are driven by the 
fact that the governments in developing countries may fail to promote law enforcement and, 
of course, all the benefits that follow. This means that these MNCs that have violated basic 
laws and regulations may never have to face the consequences. Furthermore, Falkenberg 
(2004) claims that some of “our material welfare may be resting on exploitive practices” (p. 
21). Thus, some of the various products that are purchased from customers may have been a 
part of an exploitive and unethical practice. In this way, one may say that by purchasing these 
products, which are related to such practices, could be seen as a contribution to MNCs 
continuous exploitive and unethical practices. The shoes that you wear may have been once 
produced by child labor. The fuel that is used to run your car may have been extracted from a 
place where government official are corrupt, and the human rights of the local population are 
deprived. The fish that you eat to dinner may be illegally fished, and it may as well be one of 
the species in danger of extinction.  
Falkenberg (2004) argues that “if a firm were to take full advantage of the local conditions in 
an opportunistic, selfish and egotistical manner, costs could be reduced substantially, 
revenues could be increased, thus positively affecting the bottom line” (p. 21). This means 
that the given firm would not act accordingly to what is considered ethical principles, but the 
act itself may be in violation against basic rules and regulations. The consequence from such 
selfish and opportunistic action may be one that affects negatively on the local population and 
the environment in which the firm operates. Examples of practices in which is considered 
unethical may include practices and activities such as hazardous working conditions for the 
hired employees, the firm may pay minimum or below average wages, young children may be 
exploited, the firm may bribe government officials, etc. (Falkenberg, 2004). The latter may 
come into play as the firm may want to acquire access rights to the developing countries’ 
natural resources, which Falkenberg (2004) argues that these resources neither belong to the 
government nor its officials, but the population of a given state. Moreover, Falkenberg (2004) 
suggests that harmful practices produced by, what he calls, “an opportunistic ethical egoist” 
may be those that could potentially: “deplete natural resources, extinguish species, release 
toxic wastes to the water or to the air, ignore unions, bribe public officials, pay no taxes, 
produce and sell dangerous products, or engage in illegitimate discrimination” (p. 21). The 
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difference between “opportunistic ethical egoist” and “utilitarianism” will be discussed later 
on. 
Falkenberg (2010b) suggests that eight items should be in place for certain institutions to 
achieve efficiency in governing both economic and political systems. These include: 
1. Many buyers and sellers without market power (ability to affect price) i.e. no 
monopolies. 
2. All buyers and sellers can come and go when they decide to (no exit/entry barriers). 
3. All buyers and sellers have complete knowledge of each other’s prices, qualities, and 
quantities sold. 
4. The products in the market are good substitute for one another. 
5. All costs and benefits are borne by the parties to the exchange and not by others 
6. All participants seek to maximize their utility 
7. No external agents seek to regulate quality, quantity or price. 
8. The buyers and the sellers must own what they exchange; protected property rights. 
(Source: Falkenberg, A. W. (2010). Syllabus and readings for Org 439: Culture and Ethics in 
International Organizations. University of Agder, Essay #15, pp. 2.) 
Economies that are considered inefficient may often violate one or more of the items listed 
above (Falkenberg, 2010b). Thus, the violation of one or more of these items may make poor 
countries even worst off. According to Falkenberg (2010b), in many poor but “resource rich 
countries, the politicians may sell their country’s natural resources and not use the income to 
enhance flourishing for their people” (p. 2). In this case, it may be a violation against item 
number eight listed above.  
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7.3 Small-Scale Fisheries in Developing Countries 
According to FAO (2009b), “in many developing countries small-scale fisheries contribute 
directly to food and livelihood security, balanced nutrition, poverty reduction and wealth 
creation, foreign exchange earnings and rural development” (p. iv). According to FAO 
(2010a), “the importance of the small-scale fisheries sector is of global reach. Its diversity in 
technology, culture and traditions is part of humankind’s heritage” (p. 70). Small-scale 
fisheries dominate in terms of employment in developing countries. They often provide 
economic, social and nutritional benefits to these developing countries (FAO, 2010a). 
However, one issue of particular concern is poverty that is mainly found in the poorest 
regions in the world, such as the South and Southeast Asia and the sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. 
including West Africa) (FAO, 2010a). Consequently, poverty would influence communities 
of the small-scale fisheries in such a way that millions of people are exposed to highly 
“vulnerable living and working conditions” (FAO, 2010a, p. 70). 
FAO (2010a) argued that the general emphasize on socio-institutional factors rather than 
economic and biological aspects may be important in order to reduce poverty in the long-
term. Although, the constantly threat of overfishing is unquestionably important to address, 
what is more important is to find the real causes of poverty in developing countries. 
Moreover, it is important to influence those institutions that may have played a major role in 
impeding prosperity and flourishing and instead generates poverty (FAO, 2010a), i.e. 
inadequate institutions. In this case, the social structures and institutional arrangements in 
developing countries that may have the power to control “how and by whom fishery and other 
resources can be accessed and used” (FAO, 2010a, p. 70), may also be one of the major 
factors that causes poverty. FAO (2010a) suggests some critical factors that may have 
contributed to poverty in small-scale fisheries in developing countries. These include 
“insecure rights to both land and fishery resources; poor or absent health and educational 
services; lack of social safety nets; vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change; and 
exclusion from wider development processes owing to weak organizational structures and 
inadequate representation and participation in decision-making” (FAO, 2010a, p. 11). Thus, 
in order to address the issue of poverty, there is a wide range of requirements that need to be 
met. One of these is to include marginalized groups “in the institutional processes related to 
resource management and that, in order to achieve this, new institutional approaches are 
needed” (FAO, 2010a, p. 70). Given that the people in the fishing communities have to deal 
with many challenges with regard to poverty on the daily basis, such as to meet their basic 
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needs, resource management may not be the top priority (FAO, 2010a). In most cases, the 
main problem may not be the lack of encouragement and motivation to participate in resource 
management, but the lack of capacity may have been the real issue as most people are not able 
to afford to spend their valuable time to participate in resource management when their most 
basic needs are not even met. Thus, unless the issue of poverty is addressed first, these new 
institutional approaches that are related to resource management may become ineffective 
(FAO, 2010a). 
Fish catches and fish capacity need to be controlled by national, regional and international 
institutions. According to UNEP (2011), “the root cause of overexploitation of fish stocks is 
the lack of control over fish catches or fishing capacity, or both” (p. 99). The fierce 
competition among individual fishers often results in encouraging them to catch as much as 
possible fish in a small time period (UNEP, 2011). Thus, if these uncoordinated efforts from 
individual fishers are left unchecked and uncontrolled, the outcome would be depletion of 
current fish stocks. Exploiting these fish stocks further to the extreme would result in harming 
future fish catches and potentially depleting fish stocks to the point of no return, i.e. 
completely annihilate the fish populations, as well as increasing the costs of catching fish 
(Hannesson, 2004).  
For the reason that many fish stocks often migrate, UNEP (2011) suggests that there is a need 
of “effective institutions at all levels of government, from the local to the provincial/state to 
the national, regional and international […]” (p. 99). However, unlike migrating fish stocks, 
i.e. from one EEZ to another or to the high seas, there are some fish stocks live completely 
within the EEZs and do not migrate. Thus, it is suggested that all that is needed is effective 
and adequate institutions on the national level (UNEP, 2011). There are also fish stocks that 
migrate from one Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in a country into other countries’ EEZ, 
which is called transboundary fish stocks (UNEP, 2011). In order to achieve long-term 
sustainable fisheries, effective management of shared fish stocks is needed. Thus, it is 
required that fisheries agree to cooperate on the management of shared fish stocks, i.e. “if 
these resources are to exploited on a sustainable basis” (Munro, Van Houtte, & Willmann, 
2004, p. 57). One issue of particular concern may be the ineffective regulation of fish stocks 
that live partly or completely in the high seas (UNEP, 2011). The regulation of these fish 
stocks is proved to be ineffective for the reason that they are in some cases governed by more 
than one coastal state (UNEP, 2011, p. 99). However, the issue further complicates as these 
fish stocks tend to migrate to the high seas, which is considered an open access area where 
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different rules and regulations cannot be enforced as there is no international police to ensure 
compliance to the international law of the sea. 
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8.0 Policies, Laws and Regulations 
8.1 The United Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
According to Hannesson (2004), “international law is a set of rules which nations have come 
to agree, explicitly or tacitly, is in their mutual interest to follow. There is no legislative 
assembly providing international law, and there is no international police force that can 
enforce it” (p. 29). However, an international court of justice does exist, but the disputes 
around the globe would not be solved unless the certain countries involved are willing to 
bring their disagreements into the court (Hannesson, 2004). 
According to Hannesson (2004), the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has not always been 
200 nautical miles from the coast as it is known for today. Before the 200-mile limit was 
established, the national boundaries at sea had been 3 miles (Hannesson, 2004). The idea of 3-
mile limit originated from the Dutch, which was dated back to the 1600s where the Dutchmen 
were an important trading and fishing nation. Thus, the Dutch was “the most energetic 
defenders of the freedom of the seas” (Hannesson, 2004, p. 30) during that period of time. 
Another idea that also originated from the Dutch was to use the range of the land-based 
cannons in order to determine how far off the coast a given state could govern the sea 
(Hannesson, 2004). For many years, the 3-mile limit was perceived as a norm until the end of 
World War II (Hannesson, 2004). However, after the Second World War, rapidly 
technological progress had made this norm of 3-mile limit obsolete (Hannesson, 2004, p. 31). 
This was especially the case when it came to the high technological development in both 
fisheries and oil extraction, which the latter had at that time become an increasingly important 
source of energy and perhaps even more now (Hannesson, 2004). After the Second World 
War, “the world catch of fish increased steadily by about 6 percent per year up to the early 
1970s” (Hannesson, 2004, p. 34). As the world catch of fish had increased, and so did also the 
fishing pressure on different stocks around the globe. Not only did the global fishing pressure 
on several of the fish stocks increase during this period, but due to the issue of ownership of 
the marine resources, the conflicts between many countries over these fish stocks increased as 
well (Hannesson, 2004, p. 34). Thus, the international disputes had to be addressed, and in 
order to seek the ideal solution to these problems, “the United Nations held three conferences 
on the law of the sea in the period 1958-1982” (Hannesson, 2004, p. 34). Furthermore, 
Hannesson (2004) emphasized that the superpowers at the time, i.e. the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union, played a significant role during these conventions. 
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The first conference on the law of the sea was held in Geneva in 1958, the second conference 
was held two years later in 1960, and the third and last in 1973 (Hannesson, 2004). According 
to Hannesson (2004), the first and second conference on the law of the sea in 1958 and 1960 
failed. This was mostly due to the disagreements regarding the question of how wide the 
jurisdictions over the marine resources should be. This means to what extent the ownership of 
resources on and underneath the seabed should be implemented for coastal states to reach an 
agreement on jurisdiction over the living resources in the sea. Some countries wanted to 
maintain the old 3-mile limit while others sought after a wider 12-mile limit (Hannesson, 
2004). Furthermore, the disagreements over ownership of resources on and underneath the 
seabed did not only concerned fish resources, but also oil extractions and deep-seabed mining. 
The technological advances after the Second World War had made it possible to extract 
important minerals from the deep seabed. Thus, technological progress had opened up many 
opportunities both in fisheries, oil extraction and deep-seabed mining, and as a result from 
these technological advances, ownership over these resources had become increasingly 
important for many countries. Most notably were the coastal states, which wanted to 
“establish ownership over the fish resources off their shores” (Hannesson, 2004, p. 35) For 
instance, deep-seabed mining was regarded by many countries that exported minerals as a 
threat to their own exporting activities (Hannesson, 2004, p. 35). Thus, establishing ownership 
to these resources would contribute to limit competition. Another reason for why there was a 
need to establish ownership to the resources was because the developing countries were 
worried that developed countries would take advantage of their superior technological 
advances in order to secure these resources for themselves. Thus, the disagreements in the UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea were undoubtedly caused by the different countries’ 
diversity of interests. Each country wanted to prioritize and secure their own interests, which 
made it even more difficult to reach an agreement that benefited everyone. As a matter of fact, 
no agreements were reached after the first conference in 1958 or the second conference in 
1960. According to Hannesson (2004), the first and second UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea “failed to reach the required two-thirds majority” (p. 34).  
The third conference on the law of the sea was held in 1973, and it was expected to be 
concluded within the next year (Hannesson, 2004). However, the conference turned out to last 
for about ten years, i.e. from 1973 to 1982 (Hannesson, 2004). According to Hannesson 
(2004), the consensus approach is the reason why the third conference had lasted for so long. 
In the two first conferences in the law of the sea, the main focus was mostly towards the 
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establishment of ownership over fish resources and the uncertainties surrounding deep-seabed 
mining. However, in addition to the previous issues, the third conference included a broader 
range of relevant issues that concerned the sea (Hannesson, 2004). The issues included in the 
third conference were “fisheries, pollution, navigation, research, and issues regarding the 
delimitation of the continental shelf raised by the ongoing advances in the technology for 
offshore oil extraction” (Hannesson, 2004, p. 35). The third conference continued to address 
the issues that it failed to solve at the previous two conferences, and the diversity of interests 
from countries that participated in the UNCLOS remained the same. As far as the fisheries 
were concerned, the differences of interests came into play as the countries that tend to fish at 
coast were more interested to reserve these resources, while others tend to send their fishing 
fleets to other parts of the world to fish. Thus, all countries were interested in acquire fishing 
rights that better fit their activities. According to Hannesson (2004), “from the beginning 
there was, however, a strong undercurrent favoring increased rights of sovereign states in the 
waters off coasts, at the expense of distant water fishing nations and nations with access to 
the sea but a short coastline or encircled by states bordering on the open ocean (Sweden 
versus Norway and Denmark, for example)” (p. 36).  
Furthermore, Hannesson (2004) suggested that there are overall three principal ways that may 
work in favor of the coastal states’ interests. These include “(i) extending the jurisdiction over 
the continental shelf to the waters above the shelf, (ii) defining access rights to fish stocks 
with reference to in which state’s waters they originate or mainly are found, and (iii) 
establishing fisheries jurisdiction over a certain territory irrespective of ecological or 
topographical factors, such as 200 miles from the shore” (Hannesson, 2004, pp. 36-37). It is 
further argued that the second point would be the most useful in terms of efficient control of 
the fish stocks (Hannesson, 2004, p. 37). However, the extent to which this particular proposal 
would successfully work in practice remained questionable. This is for the reason that some 
fish species may migrate from one jurisdiction to another or even to the high seas. If it is 
assumed that a coastal state had actually been granted access rights to fish stocks based on 
where they originated from, then the question is whether that particular coastal state is able to 
enforce rules in order to govern these fish stocks, regardless of how far these fish stocks may 
migrate from their coast. Thus, Hannesson (2004) argued that there may be some 
jurisdictional issues related to put this proposal into practice. Although, the United States 
supported the proposal, it got very little support from other countries that participated in the 
conference (Hannesson, 2004). Despite the lack of support of the proposal in the convention, 
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“the idea of ownership belonging to the coastal state, or the state where a fish stock 
originates, lives on in the articles of the Law of the Sea Convention pertaining to anadromous 
species […]” (Hannesson, 2004, p. 37). According to FAO (2005a), anadromous species are 
fish species such as salmon and rainbow trout. What actually distinguishes these species from 
other highly migratory species is that they live in both freshwater and saltwater (FAO, 2005a). 
Take for instance salmon as an example. Salmon is spawned in freshwaters, such as in rivers. 
However, they tend to migrate to the sea in order to feed and grow. Once they have grown 
and reached maturity, they return back to their original spawning ground in order to spawn, 
and so the cycle repeats itself (Hannesson, 2004). Fishing for these species at the high seas 
would have serious consequences as this cycle would break, which in turn would mean that 
less fish would spawn. As a matter of fact, the catches of anadromous species (e.g. salmon) in 
the high seas are completely forbidden (Hannesson, 2004). However, the same rule does not 
apply for catches of other highly migratory species (Hannesson, 2004). 
In the first of the three principal ways that may work in favor of the interests of coastal states, 
it encompasses the idea of granting the coastal state extended jurisdiction over the continental 
shelf. The main constraint to the previous idea was to grant coastal state ownership rights to 
resources restrictively to what was on and underneath the seabed. However, as this idea has 
been further developed over the years, it additionally included the waters above the 
continental shelf. Hannesson (2004) argued that the functionality of this idea would be similar 
to the idea where the coastal state are granted the ownership rights to fish stocks based on 
where they originated from. It is further argued that “this would have been logical if the rights 
to resources on and underneath the seabed had continued to be limited to the continental 
shelf” (Hannesson, 2004, p. 37). If it had not been for the technological advances after the 
Second World War, which had made it possible to exploit resources of the sea, such as fish, to 
a much greater extent, the conference would have not been struggling to reach an 
internationally agreed solution for which rights coastal states should be granted. According to 
Hannesson (2004), “continued technological development made it possible to exploit 
resources under the ocean bottom at greater depth than 200 meters” (Hannesson, 2004, p. 
37). Already the year after the third conference on the law of the sea was held, the 200-mile 
exclusive economic zone was introduced as a simple but clever solution to this 
(mindboggling) problem and it was supported by many countries that participated in the 
conference (Hannesson, 2004). The solution included exclusive ownership rights to coastal 
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states over resources that are either above, on or underneath the bottom of the sea (Hannesson, 
2004). 
Long before the third United Nation Conference on the Law of the Sea was concluded in 
1982, some of the rules that were put forward during the conferences were early adopted by 
several countries, and eventually they became international law de facto (Hannesson, 2004). 
This means that these laws were put into practice, despite the fact that they have not been 
officially or legally established. For instance, the 200-mile limit rule became an international 
law de facto long before the third conference was concluded (Hannesson, 2004). According to 
Hannesson (2004), “already in the latter part of the 1970s many countries established a 200-
mile exclusive economic zone” (p. 38). These countries include Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Panama, and Peru. The main reason for why these countries adopted the 200-mile limit was 
due to their small continental shelf and their exploitation of fish stocks that are located deeper 
than 200 meters below the surface of the waters (Hannesson, 2004). Similarly, Argentina and 
Iceland did also claim ownership of the resources of the sea (Hannesson, 2004). However, 
more importantly the United States early adopted the idea of the 200-mile exclusive economic 
zone from its coast in 1976 and later it became a law during an election campaign between 
President Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, which was “against the will of the US negotiation at 
the conference and two important departments of the US government, the Department of State 
and the Department of Defense” (Hannesson, 2004, p. 38).  
At the time the UNCLOS was concluded in 1982, not all countries that participated in the 
conference supported the solutions. As a matter of fact, the United States of America and a 
few other countries voted against the UNCLOS (Hannesson, 2004). This was mostly for the 
reason that some of the rules adopted by the UNCLOS did not worked in favor to the United 
States’ deep-seabed mining (Hannesson, 2004). Even though, the United States did not sign 
the convention until later, they were independently capable and able to implement and enforce 
their own set of rules and regulations (Hannesson, 2004). The main reason for why this was 
possible for the United States was because they were and indeed still are one of the most 
powerful countries in the world, and they could therefore unaffectedly and completely ignore 
the UNCLOS if they chose to do so. However, deep-seabed mining soon turned out to be not 
as economically profitable as previously anticipated (Hannesson, 2004). Eventually, the 
United States was willing to give their formal approval to the UNCLOS. 
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In 1994, the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) had officially and 
formally became an international law as it is well-known for today (Hannesson, 2004). A total 
of 60 states gave their formal approval to the UNCLOS by the time that it became an 
international law of the sea, which was the minimum requirement in order for the proposals 
that were put forward in the conference to be adopted (Hannesson, 2004). In 2003, a total of 
145 states had signed the UNCLOS (Hannesson, 2004). Hannesson (2004) argued that the 
UNCLOS would never become an international law if it was not for the support from the 
superpowers, i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union. Although, the challenges on the way 
to reach an internationally agreed solution were not without conflicts, setbacks or criticisms, 
e.g. aimed towards the text of the convention for being inconsistent and ambiguous, the 
achievements of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea are no doubt 
remarkable (Hannesson, 2004). According to Hannesson (2004), “most of human history is a 
history of ethnic cleansing and rule by the club, the sword, the cannon, the machine gun, and 
the bomb” (p. 39). Thus, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea has proven 
that it is possible to establish an international law, and international disputes and issues are no 
longer solved through military power but instead they may be negotiated peacefully. 
8.2 Weaknesses of the 200-mile Zone 
According to Hannesson (2004), “the main weakness of the 200-mile zone is that it does not 
establish property rights over fish stocks as such, except when stocks happen to be enclosed 
within the zone” (p. 52). This brings back to the previous point made by Hannesson (2004), 
where it was argued that the international law could not be enforced for the reason that there 
is no ‘international police’. This is particularly the case when it comes to the high seas, which 
is outside of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. According to Hannesson (2004), “a fish 
stock that is accessible on the high seas is no one’s property” (p. 43). Thus, it was further 
argued that since there is no international police to enforce the international law, and since the 
high seas are outside of a given country’s EEZ, fishing vessels around the world are 
encouraged to fish on the high seas (Hannesson, 2004, p. 52). The trend of high seas catches 
over the past few decades may reflect this particular weakness of the 200-mile zone. The 
global trend of catches from the high seas, which is also called ‘oceanic catches’, had 
gradually increased in the period from 1950 to 1999 (Garibaldi & Limongelli, 2002). 
According to Garibaldi and Limongelli (2002), catches from the high seas accounted for 
around 4-8% of the world catch in the period from 1950 to 1989. However, in 1998 and 1999, 
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the catches in these areas had accounted for more than 10% of the world catch (Garibaldi & 
Limongelli, 2002).  
Since the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea had been concluded in 1982, 
coastal states are granted ownership rights to the resources within the 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone. This means that the coastal states have been assigned property rights for 
whatever resources within the EEZ. Inside this economic zone, the coastal states may manage 
their resources however they see fit (Hannesson, 2004). More precisely, the coastal states are 
required to grant other states the right to exploit any surplus of fish resources that they are 
unable utilize themselves (Hannesson, 2004). Furthermore, each coastal state has the power to 
decide its own total allowable catch as they see suitable within their waters, i.e. exclusive 
economic zone (Hannesson, 2004). In contrast to the fish stocks in the high seas, the fish 
stocks within an exclusive economic zone are only available for the respective coastal state 
and for other states that have been authorized to fish in its waters (Hannesson, 2004). Thus, 
the numbers of players that want to exploit fish stocks within the EEZs are considerable fewer 
than on the high seas. However, Hannesson (2004) argued that “in great many cases states do 
not impose very strict access controls on fish stocks within their economic zones, and some 
have practically no controls at all” (p. 43). The question at hand is whether these waters are 
currently overfished due to the lack of control and surveillance or do the states that have been 
authorized to fish in a foreign country’s waters actually exploit these fish stocks sustainably. 
If a coastal state for whatever reasons do not control the access on fish stocks within their own 
economic zone, the only element that distinguishes the economic zones from the high seas is 
practically gone. Thus, the absence of regulation and access control to fish resources within 
exclusive economic zones and the free access to fish resources on the unregulated high seas 
appears to be no different from one another (Hannesson, 2004, p. 43).  
8.3 The Complementarity Principle 
According to Brown (2005), “all bilateral fishing agreements are based on the principle of 
complementarity between national and foreign fishing concerns” (p. 4). UNEP (2002) 
indicates that any fishing agreements between a national and foreign country should be 
rejected if they are not consistent with the principle of complementarity. It is particularly 
important both in terms of the environmental and social point of view. According to UNEP 
(2002), there are some conditions that need to be met in order for a state to apply this 
principle, which in many cases are quite demanding at least in practice. Implementation of the 
complementarity principle requires that states should have: “[1)] assessed stock levels per 
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target species; [2)] estimated precisely, on the basis of scientific studies, the level of the 
annual taking compatible for each stock; [3)] determined, by substraction, the balance that is 
likely to be attributed to foreign fishing boats in the form of licenses or fishing rights on 
specified quantities of target species” (UNEP, 2002, p. 22).  
UNEP (2002) argues in that conflicts between the national and the foreign fishing fleets 
should not occur, at least in theory.  This is with respect to the third condition, the fishing 
rights and licenses to the coastal states’ waters should only be able to acquire by foreign 
states, when the given coastal state has any ‘surplus’ fish resources after the national fishing 
interests are satisfied and domestic or local market is sufficiently supplied. However, in 
reality it is not always that simple. In fact, the gap between theory and practice has 
continuously widen from the beginning (UNEP, 2002). This is because not all coastal 
developing countries, which were or still are in a ‘partnership’ with the EU, are able or 
capable to implement this principle and its conditions in practice. For example, due to the lack 
of financial capital, the given coastal state may not be able to assess fish stock levels for each 
target species, and without any knowledge or consistent scientific data, it may not have the 
proper tools to estimate the sustainable level of annual fish catch. The latter issue may also 
arise in developed countries. In the case of the fishing access agreements between the EU and 
Senegal, the concept of complementarity may have not functioned very well (UNEP, 2002). 
The same could be said about other fishing access agreements between the EU and other 
countries, e.g. the ACP countries. 
8.4 The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is the European Union’s (EU) fisheries policy. The CFP 
only deals with issues regarding fisheries, both within the internal European waters and the 
external international waters. Before the CFP was created in 1983, all of the issues concerning 
fisheries were originally handled under the Common Agricultural Policy (European 
Commission, 2009c; Béatrice. Gorez & O'Riordan, 2003).  
The main purpose of the CFP is to promote “sustainable fisheries and aquaculture in a 
healthy marine environment which can support an economically viable industry providing 
employment and opportunities for coastal communities” (European Commission, 2009c, p. 
8). These core principles of the CFP were agreed by 15 member states of the EU in 2002.  
Conservation of marine resources is according to the CFP referred to sustainable exploitation 
of the oceans’ resources in such a way that the fish stocks are “able to replenish themselves, 
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and resilient enough to withstand other external shocks” (European Commission, 2009c, p. 
8). External shocks are here referred to changes in the external environment, in which are 
largely beyond human control, e.g. pollution and the impact of climate change (European 
Commission, 2009c).  
With regard to the small-scale fisheries sector, policy-makers and planners generally suffer 
from the lack of information and knowledge gaps (FAO, 2010a). In turn, this may prevent the 
policy-makers from establishing and formulating several key policies that are relevant to the 
small-scale fisheries sector (FAO, 2010a). As a consequent, this may impede policy-makers 
from heading in the right direction, which is “to maintain and improve the contribution by the 
sector to food security, poverty alleviation and employment” (FAO, 2010a, p. 71). This is 
especially the case when it comes to developing countries. The long-term objectives of the 
CFP are to “bring fish stocks back to sustainable levels by ending overfishing and setting 
fishing opportunities based on scientific advice” (European Commission, 2011b, p. 1). 
Fishing opportunities are here defined as “a quantified legal entitlement to fish, expressed in 
terms of catches and/or fishing effort” (Council Regulation (EC), 2002, p. 56). 
Gorez and O’Riordan (2003) argue that the CFP has failed to monitor and control the balance 
between fishing efforts and the sustainable use of the resources. The EU has since then shifted 
their attention away from the core principles of the CFP, and the level of dependency towards 
external fish supplies gradually increases. The aim of fishing outside of EU waters was to 
“meet both its market (processing and consumption) and fishing sector (employment and 
investment) demands” (Béatrice. Gorez & O'Riordan, 2003, p. 4). This had led to increased 
fishing pressure especially in ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries as the EU had 
acquired access to these countries’ fishery resources through fishing agreements. Thus, Gorez 
and O’Riordan (2003) expressed their concern when they stated that “the fishery situation in 
the EU today (over-capacity, depleted resources, supply deficit, etc.) is both potentially 
promising and perilous for ACP states” (p. 4). 
In 2008, the European Commission was supported by the Council of Fisheries Ministers to 
carry out plans to develop a new reform of the CFP (European Commission, 2009c). The 
consumption level in the EU is much higher than fish stocks are able to replenish. Thus, 
increasing fishing efforts are undeniably threatening the ecosystem in what is already 
considered overexploited waters (European Commission, 2011b). This situation could be 
described as being very destructive in many ways, since the increasing fishing efforts 
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combined with dwindling fish stocks will result in smaller catches over the years. If these 
stocks are exploited even further, the individual fish stocks may become extinct as they are 
unable to replenish themselves. Currently  “three out of four stocks are overfished: 82% of 
Mediterranean stocks and 63% of Atlantic stocks” (European Commission, 2011b, p. 1). 
Recognizing the destructive nature of overfishing, the European Commission aims for a better 
future by promoting sustainable practices through a reform of the CFP in terms of 
environmental, economic and social aspects (European Commission, 2011b). Thus, 
sustainability across the fishing industry is the core of the reform. According to the European 
Commission (2011b), “fishing sustainably means fishing at levels that do not endanger the 
reproduction of stocks and that provide high long-term yields” (p. 1).  
8.5 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
According to Falkenberg (2004), “NGO’s have played an important role in the formation of 
current institutions in the Western world” (p. 21). Non-governmental organizations may 
include “religious organizations, human rights organizations, aid and development 
organizations, aboriginal organizations, environmental organizations” (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 
22). Non-governmental organizations often aim their criticism and accusations toward 
multinational corporations (MNCs) throughout the world that shift some of their business 
practices and activities abroad (Falkenberg, 2004). The violation of basic human rights, 
justice, the environment and safety issues, e.g. hazardous working conditions, are some of the 
major areas in which the NGOs’ allegations are centered (Falkenberg, 2004). NGOs attempt 
to bring MNCs that have violated basic laws and regulation or participated in criminal 
practices into ethical scrutiny. This is done through bringing all the MNCs wrong-doings into 
the public attention in a given MNC’s home country (Falkenberg, 2004). Thus, some NGOs 
may serve as some kind of international police or, what Falkenberg (2004) calls, “watchdogs 
in areas where institutions are inadequate” (p. 22), and they may contribute to “increase the 
costs of unethical practices” (p. 21). By uncovering the MNCs’ wrong-doings and presenting 
the information and evidence to its audiences, the NGOs and the media may both benefit from 
their publicity (Falkenberg, 2004). NGOs are like any other organizations - they need capital 
in order to survive. Thus, there are many NGOs in which greatly depend on voluntarily 
financial donations and support from inspired individuals and/or organizations (Falkenberg, 
2004). NGOs try not only to reach the public through the media, but also the key stakeholders 
which the MNCs are dependent on. If a NGO has found out that a MNC has engaged in 
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unethical practices, these messages with evidence may be delivered by the media. In turn, this 
may weaken the trust that key stakeholders have to the MNC (Falkenberg, 2004). 
(NGOs attempt to bring MNCs that have violated basic laws and regulation or participated in 
criminal practices into ethical scrutiny). This may be particularly the case when it comes to 
international corporations that base their action solely on a straight forward cost-benefit 
analysis. If the costs and the chances of being caught have increased substantially, some 
corporations may reconsider their actions when operating abroad. However, many 
international economic enterprises have been put under ethical scrutiny by NGOs in the past. 
Some examples of MNCs that have been under ethical scrutiny include “BP, Shell, Enron, 
Statoil, Ikea, GAP, Nestlé, NIKE and Parmalat” (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 17) and many more. 
The consequences of ethical scrutiny may become devastating for those MNCs involved in 
unethical practices, and it may greatly affect their business practices abroad. These may 
include “tarnished reputation, trust erosion, lowered brand equity as well as lowered sales” 
(Falkenberg, 2004, p. 21).  
MNCs are like any other large international corporations in which seek to maximize their 
earnings. However, some may deliberately engage in criminal activities, while others may 
have thought that their activities may have been legitimate as no laws or regulations have 
been broken. In some cases, this has been used as an argument as various of firms try to 
defend “their actions by claiming that they operate well within local laws and regulations” 
(Falkenberg, 2004, p. 17). However, laws and regulations are different from a country to 
another, and, thus, they may not always be ethical. In this regard, Falkenberg (2004) argues 
that “one does not have to break a law to be subject to ethical criticism” (p. 17). Recently, it 
has become a trend to act accordingly to ethical principles as some corporations may find it 
beneficial to do so. However, Falkenberg (2004) argues that “one should act ethically 
because it is right to do so, not only when it is profitable” (p. 17). 
Although, NGOs have played an important role in governing MNCs that operate in areas 
where institutions are inadequate, both the NGOs and the media may not always be right 
about their claims and accusations. According to Falkenberg (2004), “not all NGO’s do their 
homework properly and make erroneous accusations” (p. 22). This includes the media as 
well. In some cases, NGOs and the media are more concerned about generating support and 
donations from their audiences through their publicities that they may solely focus on what is 
wrong rather than what may be considered objective and fair. Falkenberg (2004) explains that 
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“bad news brings vast audiences and there is a tendency to exaggerate the bad news and not 
give equal coverage to the good news” (p. 22). This may not only be costly for the given 
MNC, which has come under ethical scrutiny, but the credibility of such actions by the NGOs 
and the media may be reduced substantially at both presently and in the future. Time and 
again the NGOs as presented by the media tend to focus on problems and issues that are far 
away from home. Thus, it becomes difficult for the home audience to evaluate the credibility 
of the NGOs bring up worldwide issues that do not directly concern their home country 
(Falkenberg, 2004). Such problems may include species preservation, resource utilization, 
environmental responsibility or problems related to the local population’s well-being where 
the MNCs operate. Falkenberg (2004) argues that “these issues are of course important – but 
it is easier to focus on problems that are far from home instead of focusing on issues like 
energy consumption or possible over consumption in the western markets” (p. 22). Another 
important issue in developed countries that is worth to be mentioned and needs to be 
addressed is pollution. While some NGOs may in some cases only focus on problems far from 
home and they could sometimes be unfair to MNCs when not including the MNCs positive 
practices into account as well, generally NGOs have managed to increase the cost of 
transgression, which is a remarkable achievement in itself. In recent years, large international 
economic enterprises are increasingly more concerned about transparency, corporate social 
responsibility and the environmental implications of their operations in foreign countries 
(Falkenberg, 2004). Thus, “[…] NGO’s have successfully engaged some MNC’s in a different 
kind of cost/benefit calculus. At the same time, they have raised the general awareness of 
ethics and morality in their societies, and caused a change in how we feel about certain 
practices and thus affected a change in convention and local institutions” (Falkenberg, 2004, 
p. 22). 
8.6 Fisheries Access Agreements: EU and Senegal 
The fisheries access agreements between the European Union and numerous of developing 
countries (e.g. the ACP countries) have in the last decades attracted a great deal of criticism 
from various of NGOs and the media (Brown, 2005). The Coalition for Fair Fisheries 
Arrangements (CFFA) was established by the International Collective in Support of 
Fishworkers (ICSF) and some other European NGOs (e.g. CCFD and Greenpeace) in 1992 in 
order to protect the Senegalese fishermen from the EU’s harmful fishing practices and its 
government’s acts of self-interests by selling fishing rights to foreign countries in exchange 
for financial compensation (CFFA, 2012). Through the CFFA, the issue of ‘fishing access 
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agreements’ between the EU and Senegal as well as other developing countries was brought 
into light (CFFA, 2012). 
According to Brown (2005) and the UNEP (2002), the fishing access agreements between 
Senegal and the EU were dated back to 1979. In her contribution to the Coalition for Fair 
Fisheries Arrangements (CFFA), Beatrice Gorez stated that Senegal was “the first country to 
have signed a fisheries agreement with the EU in 1979” (as cited in, Nordberg, 2003, p. 3). 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was concluded in 1982, 
and more than a decade later it became formally known as the International Law of the Sea in 
1994 (Hannesson, 2004). Thus, the Law of the Sea did not come into force until many years 
after the establishment of fishing access agreements between the EU and Senegal. This means 
that the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) was also not officially introduced as part of the 
international law. However, Brown (2005) argued that many countries were early adopters of 
the EEZs. The most of these were coastal states of the European Union. 
8.6.1 Maastricht Treaty and the Lomé Convention 
The Maastricht Treaty defined the main policy guidelines with regard to how the EU should 
perform and act in developing countries (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002). According to 
Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002), the guidelines included in this treaty include to aid 
developing countries “to reduce poverty and promote sustainable development” (p. 75). 
Furthermore, it was stated that “this commitment is equally valid in such areas as fisheries, 
trade and agriculture” (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002, p. 75).  
The Lomé Convention played a central role in terms of development in the relationship 
between the EU and the 71 ACP countries (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002). The Convention 
spanned a period of 10 years, i.e. from 1990 to 1999 (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002). 
Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002) argued that after the Lomé Convention IV had expired in 
1999, the fishery relations between the EU and the ACP countries may had been hanging on a 
balance. This was mainly due to its focus on the development potential in the fishing industry. 
More specifically, the Lomé Convention recognized how the EU could possibly contribute in 
the development of the ACP countries’ “capabilities to exploit their own coastal resources” 
(Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002, pp. 75-76). Although, the Lomé Convention supported some of 
the development aspects in the fishing industry, it seemed that the Convention had 
disregarded what was considered as one of the most important factors that may have a 
profound impact on the coastal states’ economic growth and poverty reduction (Kaczynski & 
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Fluharty, 2002). That is the integration aspects of development in the ACP countries. As far 
as the fisheries were concerned, this included “requirements to unload of harvested resources 
and/or investment in coastal states’ land infrastructure for purposes of value added 
processing” (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002). As the fishery relationship between the EU and 
the ACP countries extends over a longer period of time, the inclusion of the EU by the ACP 
countries becomes essential fisheries areas such as “in resource conservation, environmental 
protection, assistance in creation of local fishing fleets and private sector development” 
(Secretariat d’etat a la mer, Direction de peches maritimes etcultures marines. Cout financier 
pour la C.E.E. des Accords signes avec le pays A.C.P., Paris, August 1992; in Kaczynski & 
Fluharty, 2002, p. 76). However, Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002) argued that from the point of 
view of the EU, their participation in other coastal states’ affairs may not be desirable. This 
was due to the fact that “implementation of such policy changes would result in loss of 
revenues, higher costs of cooperation, growth of imports, and unemployment in the fishery 
sector” (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002, p. 76).  
According to Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002), the international fisheries cooperation 
agreements between the EU and the ACP countries were negotiated by the EU Commission’s 
Directorate General for Fisheries (DG XIV). An issue of particular concern with regard to the 
agreements was that the EU Commission’s Directorate General for Fisheries claimed that 
their agreements with the ACP countries were strictly commercial (Martinez, 1996). This 
basically means that the EU practically denied having any responsibilities that were related to 
development or poverty reduction on the developing countries that they cooperated with 
(Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002; Martinez, 1996). As previously stated, EU had under the 
fishery agreements provided financial compensations to the ACP countries’ governments on 
the annual basis in exchange for fishing access (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002). However, with 
purely commercial agreements added into the equation, it may bring difficulties to monitor 
and control how these funds were utilized in the given developing country (Martinez, 1996). 
Given that most of these developing countries’ governments were indebted and, thus, in dire 
need for additional financial support, the financial compensation provided by the EU without 
any form of control would unquestionably be welcomed by these countries’ governments 
(Martinez, 1996). Thus, for them the practice were only beneficial as the financial 
compensation could be seen as a “blank cheque to be used at will, not necessarily for the 
people’s benefit” (Martinez, 1996, p. 43). Without knowing how these funds are utilized, the 
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chances that they are being used for future development in developing countries’ fisheries 
sector and poverty alleviation are probably slim. 
According to Martinez (1996), “to preserve EU interests, the actual catches of the EU under 
a given fishing agreement are not made public” (Martinez, 1996). Thus, without any hard 
facts and numbers to base on and to compare, no countries may require higher financial 
compensations from the EU. Furthermore, in addition to the lack of transparency with regard 
to the actual catches from the EU, Martinez (1996) argued that the agreements which were 
negotiated by DG XIV had many issues (in which the EU had taken advantages of its 
weaknesses and altered the terms in their favor). One of these was related to catch quotas. 
According to Martinez (1996), “the fishing rights for trawlers are assigned in terms of Gross 
Registered Tonnage”, in which would allow “the fleet to progressively increase its fishing 
effort by developing technical innovations for any given tonnage” (p. 43).  
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8.7 The UNCLOS and the EU-Senegal Fisheries Access Agreements 
Ever since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was concluded 
in 1982 and formally became international law in 1994, the United Nations have undoubtedly 
accomplished major achievements in terms of the international political and economic affairs 
(Hannesson, 2004). Most notably, the UNCLOS established “an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) of 200 nautical miles” (Brown, 2005, p. 1), which allows coastal states ownership 
rights within the EEZ and to regulate, control and manage their fish resources however they 
see fit (Hannesson, 2004). This means that coastal states may regulate the access of their own 
EEZ. This could be done by either imposing rights and rules on foreign fishing operators, or 
limiting the pressure on marine resources in order to implement management and 
conservation measures (UNEP, 2002). Before the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea was adopted in 1982, a number of countries had already extended beyond their 
territorial waters of 12 nautical miles (UNEP, 2002). This includes Senegal. According to 
Brown (2005), the establishment of EEZs makes “95% of the world’s fish stocks and 35% of 
the oceans under the jurisdiction of coastal nations” (p. 1), i.e. within EEZs. UNEP (2002) 
claims that 90 % of the marine resources are within EEZs. Thus, the EEZ has without a doubt 
made significant and major changes to the regulation of the sea in terms “of the principle of 
free access to sea resources, since it creates and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 
marine miles (Art. 62), within which coastal states dispose of sovereign rights on sea 
resources (living or non-living)” (UNEP, 2002, pp. 21-22). 
However, one issue in particular concern with regard to the UNCLOS is Article 62, in which 
deals with the utilization of living resources within EEZs. Article 62, Section 2 of the 
UNCLOS is stated as follows: “The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the 
living resources of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the 
capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other 
arrangements […], give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch […]” 
(United Nations, 1982, Part V: Exclusive Economic Zone; Article 62, Section 2). Thus, it 
appears that the UNCLOS encourages coastal states, e.g. Senegal, to give the authorization for 
other states to exploit any surplus that they are unable to utilize themselves (Brown, 2005; 
Hannesson, 2004; UNEP, 2002). In turn, this may contribute to further overexploitation of 
fish stocks, and the impact of such actions may affect the fish stock conservation and 
management greatly. In turn, overexploitation of marine resources may lead to a shortage of 
food, in which may again threaten food security for coastal states. 
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The establishment of the EEZ also marked the end of the long distance fishing by, for 
instance, the United States and the European Union (Brown, 2005; Hannesson, 2004). What 
have previously been considered an open or free access fishing area is now under the 
jurisdiction of one or more coastal states. Consequently, those states that have relied heavily 
on long distance fishing in the past, would now have to depend on fisheries agreement, license 
arrangements or joint ventures to acquire fishing rights and access to other coastal states’ 
EEZs (Brown, 2005). This is particularly the case when it comes to the European Union and 
the ACP countries. 
The UNEP (2002) suggests that existing regulations must be enforced before one may 
consider implementing and imposing new regulations and organizational measures. This 
include, for instance, industrial fishing vessels are too frequently been observed within the 
six-mile zone, which is reserved for small-scale fishing vessels (UNEP, 2002). Existing 
regulations need to be enforced in order to stop industrial vessels to sail into the six-mile 
zone. The UNEP (2002) recommends that “all the professionals of the sector should be 
encouraged to reflect upon the reasons for such non-compliance with the laws, and consider 
ways and means for ending it” (p. 60). (Check also harmful practices, p. 52) 
When new regulations are concerned, the UNEP (2002) suggests that export of all endangered 
fish species should be banned. If the export of these species is not banned, endangered species 
should be charged with an additional tax (UNEP, 2002). In this way, the cost of exporting 
endangered fish species may not be as beneficial, which in turn may reduce the fishing 
pressure on the concerned species.  
8.8 The Complementarity Principle 
There are several weaknesses to the complementarity principle. In the case of the EU-Senegal 
fishing agreements, the UNEP (2002) argues that the development of the EU-Senegal fishing 
agreements and the development of the Senegalese small-scale fisheries in the 1980s existed 
simultaneously with one another. In the period of the 1980s, the landings from small-scale 
fisheries were estimated to be 150,000 tons. In 1990, small-scale fisheries landings increased 
to 250,000 tons, and the landings increased further to as much as 350,000 tons in 2002 
(UNEP, 2002). According to the UNEP (2002), “as regards coastal, demersal and pelagic 
resources, national fishing ships seem not only capable of exploiting almost all of the stocks 
but also exploiting them fully” (p. 23). This is with the exception of pelagic resources, since it 
is not fully exploited by small-scale fisheries. UNEP (2002) argues that the productivity or 
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capacity problems are not the reasons why small-scale fisheries in Senegal have not fully 
exploited pelagic resources. The actual problems are rather with high capital costs and the 
attractiveness of export species with higher commercial value (UNEP, 2002).  
If the complementarity principle is fully operational, UNEP (2002) argues that the EU-
Senegal fishing agreements should actually be based on scientific evaluation and data. 
However, in reality this is not the case. First of all, researchers’ scientific data have seldom 
been taken into consideration by the important actors. Furthermore, UNEP (2002) argues that 
the data collected in order to conduct an evaluation may not be correct or accurate. Fishing 
agreements may have been established, despite the fact that one or more fish stock may have 
been already fully exploited by the coastal country (UNEP, 2002). Surprisingly, if the 
conditions for a theoretically complementarity between national and foreign fishing concerns 
are met, UNEP (2002) claims that it does not necessarily mean that there are no longer 
practical problems. According to UNEP (2002), “if foreign fishing is normally allocated 
according to what remains beyond national fishing capacity, both of them will be competing 
in the same fishing zones” (p. 23). This means that competition between national and foreign 
fishing fleets both large-scale and small-scale is inevitable, i.e. given that a fishing access 
agreement between two states exists. 
UNEP (2002) suggests that there are all in all two types of competition that may take place 
under such circumstances; 1) competition between national and foreign industrial fishing 
fleets, and; 2) competition between national and foreign small-scale and industrial fishing 
fleets. The latter especially raises serious concerns since there is a conflict at sea between two 
types of fishing activities; industrial large-scale and traditional small-scale fishing. UNEP 
(2002) claims that the conflicts between these two fishing activities “have tended to worsen 
since small-scale fishing has been in the position to compete off-sea with industrial fishing 
boats” (p. 23).  
The consequences of these encounters are always uncertain and sometimes dangerous. The 
depletion of coastal demersal fish stocks and destruction of fishing gear is some of the 
outcome of such encounters (UNEP, 2002). More importantly, these kinds of conflicts may 
sometimes result in collisions between industrial and traditional fishing vessels, which may in 
turn be the cause of human casualties (UNEP, 2002). Several NGOs and the media often tend 
to draw attention to encounters which results in collisions between the EU industrial fishing 
trawlers and the Senegalese small-scale fishing vessels. However, the UNEP (2002) claims 
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that foreign fishing vessels are only responsible for a few of these collisions in which take 
place in the reserved fishing zone. Thus, most of the collisions are, in fact, between national 
industrial and traditional fishing vessels, and not between foreign industrial and national 
traditional fishing vessels as many NGOs claim (UNEP, 2002). This brings back to the point 
where the Senegalese development of small-scale fisheries was progressing simultaneously 
with the development of the EU-Senegal fishing agreements. Since the development of small-
scale fisheries in Senegal is on a relatively high level, it may compete directly with both 
national and foreign industrial fishing vessels in which may be the cause of conflicts at sea 
(UNEP, 2002). Thus, the faster the small-scale fisheries are developing in this period; the 
higher are the risks of conflicts involved with industrial fishing activities, i.e. both national 
and foreign. Therefore, the UNEP (2002) suggests that extending the limits of the reserved 
zones should perhaps be considered. 
According to the UNEP (2002), there are at least three reasons for why e.g. the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Agreement on Straddling and Migrant 
Stocks, and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) stress the importance of 
protecting small-scale fisheries when it comes to preservation of marine resources. These 
three reasons to protect small-scale fisheries are as follows; 
1) It plays a more important role in the supply of low-cost animal proteins than 
industrial fishing which is more concerned about commercial profits; 
2) Its practices are also perceived as being more sustainable than those of industrial 
fishing (type of fishing gear and variety of catch, which are minimally disposed of in 
the local market, whereas industrial fishing is generally mono-specific and increases 
the risks of rejections); 
3) Small-scale fishing is further integrated in the local economic fabric and provides 
employment and revenue to many people. 
(Source: UNEP (2002), “Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalisation and Trade-related politics: a country 
study on the fisheries sector in Senegal”, New York and Geneva, United Nations Publication, pp. 24) 
It is here important to emphasize that the Senegalese small-scale fisheries have these 
characteristics as listed above. Due to its level of development, the Senegalese small-scale 
fisheries compete directly with industrial fishing activities, i.e. both foreign and national. This 
concern was brought into light once more when Senegal signed a new fisheries access 
agreement with the EU in 2002. 
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In many cases, it has been argued that small-scale fisheries may be relatively more sustainable 
than large-scale fisheries. This could partly be explained through the diversity of gear that is 
used to catch fish in small-scale fisheries. The fishing gears are mostly dependent on the 
season and the target species. Thus, not only may the gear that is used in small-scale fisheries 
generate less bycatch, but more importantly it may consume less energy as well. This means 
that the energy consumption (input) per unit of fish caught (output) is relatively less than what 
is consumed in the activities and operations in large-scale fisheries (Thomson, 1980; Kurien, 
2008; ICSF, 1984; Jacquet and Pauly, 2008, in Sharma, 2008). For instance, the small-scale 
fisheries “employ more people per unit of fish output” (Sharma, 2008, p. 8), but there are less 
negative impact on the environment and the fish stocks. This means that small-scale fisheries 
are more environmental friendly than industrial large-scale fisheries. Thus, small-scale 
fisheries are more sustainable than large-scale fisheries. Sharma (2008) agrees with this view 
and claims that “even though the sector is rapidly changing today, and is relatively more 
technology and capital-intensive, small-scale fisheries does still provide the model on which 
to sustain fisheries and fishery dependent livelihoods into the future” (p. 2).  
According to Sharma (2008), there are, however, “several cases where the States have taken 
steps to protect access rights of small-scale fisheries, most importantly perhaps through the 
introduction of exclusive artisanal fishing zones” (p. 7). The exclusive artisanal fishing zones 
are often being introduced and established by the States due to the high demand and pressure 
from the small-scale fishworkers’ and the fishing community as a whole (Vera et al.,2007; 
ICSF, 2004; Mathew, 1990; Mathew, 2007; O'Riordan, 2004 in Sharma, 2008). However, 
Sharma (2008) argues that although these activities are unquestionably important to secure the 
access rights to the small-scale fishworkers and the community, these exclusive artisanal 
fishing zones are difficult to enforce and thus remains a phenomenal challenge and problem 
for the community as a whole. On the other hand, the same problem could also be said about 
the original economic exclusive zone (EEZ) established by the UNCLOS. Most developing 
countries may have a hard time to invest in surveillance, control and management of their 
resources due to the lack of capital. 
When it comes to the area of fisheries management, the objectives are to protect the marine 
resources and at the same time sustain the livelihoods of the fishing communities. Therefore, 
it may be essential to direct the attention towards fisheries management and adopt the 
necessary methods in order to achieve well-managed fisheries. If these fisheries are being 
successfully well-managed, they may in turn “contribute to securing economic and social 
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rights of fishing communities, provided they are inclusive regimes that foster equity and 
community wellbeing, and provided they recognize certain attributes of small-scale fisheries 
as desirable for better fisheries management” (Sharma, 2008, p. 8). The latter includes 
attributes related to the fishing gears and practices that are used in small-scale fisheries. This 
is in the assumption that the fishing gears used in small-scale and artisanal fishing are more 
environmental friendly as the usage of fishing gears depends on the target species and the 
season (Sharma, 2008). Thus, practices in small-scale fisheries may presumably involve 
fishing smaller quantities than industrial large-scale fishing practices, and therefore may also 
involve less negative impact on the given target species, non-target species, the ecosystem, 
the seabed, the fishery resources as well as the environment in general (Sharma, 2008).  
However, in the case of the EU and Senegal, the small-scale fisheries in the West-African 
countries may have a much greater fishing activity than EU’s industrial trawlers. This is of 
course in the assumption that the figures provided by the EU itself are indeed correct. One 
may argue that small-scale fisheries may not always necessarily promote environmental 
friendly practices. This is under the assumption that there are excessive small-scale fishing 
fleets, which may lead to overcapacity.  
There are some countries that make the effort to seek to protect their fishing resources and the 
interests of their own local small-scale fisheries through fisheries legislation, e.g. this may 
involve introducing exclusive artisanal fishing zones, while there are some that seeks to 
completely ban harmful fishing techniques and practices. In order to protect the resources and 
sustain livelihoods, Sharma (2008) seems to support the latter method and suggests that 
“regulation and prohibition of destructive fishing gear and practices like non-selective 
bottom trawling and dynamite fishing can also help secure economic and social rights of 
small-scale fishing communities” (p. 8). There are many examples where harmful fishing 
practices are prohibited. One example is provided by ICSF (2008) where bottom trawling was 
banned in Venezuela in 2008. Previously, the law in Venezuela prohibited trawl-fishing that 
was six miles, i.e. 10 km, from the mainland (ICSF, 2008). However, a recent law 
modification made by its government has resulted in a complete ban of trawl-fishing activities 
in all of the Venezuelan waters (ICSF, 2008). Another example provided by Mathew (1990) 
showed that Indonesia had also banned trawling in certain areas of their fishing grounds in 
1980. The objectives of the trawl-ban was “1) to facilitate better resource management; 2) to 
ensure the development of the traditional sector; and 3) to prevent open conflicts” (Mathew, 
1990, p. 21). The latter listed point was due to the violent conflicts between industrial trawlers 
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and traditional fishermen in which resulted in “destruction of fishing unit and loss of life in 
the 1970’s” (Mathew, 1990, p. 9). 
Malaysia is another country that has also experienced conflicts between trawlers and 
fishermen (ICSF, 2007). However, in order to combat these violent conflicts, Malaysia 
adopted a zoning system, which was a concept borrowed by the Japanese (ICSF, 2007). The 
zoning system is based on a simple concept where the fishing ground is divided into four 
different zones. In each zone, the type of vessels that are allowed to fish in that given zone is 
specified (ICSF, 2007). Therefore, the fishing activities of large vessels are restricted to the 
fishing zones which are furthest away from the coast, whereas small fishing vessels are 
assigned to zones that are closer to the coast. However, they are allowed to fish freely in the 
other zones as well (ICSF, 2007). Of course, smaller vessels are also restricted in terms of 
their travel distance from the coastline due to their size. According to ICSF (2007), the system 
seems to turn out to be very effective thus far and may have contributed to reduce conflicts 
between large and small fishing vessels. Thus, such extreme fisheries management measures 
may contribute to protect a given country’s seabed and ecosystem. Moreover, it may also aid 
artisanal fishworkers in achieving more rights to their own fishing grounds. However, Sharma 
(2008) claims that the implementation of fisheries management policies and programs 
remains a problem in most cases.  
According to Sharma (2008), “activities and management measures that diminish the 
economic and social rights of fishers should not be considered” (p. 9). This means that 
conservation of marine resources by, for instance, establishing marine protected areas should 
not in any way disrupt or deny small-scale fishers access to their fishing grounds (Sharma, 
2008). This includes aquaculture. If the fishing access and rights of small-scale fishers 
happened to be unjustly and unduly denied, then one may have to seek for another set of 
solutions. Such management measures may cause “negative impacts on capture-fisheries-
based livelihoods; on the quality of life of coastal communities; and on indigenous species” 
(Sharma, 2008, p. 9). Furthermore, inland waters as well as waters at the coastline should not 
be privatized and should be avoided at all costs (Sharma, 2008, p. 9). This may be consistent 
with FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) Article 7.6.6 and Article 
9.1.4 (Sharma, 2008). According to Article 7.6.6 of the CCRF titled ‘Fisheries management’, 
the given State concerned should take into consideration of the needs and interests of 
indigenous people and the local fishing communities when determine the usage, conservation 
and management of fisheries resources. This is because indigenous people and the fishing 
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communities are “highly dependent on fishery resources for their livelihood” (FAO, 2011a, p. 
33). The consequences could be devastating for a great number of people if the given State 
does not recognize the role of coastal communities. In Article 9.1.4 in the CCRF FAO takes 
into account responsible development for aquaculture. In accordance to this article, it asks 
States to “ensure that the livelihoods of local communities, and their access to fishing 
grounds, are not negatively affected by aquaculture developments” (FAO, 2011a, p. 53).  
8.9 Working Conditions  
The working conditions in the fisheries sectors are in general often poor. It is an occupation 
which is known to be dangerous and the rates of accidents seem to be high (Sharma, 2008). 
According to Sharma (2008), hazardous working conditions in the fisheries sector could be 
found “in fisheries-related activities, such as in processing fish, baiting hooks, and selling 
fish, are also known to be poor” (p. 11). Environmental uncertainties may also play a major 
role in safety issues in the fishing communities as fishers and fishworkers may seem to be 
highly exposed to natural disasters (Sharma, 2008). This may include typhoons, tsunamis, 
cyclones etc. Despite all the risks that are taken by fishers and fishworkers, the fisheries sector 
is, according to Sharma (2008), lagging “behind many others in putting in place legal 
provisions ensuring better working and living conditions, and access to adequate social 
security” (p. 11). Sharma (2008) suggests that it is important to aim the focus towards 
“implementation of the provisions of several international instruments, that recognize rights 
to better and safe conditions of work, social security etc.” (p. 11). Thus, one may want to look 
into some of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions in order to better the 
working conditions in the fisheries sector. Sharma (2008) suggests that “the provisions of the 
2007 ILO Work in Fishing Convention are implemented in order to secure the rights of 
fishers to decent work” (pp. 11-12). According to Article 9 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), “the States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance”. In this respect, 
Sharma (2008) suggests that caution is needed when it comes to the case of the fisheries 
sector as a great number of people are self-employed. Thus, the systems of social security 
should not only include those on the organized sector but also for those who are self-
employed (Sharma, 2008). 
When it comes to rights to basic services and a decent quality of life, there is a lack of access 
to basic services, such as access to a proper education and health services, in the fishing 
communities (Sharma, 2008). This is especially the case when it comes to those communities 
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located in urban slums and remote areas. Thus, it becomes a challenge to ensure a decent 
quality of life for those living in these fishing communities (Sharma, 2008). Furthermore, the 
livelihoods options of these people may be limited. Sharma (2008) argues that artisanal 
fishing families in some developing countries seem to be “among the most socially, 
economically and politically disadvantaged segments of the population” (p. 13). In 2002, 
FAO (2002b) estimates that the number of income-poor fishers is as high as 5.8 million. This 
number represents 20 percent of the total number fishers in the world, which is estimated to 
be around 29 million people (FAO, 2002b). Income-poor fishers are, according to FAO 
(2002b), small-scale fishers who may earn less than US$1 a day. Moreover, there are about 
17.3 million income-poor people in related upstream and downstream jobs and activities in 
the fisheries sector (FAO, 2002b). These types of jobs include e.g. marketing, processing, 
boatbuilding. Hence, the combined total number of income-poor people is estimated to be as 
many as 23 million, excluding their respective households in which may be highly dependent 
on small-scale fisheries (FAO, 2002b).  
In order to secure basic social and economic rights for the fishing communities, Sharma 
(2008)  suggests that States should systematically follow the eight internationally agreed goals 
that are set by the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These eight 
goals include; “reducing poverty, eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary 
education, reducing the maternal mortality ratio and halving the proportion of people without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation” (Sharma, 2008).  
According to Thorpe (2005), “the formulation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
is one of the main conditions for concessional lending by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank to developing countries” (p. iv). There are in some cases where 
the fisheries sector is neglected in the PRSPs, even though it has been proven that the fisheries 
sector may potentially contribute to achieve food security as well as improving livelihoods in 
many developing countries (Thorpe, 2005). In a review of the PRSP of African countries, it is 
stated that there were six countries in which offered a fairly good report in their PRSPs 
(Thorpe, 2005). These countries include Benin, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania 
and Mozambique. While there were about five African countries which gave an extensive 
coverage to the fisheries sector in their PRSPs (Thorpe, 2005). These countries are Cameroon, 
Ghana, Guinea, Malawi and Senegal. Thus, these countries have made an effort to effectively 
integrate the fisheries sector into implementing poverty reduction strategies (Sharma, 2008). 
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It is important that all men and women have the rights to participate in decision-making and 
fisheries management. This is because these decisions may affect these peoples’ lives and 
livelihoods and these decisions may as well contribute to secure their rights, i.e. their social, 
economic and cultural rights (Sharma, 2008). Thus, the necessity of the local fishing 
communities’ participation is essential. This is particularly the case when it comes to fisheries 
management. According to Sharma (2008), there are in some cases where “several countries 
are, of late, fostering processes related to decentralization, devolution, co-management and 
community-based management” (p. 14). In order to acquire the rights to participate in 
decision-making and fisheries management, Sharma (2008) suggests first of all that the role of 
the fishing communities in co-managing fisheries resources needs to be enhanced. To do this, 
the national and provincial governments’ accountability to fishing communities should be 
increase. Furthermore, Sharma (2008) suggests that the governments should “devolve power 
to fishing communities, make efforts to enhance the capacity of communities in fisheries 
management, and enhance their negotiating power” (p. 14). More importantly the States 
should provide financial support to the “fishworker organizations, community-based, non-
governmental organizations and research institutions to implement programmes to promote 
fishing communities awareness of rights and to strengthen their capacity to lobby and 
advocate for their rights” (Sharma, 2008, p. 14). 
According Article 6.13 of the CCRF, “States should, to extent permitted by national laws and 
regulations, ensure that decision-making processes are transparent […]” (FAO, 2002b, p. 
19). Furthermore, it asks States to “facilitate consultation and the effective participation of 
industry, fishworkers, environmental and other interested organizations in decision-making 
with respect to the development of laws and policies related to fisheries management, 
development, international lending and aid” (FAO, 2002b, p. 19). Article 6.16 highlights the 
importance of fishers’ and fish farmers’ involvement in the formulation of policy and the 
implementation process. Some of the principles of the Rio Declaration may have recognized 
that the local communities’ rights to participate in decision-making processes. According to 
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), 
“environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens” (UN, 
1992, p. 3). Furthermore, Principle 10 asks States to “facilitate and encourage public 
awareness and participation by making information widely available” (UN, 1992, p. 3). 
Thus, Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration encourages States to give the communities access to 
the information related to environmental issues that is held by the States themselves, and it 
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encourages them to give the communities an opportunity to participate in the decision-making 
process. 
8.10 The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
The European Union has for the past few years been accused to deliberately overfish West 
African coastal waters for their own benefit, leaving these countries worse off. The West 
African countries are now facing a situation where the local fisheries are at the risk of 
collapse, which have forced its people to immigrate illegally to Europe through the Canary 
Islands in Spain. In their voyage to Europe, the unforgiving sea has taken countless of lives 
and those who were lucky enough to get to land would most likely be arrested, deported and 
fined.  
In response to the critics and accusations, the European Union enforced a reform of the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 2002. The changes in the CFP were made to address 
issues of overfishing. These include long-term objectives such as fisheries management, 
environmental protection, plans to replenish and manage fish stocks, limiting fishing efforts, 
and developing new bilateral fisheries agreement, i.e. including the ACP countries (European 
Commission, 2009a). Overall key objective of the CFP was “to ensure sustainable 
exploitation of living aquatic resources in all three dimensions – environmental, economic 
and social” (European Commission, 2011a, p. 5). However, the Green Paper from the 
European Commission explicitly stated that the CFP had failed to meet the main objectives 
that were developed in the reform in 2002 (European Commission, 2009a, 2011a). 
According the impact assessment from the European Commission (2011a), there are some 
difficulties in recognizing the actual problems and drivers behind the failure of the CFP due to 
the complexities. An explanation is provided by the European Commission (2011a) below. 
“[…] overcapacity is the main driver for overfishing. However, overfishing is also a driver 
for overcapacity, as the reduction of quotas intended to curb it, further increases 
overcapacity. Similarly, overcapacity implies also poor economic performance of the 
catching sector. But that poor economic performance in turn, fosters overfishing as a short 
term fix for diminishing revenues. The poor economic performance also results in the 
continuous industry call for public financial support, which maintains overcapacity. The poor 
economic (and social) performance also fosters overfishing indirectly because it encourages 
Council’s deviation from TACs proposed by scientists.” 
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(Source: European Commission, 2011a, Impact Assessment Accompanying Commission proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Common Fisheries Policy [repealing 
Regulation (EC) N° 2371/2002] (pp. 1-84). SEC(2011) 891. Brussels, 13.07.11, p. 5) 
Despite the complexities in identifying the problems and drivers of the CFP, the European 
Commission has attempted to map out the causes for why CFP failed. These include the lack 
of environmental, economic and social sustainability, and these problems are closely related 
to one another (European Commission, 2011a). All of the problems mentioned by the 
European Commission could be either directly or indirectly related to overfishing, for the 
reasons described above by the European Commission (European Commission, 2011a).  
8.10.1 Lack of environmental sustainability 
According to the impact assessment conducted by the European Commission (2011a), the 
lack of environmental sustainability was due to the drivers of overfishing. These include 
discards, overcapacity, compliance issues, inadequate scientific advices, failure in completing 
objectives, and micromanagement (European Commission, 2011a). 
Discarding practices in community waters are, according to the European Commission 
(2011a), not illegal. The amount of discarded fish annually in European fisheries are 
estimated to be 1.7 million tons, i.e. 23% of total catches (European Commission, 2011a, p. 
11). The impact of discards is severe for both targeted and non-targeted species. Furthermore, 
the Total Allowable Catches (TAC) is only based on the landings, not the actual catches. This 
means that all discarded fish are not in any ways taken into consideration by the TAC system 
(European Commission, 2011a). Thus, as a conservation tool, the TAC system may not 
adequately portray the complete picture of the actual fishing pressure within community 
waters. This means that the fishing pressure could be much higher than what has been 
indicated by the landed catch (European Commission, 2011a, p. 11). Thus, the credibility of 
the TAC system is significantly reduced as discarded fish is not included. As a consequence, 
the scientists will lack the required data in order to give adequate scientific advices (European 
Commission, 2011a). 
Another problem that undermines the environmental sustainability is overcapacity, which is 
one of the main drivers of overfishing. Overcapacity means that there is an excessive number 
of fishing vessels that target the available fish species in the community waters (European 
Commission, 2011a). In addition, it could also mean that “there are too many vessels for the 
available fishing rights” (European Commission, 2011a, p. 8). According to the European 
Commission (2011a), there has been a significant reduction as regards to the number of 
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vessels in the community waters in the period between 1992 and 2009; 105,000 to 80,000 
fishing vessels in EU waters (p. 9). This could be explained by the limited fishing 
opportunities, high environmental protection efforts and high fuel prices, in which 
“encouraging consolidation and reinvestment in fewer larger vessels and towards more 
selective and fuel efficient fishing […]” (European Commission, 2011a, p. 9). However, 
scientific studies recommend that for most of the fish stocks it is required that at least 40 % of 
the fishing mortality should be reduced (Gulland 1990, Lassen 1996, in European 
Commission, 2011a, p. 10). According to the European Commission (2011a), programs to 
combat overcapacity has shown to be ineffective as overcapacity exists in the different fleets 
in the Member States; “9% overcapacity for Portugal, 23% for Spain and 50% for the 
Swedish demersal cod fleet” (p. 10). 
According to the European Commission (2011a), there are two problems that may reduce the 
efficiency of the current CFP. Firstly, the complexity in the framework of the policy makes it 
difficult to enforce (European Commission, 2011a). In addition, the decision-making process 
is characterized by a top-down structure, where the Council of Ministers is the decision 
makers (European Commission, 2011a). In turn, the complex framework of the CFP does not 
correspond to the actual implementation of the policy (European Commission, 2011a). This 
leads to micromanagement of fisheries activities. Secondly, the CFP does not have a clear set 
of objectives that needs to be met in order to promote long-term environmental sustainability 
(European Commission, 2011a). In turn, the main objectives are overlooked and the attention 
is instead shifted towards short-term economic and social achievements.  
When it comes to the difference between TACs and sustainable catches, the Council’s 
decisions of TACs tend to deviate from the scientific advices and recommendations 
(European Commission, 2011a). In the period between 2003 and 2010, the decided TAC was 
on average 47% above the level of sustainable catch that was recommended by scientists 
(European Commission, 2010). In 2005, the TACs were set 59% above the recommended 
level, which was the highest deviation in the period of 2003-2010 (European Commission, 
2010). Five years later, the deviation of TAC from scientific advices in 2010 had been 
reduced to 34%, which was the lowest recorded deviation in the period between 2003 and 
2010 (European Commission, 2010, 2011a). However, the TACs that are set by the Council 
are still too high as opposed to the recommendations given by scientists. 
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Numerous of fish stocks in the community waters are endangered or in the verge of extinction 
due to years of overfishing. In this case, the scientific advice given to the decision-makers is 
to stop fishing these stocks. However, the number of fish stocks that was allowed to catch by 
the Council, but should not be caught according to scientific advices were on the average of 
17 fish stocks in the period between 2003 to 2010 (European Commission, 2010). The highest 
number recorded was in 2004, where 24 of the endangered fish stocks were exploited. Even 
though, this number has recently been reduced to 14 fish stocks in 2010, it is still considered 
very high compared to what has been recommended by scientists (European Commission, 
2010, 2011a). 
8.10.2 Lack of economic sustainability 
According to the impact assessment from European Commission (2011a), the European 
Union “is the fourth main world producer of fisheries and aquaculture products behind 
China, India and Peru, with 4.6% of the world catches and aquaculture in 2007” (p. 14). In 
2005, the total production of marine capture fisheries and aquaculture was estimated to be 
over 6.6 million tons. In 2007, the total production decreased to 6.4 million tons, i.e. a 
reduction of approximately 3% compared to the estimates from 2005 (European Commission, 
2011a). 
In the European Union, five of the member states that contribute the most to the total 
production in an arranged order of contribution, are Spain, France, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Italy. According to the estimates provided, the total production in Spain 
accounted for 16% of the total production of all member states in the EU in 2007 (European 
Commission, 2011a). In comparison to the other member states, Spain had the highest 
production both in marine capture fisheries and aquaculture in 2007, with 735 926 tons and 
284 982 tons respectively. Furthermore, the total production in France accounted for 12% of 
the total production in the EU fisheries sector in 2007, UK 12%, Denmark 11% and Italy 7% 
(European Commission, 2011a).  
In the European Union fisheries sector, aquaculture accounts for 20% of the total production, 
while the marine capture fisheries account for 80% (European Commission, 2011a). The total 
production from capture fisheries had decreased from 5.5 million tons in 2005 to 5.1 million 
tons in 2007. On the other hand, the total production from aquaculture had increased from 1.2 
million tons in 2005 to 1.3 million tons in 2007 (European Commission, 2011a). Although, 
80% of the total production of fish and fishery products come from capture fisheries, the 
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performance from aquaculture is in general better (European Commission, 2011a). However, 
while the global production of fish and fishery products that come from aquaculture have 
increased over the past four decades (Huang, et al., 2007), the production from aquaculture in 
the EU had in general stagnated in the past 15 years (European Commission, 2011a). The 
problems related to the stagnation are often times not within the objectives and framework of 
the CFP (European Commission, 2011a). These include “limited space available for further 
development, efforts necessary to meet the requirements of EU environmental and sanitary 
legislation, and low levels of innovation necessary to compete on a global market” (European 
Commission, 2011a, p. 16). 
According to the European Commission (2011a), the processing industry generates the 
highest overall value, in which accounts for nearly €25 billion (European Commission, 
2009b). The leading production countries are Spain, France, the United Kingdom and Italy 
(European Commission, 2009b). With regard to the performance of the different sectors, the 
catching sector does not perform as well as the processing sector (European Commission, 
2011a). Thus, the most important economic activity in the EU is the processing sector 
(European Commission, 2011a, p. 16). 
However, according to the European Commission (European Commission, 2011a), the “EU’s 
internal production covers slightly less than 40% of the demand (68% in 1995)” (p. 15). In 
2007, the total internal production in the EU was 6.4 million tons. About 2 million tons of the 
total production were exported whereas the imports in the EU accounted for around 9 million 
tons (European Commission, 2011a). Hence, the supply of products for food consumption 
from the EU accounted for nearly 13 million tons, i.e. excluding the non-food use (European 
Commission, 2011a). Thus, the EU has to increase their imports in order to fill out the gap 
between the demand and supply (European Commission, 2011a). In turn, the EU becomes 
highly dependent on external supply, and the countries that export fish and fishery products to 
the member states are most likely increasing their fishing efforts. Within the EU, the 
competition between internal fish producing countries and external fish exporting countries is 
expected to intensify, which will gradually increase over the years as long as the EU is 
dependent on external fish supplies (European Commission, 2011a). 
The consumption level in the EU had increased over the years, especially in the Eastern and 
Central regions of Europe (European Commission, 2011a). According to the impact 
assessment from the European Commission (2011a), the “EU demand has been growing in 
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the last decade” (p. 14). The average per capita consumption in the EU is estimated to be 
22.3kg (European Commission, 2011a), whereas the world per capita consumption is 17.8kg 
in 2011 (FAO, 2011b). Thus, the average per capita consumption in the EU is considerably 
higher than that of the world. However, the per capita consumption differs from a member 
state to a member state. For instance, the per capita consumption in Bulgaria was estimated to 
be 4.2kg, while it is considerable higher in Portugal where the per capita consumption is 
55.6kg (European Commission, 2011a, p. 15). The future demand for fish and fishery 
products is not expected stop anytime soon. This in part due to the fact that fish consumption 
is associated with beneficial health effects (European Commission, 2011a). 
8.10.3 Lack of social sustainability 
The EU’s total employment in the fisheries sector including all of its three sub-sectors, i.e. 
capture fisheries, fish processing and aquaculture, was around 421.000 persons in 2002 and 
2003 (Salz, Buisman, Smit, & Vos, 2006). In 2005, the total employment in the fisheries 
sector was about 407,000 people (European Commission, 2011a). In 2007, the total 
employment in the fisheries sector was 354,715 (European Commission, 2011a). From the 
estimated total employment in 2005, 187,000 of these people were employed in the capture 
fisheries, 138,000 people in fish processing and 63,000 people in aquaculture (European 
Commission, 2011a). In terms of percentage, the employment in capture fisheries accounted 
for 46% of the total employment in the EU’s fisheries sector, and fish processing and 
aquaculture accounted for 34% and 16% respectively (European Commission, 2011a). Hence, 
the majority of people in the fisheries sector are employed in the capture fisheries. According 
to Salz et al. (2006), employment in the catching sector is dominated by Spain, Greece and 
Italy in 2002 and 2003. These three member states accounted for around 60% of the EU total 
employment in the catching sector, while the employment estimated in France and Portugal 
accounted for 10% each (Salz, et al., 2006, p. 15). As regards processing sector, the member 
states that had the highest employment are Spain, France and the United Kingdom (Salz, et 
al., 2006). Moreover, the majority of people employed in aquaculture were both in Spain and 
France (Salz, et al., 2006). 
According to Salz et al. (2006), employment in the catching sector has since 1996 and 1997 
decreased by approximately 4-5% each year (p. 15). In the period between 2002-2007, the 
catching sector had its employment decreased by 31%, aquaculture by 16%, and the 
processing sector by 6.5% (European Commission, 2011a, pp. 18-19). Hence, the 
employment in the catching sector had the highest decline as opposed to the two other sectors. 
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The reasons for why the catching sector had this considerable decrease in employment include 
low wages, technical development, employment of non-EU crew, fleet reduction and 
hazardous working conditions (European Commission, 2011a, p. 19). 
Since the failure of the CFP, the EU has shifted their attention away from the core principles 
of the CFP, and the level of dependency towards external fish supplies gradually increases 
(Béatrice. Gorez & O'Riordan, 2003). Gorez and O’Riordan (2003) argue that the failures of 
the CFP to monitor and control the balance between fishing efforts and the sustainable use of 
the resources, was one of the many causes that made the EU dependent on external fish 
supplies, which had contributed to add fishing pressures to other coastal waters in the world, 
especially the third world countries. The aim of fishing outside of EU waters was to “meet 
both its market (processing and consumption) and fishing sector (employment and investment) 
demands”(Béatrice. Gorez & O'Riordan, 2003, p. 4). This had contributed to increased 
fishing pressure especially in ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries as the EU had 
acquired access to these countries’ fishery resources through fishing agreements. Thus, Gorez 
and O’Riordan (2003)  expressed their concern when they stated that “the fishery situation in 
the EU today (over-capacity, depleted resources, supply deficit, etc.) is both potentially 
promising and perilous for ACP states”(p. 4). 
8.11 The Fisheries Partnership Agreement 
8.11.1 The European Union  
According to O’Riordan (1999), in the EU “some 1,300 vessels and 20,000 jobs in fishing 
directly depend on fisheries agreements with third countries. Fisheries agreements possibly 
also provide as many as 50,000 – 10,000 jobs in such ancillary industries as ship building, 
fish processing, transport, marketing, etc.” (p. 4). Thus, Brown (2005) argues that the EU has 
had a long history with regard to fishing, and their demand for fish and fish products is 
exceptionally strong. As a matter of fact, the EU is one of the world’s largest markets for fish 
and fish products in the world (Brown, 2005). However, the fishes and fish products are not 
from their own coastal waters but their home market is mainly being supplied from third 
countries and international waters (Brown, 2005), i.e. in fishing grounds not considered as an 
EEZ. In 2002, 20 countries had signed fisheries access agreements with the EU where the 
majority of these are from Africa (Sporrong, Coffey, & Bevins, 2002a). 
The fish and fish products provided from these co-called access agreements accounts for 
approximately a quarter (or 20 to 25 per cent) of the fish consumed in the EU in 1999 
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(O'Riordan, 1999). According to O’Riordan (1999), the estimate of self-sufficiency in the 
EU’s own Community waters in 1984 was 84 per cent, while in 1994 their self-sufficiency 
was reduced to 58 per cent. Thus, their self-sufficiency is falling intensely overall. Moreover, 
the EU’s supplies deficit was “estimated to be growing at an annual rate of 15 to 25 per 
cent” (O'Riordan, 1999, p. 4). It is further argued that the EU had to import around 35 to 40 
per cent of its fish supplies due to the high demand for fish and fish products and the failure of 
self-sufficiency from their own coastal waters (O'Riordan, 1999). 
8.11.1.1 Over-capacity in EU Fishing Fleets 
Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the pressure on the West African fish stocks had in fact 
increased six-fold (Hogan, 2003). The main contributors to the increase in fishing pressure in 
the West African region are the EU, the Russian and the Asian fleets (Hogan, 2003).  
Since the end of the 1970s, many EU member states had been struggling to address the 
problems of over-capacity in their fishing fleets (UNEP, 2002). In order to deal with over-
capacity in the EU fishing fleet and overfishing of fish stocks with commercial value in its 
own waters, the EU has been using the fisheries agreements to transfer their problems by 
redeploying their fishing fleets to third countries’ waters, in which had agreed to grant them 
fishing access in exchange for cash (O'Riordan, 1999; UNEP, 2002). Thus, fishing 
agreements seem to work in favor of distant waters fishing nations, e.g. the EU, rather than 
coastal states, e.g. the ACP countries. In this regard, O’Riordan (1999) emphasizes the issue 
of over-capacity of the EU fishing fleets, which may be the cause of overfishing of 
commercial fish stocks in EU waters. In 1999, the fish stocks which are considered over-
exploited in EU waters accounted for 55 % (O'Riordan, 1999). Additionally, the percentage of 
seriously over-exploited fish stocks accounted for 42 %, while depleted or collapsed fish 
stocks represented 7 % of the total fish stocks in EU waters (O'Riordan, 1999). Thus, the EU 
fishing fleets are highly pressured to find other sources fish. The immediate solution is to 
negotiate fishing access agreements with third countries, which in turn will make them greatly 
dependent on third countries’ marine resources. 
8.11.2 Senegal 
Over the past decades, Senegal has not only signed bilateral agreements with the EU. 
According to UNEP (2002), bilateral fishing agreements had for instance been signed 
between Senegal and its neighbor countries as well, such as Cape Verde, Gambia Guinea 
Bissau and Mauritania. Normally, these fishing agreements are based on the principle of 
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reciprocity, which grants both concerned states reciprocal fishing rights (Samb, 1999; Kebe 
and Deme, 1991, in UNEP, 2002). However, the fishing agreement between powerful fishing 
nations and developing countries may be different. These agreements are seldom based on the 
reciprocity principle, but they tend to rather “focus on issuing licences or fishing rights in 
exchange for financial contribution” (UNEP, 2002, p. 22). Furthermore, Senegal had also 
signed fishing agreements with Japan, which authorized the Japanese fishing fleets, under 
certain conditions, to fish in its waters (UNEP, 2002). All of these agreements may have 
potentially contributed to the decline of the overall fish stock in the West African coastal 
waters. However, according to UNEP (2002), “it is the agreements signed with the EU that 
attracts most of the attention in view of the various factors at stake: the targeted species, the 
size of the flotillas and the financial stakes” (p. 21).  
Criticisms against powerful fishing nations, such as the EU, are often directed towards the 
fisheries access agreements with third countries, which may have contributed to slowing 
down the development of the coastal sate, competing with small-scale fishing as well as 
ignoring the state of targeted fish stocks and encouraging overfishing (UNEP, 2002). In their 
examination of the fishery agreement between the EU and the West African coastal countries, 
Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002) argued that the European Union fishery policy in West Africa 
could be best explained through its fishery agreements with Senegal (p. 82). Hogan (2003) 
claims that the case of West Africa is an exceptionally good example of how foreign fleets 
strip away fish stocks from third-countries. Most of the criticisms and accusations against the 
fisheries access agreements between the EU and developing countries are directed towards 
some of these different points. 
Criticisms towards the EU Fishing Agreement 
1) The ‘export’ of EU fishing fleets to areas with already scarce resources; 
2) The limited capacity of signatory states to monitor or control the activities of the EU 
fishing fleets; 
3) The lack of transparency in the negotiation of agreements and a lack of 
communication and coordination between the Directorate General for Development 
and the DG for Fisheries during negotiations which has led to institutional 
disagreements within the EU; 
4) Fishing methods that can cause long term environmental damage; 
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5) Fundamentally, the policies have attracted criticism because of the conflicting impact 
of EU fisheries policies on the EU development policies in West Africa. 
(Source: Brown, O. (2005). Policy Incoherence: EU Fisheries Policy 
in Senegal. Human Development Report Office, UNDP, pp. 5) 
6) These types of agreements tend to ignore the traditional artisanal fisheries’ interests, 
and, thus, the support for research and development in the respective countries is very 
little or close to none (Koulaïmah-Gabriel & Oomen, 1997, p. 3). 
7) The fishing rights granted by the governments of third countries may therefore serve 
as a threat to sustainability of fish stocks in the area, and they could in many cases be 
considered excessive for at least three factors: 1) the lack of information on fish 
stocks; 2) the European fishing sector is pressured to sign fisheries agreements with 
third countries due to the lack of marine resources and the over-capacity of EU fishing 
fleets; 3) the governments of third countries’ need for financial contribution, which is 
often unconditional, is great (Koulaïmah-Gabriel & Oomen, 1997, p. 3). 
8) The consequences of subsidies provided to the EU fishing vessels could be over-
capacity in the EU fishing fleet and the overexploitation of fish stocks (Kaczynski & 
Fluharty, 2002). These subsidies contribute to financially support the EU fishing 
vessels’ continuation to fish, despite the fact that the depleted fish stocks are no longer 
economically profitable (Brown, 2005). Moreover, the subsidies displace “foreign 
investors and local entrepreneurs in the coastal states, distorts economics of the 
European fishing enterprises and promotes excessive pressure on the resources that 
greatly harms the marine environment in the West African region” (Kaczynski & 
Fluharty, 2002, p. 75) 
9) The illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing by the European Union fishing 
fleets. According to CTA (2004b), “undeclared landings, misreporting and under-
reporting of catches from EU fishing fleets are widespread”. In 2004, the European 
Commission confirmed these compliance issues within their fisheries through a 
published report titled “Compliance Scoreboard” (European Commission, 2004). This 
Compliance Scoreboard from 2004 has shown that there is a very low level of 
compliance among the EU member states, and a lack of willingness to report catch 
volume related to those EU activities in third-countries, particularly in the ACP coastal 
waters (CTA, 2004b). 
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The first fishing agreement that had been signed between the EU and Senegal was in 1979 
(UNEP, 2002). Since the beginning of the fishery agreement with Senegal, “the EU fishing 
industry benefited from profitable access to the once-rich Senegalese waters, with few 
restrictions imposed by either the EU or the Senegalese government” (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 
2002). Normally, the agreement between the two parties was renewed every two years, but, in 
1997, the EU and Senegal signed a four-year long fishing agreement (UNEP, 2002), which 
was followed by another four-year long agreement in 2002. Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002) 
claimed that the fishery agreement between the EU and Senegal turned out to be not as 
beneficial as previously anticipated in terms of environmental and social aspects, i.e. the fish 
stocks are depleted or in the state of collapse while the Senegalese artisanal fishery may have 
been disrupted by the EU industrial fishing fleets. This was found out after more than 15 years 
of repeatedly renewing the EU-Senegalese agreement (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002, p. 82). 
Worryingly, Senegal and its neighbor countries in the West African coastline have to face the 
consequences and find ways to remedy the depleted fish stocks and restore the disrupted local 
small-scale and artisanal fishery (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002).  
In the case of Senegal, the increased fishing pressure from the three main fleets (i.e. the EU, 
Russia and Asia) had also a negative impact on the small-scale fishers, fishworkers and the 
local fishing communities. The small-scale fishing industry had to face direct competition 
with the EU’s industrial fishing fleets to not only supply the local market in Senegal but to 
supply to the European market as well (Brown, 2005). Furthermore, the issue of food security 
may be at risk as there may be a local market supply shortage. This is because those fish 
species which were previously consumed locally in Senegal may have been excessively 
exploited due to their high commercial value in the European market (UNEP, 2002). As a 
result of this, these fish species are fished and exported to the EU market, leaving the local 
Senegalese fishing communities in a bad shape as their local food security and jobs are 
threatened (UNEP, 2002). 
As regards to food security and fish prices, Brown (2005) argues that the export of fish to the 
EU market has made the fish prices to increase in the Senegalese domestic market. As the fish 
prices in the domestic market have increased, the local consumers may have a limited 
selection of fish due to their lack of purchasing power. According to Brown (2005), as 
Senegal becomes more export-oriented, the fish resources are more concentrated around big 
cities, such as the capital of Senegal, Dakar. The annual consumption per capita of fish in and 
around Dakar is around 43 kg, while the estimate for the whole country is on the average of 
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26 kg (Brown, 2005). The quantity and quality of fish that are distributed to location further 
away from the coast tend to be less and poor, than those locations that are closer to the 
coastline of Senegal (Brown, 2005). Presumably, the amount of fish distributed across the 
country to those who do not live by the coastline may be reduced even more as the fish stocks 
in the Senegalese waters are currently considered overfished. According to Nordberg (2003), 
by the year of 2000, “the average landed size of most export species have fallen below the 
level of sexual maturity representing fishing activities that have increased beyond sustainable 
levels” (Nordberg, 2003, as cited in, Brown, 2005, p. 4).  
Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002) stated that these fishery agreements between the EU and the 
West African countries could be overall described as “access to stocks for financial 
compensation” (p. 78), or ‘access for cash’ agreements as described by Nordberg (2003). 
According to Sporrong et al. (2002a), the EU paid a total of some EUR 137.45 million as 
financial compensation to all third-countries that were under the fisheries access agreements. 
Furthermore, it was argued that there were two ways for the EU and its fishing vessels to 
make payments for fishing access in the West African waters; “(a) an amount directly paid by 
the EU, usually in yearly installments, and (b) license fees to be paid by individual EU 
vessels” (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002, p. 79). Normally, approximately two-thirds or more of 
the total value of compensation are paid by the EU annually to the West African countries in 
exchange for fishing access, while the remaining one-third or less of the total value of 
compensation are fees paid by ship-owners privately (IFREMER, 1999; Kaczynski & 
Fluharty, 2002). However, in the five-year period between 1993 and 1997, the financial 
contribution provided by the EU to third countries through fisheries agreements in general 
accounted for 82.8% (averagely €155 million annually), whereas fees paid by EU ship-owners 
accounted for the remaining 17.2% (averagely €32 million annually) (IFREMER, 1999). 
During the same period, the compensation and fees under the EU-Senegalese agreement 
accounted for €9.368 million (90.1%) and €1.028 million (9.9%) annually by the EU and the 
ship-owners respectively (IFREMER, 1999). In the written analysis with the title ‘Accords de 
Pêches Sénégal – Union Européenne’, Dieng (1995) stated that the financial compensation 
provided by the European Union to Senegal in the period between 1994 and 1996 remained at 
the same level of €18 million (as cited in Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002). The main reason was 
less fish to catch for the EU fishing fleets in the Senegalese waters. According to UNEP 
(2002), financial compensations was made in the agreement with Senegal in 1997, which 
accounted for €48 million. Furthermore, for the first time bottom trawling of pelagic species 
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was introduced in the agreement between the parties, which the potential of annual catch was 
estimated to be around 25,000 tons (UNEP, 2002, p. 21). 
8.11.3 The Problem of Fisheries Agreements 
While numerous of countries in Africa struggle with food shortage and local population 
growth (UNEP, 2009), the European Union had taken advantage of their Fisheries Partnership 
Agreements (FPA) with West African countries. For nearly three decades, the agreements 
between the parties have been given the EU access to the West African waters (Iossa, et al., 
2008; Lundstedt, 2009). Senegal was one of the countries that were affected by this 
agreement, including the countries in the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) (Lundstedt, 2009). Thus, the European Union is according to Iossa, et al. (2008) 
responsible for playing a major role in depleting fish stocks outside of the West African 
coastline, including the Senegalese waters (Iossa, et al., 2008).  
Europe is known to have high consumption levels of fish and fishery products, while at the 
same time their waters are suffering from years of overexploitation and dwindling fish stocks 
(UNEP, 2009, pp. 15-17). According to Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002), “in Europe, the 
market demand for seafood and the capacity of fishing fleets to extract living marine 
resources from its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) far outstrips available reproductive 
capacities” (p. 76). As the fish stocks in the EU waters are collapsing while at the same time 
they have to cope with over-capacity in their fishing fleet, the European Commission has been 
put under a lot of pressure to not only manage their fish stocks but also negotiate with foreign 
countries in order to acquire access rights to their fishing grounds (Brown, 2005). Thus, the 
European fishing industry is unquestionably “highly dependent on distant water fishing for 
investment opportunities, employment, and supplies of raw material” (O'Riordan, 1999, p. 4). 
In order to meet these needs, the European Union has to rely on fisheries agreements. In fact, 
the EU has been dependent on these fisheries agreements since 1977 (O'Riordan, 1999). 
These agreements with third-countries are in some cases considered to be tools for the EU to 
maintain as well as expand their distant water fishing fleet in third-countries, while at the 
same time the fisheries agreements are used to reduce the fishing pressure on the European 
Community waters at home (O'Riordan, 1999). Considering the technology that are put into 
use in the EU member states waters, the end result in overexploiting these waters in the long-
term has turned out to be devastating (Fitzpatrick & Newton, 1998). Currently, overfishing 
has not only threatened the sustainability of fisheries resources in the present generation, but 
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the issues observed at this very moment may also influence future generations (Fitzpatrick & 
Newton, 1998). 
As a matter of fact, the European Union’s fish resources are  overexploited to the extent that 
they can only meet 50% of their internal demand (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 14) However, in the 
past few years, the EU’s internal production is not able to cover more than 40% of their 
internal demand (European Commission, 2011a). Thus, in search for fish and profit 
elsewhere, the EU’s focus was set upon African waters in order to continue sourcing their fish 
and meet the increasing demand for fish and fishery products at home (UNEP, 2009). 
According to Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002), the EU solved parts of their issue of dwindling 
fish stocks by redeploying its member states’ fishing fleets into the waters of non-EU 
countries or, more specifically, in developing countries. In this case, fishing in West African 
coastal states was mainly through “cooperation” fishery agreements. According to Kaczynski 
and Fluharty (2002), “cooperation agreements in fisheries between European Union (EU) 
and West African coastal states are seen as important tools of EU’s economic cooperation 
policy with countries of the Third World” (p. 75). For years, the Fisheries Partnership 
Agreement has made it possible for the European Union to acquire access to and exploit the 
waters of the ACP countries (i.e. Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries), and the shortage of 
fish in Europe was no longer a concern. In other words, the European Union is ‘exporting’ 
their problems elsewhere in order to manage their own fisheries and limit their fishing, while 
taking advantage of West African countries, such as Senegal, which have weak regulations 
and lack of control and surveillance services of marine resources (New York Times, 2008).  
According to Iossa et al. (2008), the objective of fisheries agreements with developing 
countries “sustainable development and the gradual integration of ACP countries in a global 
economy via regional integration” (p. 11). However, since the ACP countries, which include 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries, still struggle to find their way into the global 
economy, new trade relations with the European Union were negotiated.  
The negotiations between the ACP countries and the European Union were completed in 
December 2007. The number of ACP countries that signed a new fisheries agreements  with 
the European Union was less than 50% (Iossa, et al., 2008). Senegal was one of the countries 
that did not sign a new agreement. However, two countries in West Africa agreed to sign new 
agreements with the European Union. These two countries were Ghana and Ivory Coast. Iossa 
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et al. (2008) argue that Ghana and Ivory Coast accepted to renew their agreements with the 
EU in order to avoid the risk of losing market access and disruption of trade (p. 11). 
8.11.4 The Senegalese Government  
On the other hand, foreign industrial trawlers from the European Union, China, Russia, or 
from other places in the world that exploit the waters of Senegal are not the only ones to 
blame. As a matter of fact, the Senegalese government plays a major role in the decline of 
their own fisheries sector (New York Times, 2008). The exhaustion of the Senegalese marine 
resources was also caused by the government’s desire of short-term benefits at the expense of 
the fishing communities’ welfare. The African officials are said to oversell fishing rights to 
foreign fleets, in which gave foreign operators to gain access to exploit their own waters (New 
York Times, 2008). In return for granting fishing access to foreign operators, most countries 
in West Africa would receive “access fees” from the European Union. Thus, they chose to 
contribute to overexploit their own their marine resources in order to gain the “access fees” 
from the European Union, in which often represent a significant amount of the total 
government income (Iossa, et al., 2008). In 2002, Senegal agreed to sign a four-year 
partnership agreement with the European Union, which was worth $16 million a year, despite 
early warnings indicated by studies that were conducted in 1991 and the European Union’s 
scientific report in 2002 (New York Times, 2008). The agreement allowed the European 
Union to fish tunas and bottom-dwelling species, where the latter is rapidly declining as only 
a quarter is left of what it has been in the 1980s (New York Times, 2008). In 2006, 
Mauritania, yet another West African country, had signed a six-year long partnership 
agreement with the European Union that was worth $146 million a year (New York Times, 
2008). Since this amount of money accounted for about a fifth of the government budget, 
Mauritania chose to ignore the fact that their marine resources would be exploited to the 
maximum, which in turn would severely affect their local fishermen (New York Times, 
2008).  
Iossa et al. (2008) indicated that the Senegalese government may show some weaknesses in 
their regulation and management of their marine resources, since what is being regulated and 
controlled are not the actual fish catches but the quotas on the number of boats, which are 
operating in their waters. What's more is that the Exclusive Economic Zone of the country 
could be easily accessed through a fishing license, which could be easily acquired from 
another country in the area and there is practically “no limitation to the catches” (Iossa, et al., 
2008, p. 7), i.e. in terms of quantitative or qualitative. Furthermore, Iossa et al. (2008) argue 
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that fishing authorities may have failed to control all the foreign industrial vessels that cross 
borders, i.e. sail from one Exclusive Economic Zone to the next. 
8.11.5 The Non-Renewal of Fisheries Agreement 
After years of exploitation of the marine resources, the Senegalese had finally put an end to 
the fierce competition between traditional fishermen and foreign industrial trawlers and the 
many conflicts that largely revolved around fish stocks access. In the dire need to address the 
issue of fast-depleting fish stocks, the fishing agreement between the European Union and 
Senegal has not been renewed in 2006, which is the first time since 1979 (Iossa, et al., 2008; 
Stilwell, Samba, Failler, & Laloë, 2010). Previous agreements with the European Union had 
shown that the partnership itself was not an ideal way to address the many issues in the 
country, which had also caused a lot of concerns for the local fishing communities in Senegal. 
Thus, they refused to sign the agreement in urgent need to limit foreign vessels from 
exploiting their marine resources, and shift their focus towards “food security and the 
development of its national industry” (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 1). In this way, traditional 
fishermen and national corporations may get a better chance to operate as non-renewal of the 
agreement may have relieved some pressure off the overexploited fish stocks. On the other 
hand, Stilwell et al. (2010) argue that whether “[…] the non-renewal of the fisheries’ 
agreement with EU can be viewed as a victory for local Senegalese fisheries’ groups is 
however, questionable” (Stilwell, et al., 2010, p. 616). 
Even though Senegal refused to sign a new agreement with the European Union, the country 
still seeks to attract foreign skills, technology and investment, as most other poor countries 
would do (Falkenberg, 2004; Iossa, et al., 2008). Thus, they allow foreign countries to 
establish joint ventures with national companies (Iossa, et al., 2008). However, joint ventures 
can only be formed on the condition that at least 51% of the shares are in the possession of the 
Senegalese investors (Iossa, et al., 2008). These kinds of joint venture are particularly 
common when it comes to the tuna fishing industry, where high investments are required. 
Regardless of the non-renewal of the fisheries’ agreement with the European Union, the 
Senegalese government had reached an agreement with France and Spain for the benefit of 
their own tuna fishing industry (Iossa, et al., 2008). Thus, granting the French and Spanish 
pole-and-line tuna boats access to Senegalese waters. According to Kaczynski and Fluharty 
(2002), “the tuna fishery is the least controlled component of EU fleet operations in the West 
African 200 mile EEZ” (p. 86). It is further stated that the countries that utilize the tuna 
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resources from the West African waters include Cuba, France, Japan and Spain (Kaczynski & 
Fluharty, 2002). 
On the other hand, the rules and regulations that are imposed by the government discriminates 
these foreign vessels in favor of their own, as “foreign vessels in principle are subject to 
specific rules and controls” (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 8). In addition, the Senegalese government 
aims at creating more jobs and adds more value in the country. Thus, it is now required from 
all foreign vessels to “land a certain quota of catches in Senegalese ports (usually 60%), 
which is intended to prioritise local Senegalese processing plants […]” (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 
8). In the past, foreign vessels could ship all their catches directly to Europe with no jobs 
created and no value added in Senegal. According to the European Commission (2008), the 
Senegalese government required that all foreign fishing vessels, including the European, “to 
land their whole catch in a Senegalese port” (p. 1). In this case, the Senegalese government 
monitors all European and other foreign vessels whereas their national small-scale fishing 
fleet is not under surveillance or regulated at all (European Commission, 2008, p. 1). 
8.11.5.1 Joint Ventures and the ‘Senegalization’ of Foreign Fleets 
Joint ventures between foreign and national companies could also be found in the majority of 
companies in the processing sector (Iossa, et al., 2008). These joint ventures may benefit the 
Senegalese economy in terms of high processing capacity and exportation of higher value-
added products (Béatrice  Gorez, 2007; Iossa, et al., 2008). However, there are some issues 
regarding joint ventures. According to Gorez (2007), “over 80 percent of the added value 
generated goes to the European operators, and only 19 percent to the third countries” (p. 6). 
Furthermore, the Senegalese expected to gain more know-how from the Europeans through 
these joint venture companies. In this way, they could better develop the Senegalese 
processing sector, but , however, they are seldom involved in the management of joint venture 
companies by the European fishing professionals (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 8). 
In addition, joint ventures may be established for other purposes than to aid the Senegalese 
government’s efforts to develop its national industry. As previously mentioned, foreign 
vessels are subjected to different rules and controls in comparison to the national vessels. 
Thus, in order to bypass these rules and regulations, the European vessels seek to form joint 
ventures which allow them to get better access to marine resources in deep waters as well as 
in coastal waters (Iossa, et al., 2008). Furthermore, through joint ventures, European vessels 
are also allowed to fish under the Senegalese flag. According to the UNEP (2002), “fishing 
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ships flying foreign flags are authorized to fish in Senegalese waters either under fishing 
agreements concluded between Senegal and the State of the flown flag or the organization 
representing that State, or when chartered by Senegalese nationals” (p. 21).Fishing access to 
third-countries’ waters could also be acquired by fishing vessels owned by EU member state 
companies or other foreign states through simply registering under a foreign flag (CTA, 
2004a, p. 6). Thus, what seemed to be Senegalese-owned vessels were actually foreign vessels 
in disguise, and these vessels are financed and run by the Europeans (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 9). 
This method is called the ‘Senegalization’ of foreign vessels, which in this case are European 
fishing vessels. These cunning methods are not only to bypass the coastal state’s attempts to 
regulate and control its own waters, but they also give these European companies a better 
chance to “escape any EU control and regulatory measures” (CTA, 2004a, p. 6). 
Consequently, management and control of foreign industrial vessels would be difficult due to 
the fact that it is hard to distinguish between foreign and national vessels (Iossa, et al., 2008). 
According to Iossa et al. (2008), the attempts from the Senegalese government to grant 
national companies and small-scale fishermen better access to national marine resources as 
well as reducing the high pressure on marine resources may not have been successful. In their 
search for other means to control and acquire access to the Senegalese marine resources, 
European operators are in fact undermining all of the efforts made by the Senegalese 
government to develop their economy as well as to make an end overexploitation of fish 
stocks (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 8). In order to bypass the rules and regulations imposed by the 
government, European operators control the marine resources “through the “Senegalisation 
of European vessels, the buying out of Senegalese fishing quotas and the repatriation of 
capital” (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 8). It is previously stated that foreign vessels are required to 
land their catches in Senegalese ports where the fish would be processed locally. However, 
this rule does not apply to ‘Senegalized’ European vessels (Iossa, et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
the practice of transshipment is another way to bypass the government rules and regulations 
(Iossa, et al., 2008). Transshipment is a practice where catches from small boats are 
transferred into larger vessels. In that way, the catches could be transported directly to their 
given destination without having to land their catches in Senegal (Iossa, et al., 2008). 
However, such practices to bypass rules and regulation would not work in favor of countries 
that struggle economically as it threatens “the sustainability of stocks and ultimately the 
development of the local economy” (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 8). 
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Iossa et al. (2008) claim that European fisheries operators in Senegal may still have many 
widely spread practices which do not work in favor of the Senegalese government or its 
people. Such diffused practices include “the so-called “Senegalisation” of European boats, 
buy out and cumulating of Senegalese fishing quotas, transshipment and repatriation of 
profits” (Iossa, et al., 2008). In addition, there is illegal fishing in the Senegalese waters, 
which is not properly monitored or controlled by the government. According to Iossa et al 
(2008), these types of practices does in fact serve as a hindrance to the country’s long term 
development as they “bypass the government’s attempts to regulate access to and control of 
the marine resources” (Iossa, et al., 2008, p. 1).  
8.11.6 The Consequences of signing a new EPA with the EU 
According to Iossa et al. (2008), the consequences of signing a full EPA with the European 
Union, would mean to liberalize the fisheries sector in the sense that European companies 
would be granted full access to operationalize and establish in the fisheries sector as they see 
fit, and the number of foreign vessels would probably increase. Interference from the 
Senegalese government would no longer be possible, since the agreement overrides any 
efforts from the government to introduce new policies (Iossa, et al., 2008). This means that 
the Senegalese government can no longer impose policies such as limiting fishing access of 
foreign vessels or to require them to land certain quotas of their catch in Senegalese ports 
(Iossa, et al., 2008). Thus, the catches would be directly transported to their appointed 
destinations without any limitations imposed by Senegalese government, which will probably 
cause numerous of companies in the industry to go bankrupt.  In turn, many people who work 
in the processing industry would be considerably affected as job losses are inevitable in this 
case (Iossa, et al., 2008). As a result, the rate of unemployment will then increase which may 
also lead to an increase of illegal immigrants to Europe. 
No limited access into the Senegalese waters would mean that there will be more foreign 
industrial vessels that operate in the waters - and the more foreign vessels operating, the 
higher the pressure on fish stocks. Thus, the EPA may threaten the food security of thousands 
of people in Senegal by exploiting their marine resources (Iossa, et al., 2008).  
In addition, there is no longer a point for European operators to establish joint ventures with 
local companies in Senegal, since their intentions were, in the first place, to acquire access to 
the Senegalese marine resources through joint ventures (Iossa, et al., 2008). Furthermore, the 
fierce competition between local fishermen and foreign operators would inevitably increase 
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due to absence of restrictions, which would certainly work in favor of the foreign operators 
(Iossa, et al., 2008). 
One of the apparent recommendations given to Senegal with regard to the fisheries agreement 
is that the country must reject renewing the agreement. It is rational to refuse to sign a new 
agreement due the fact that a full fisheries agreement, including services and investment 
provisions, threatens the food security of millions of people in Senegal, and effective 
management of fisheries and conservation of fish stocks (Iossa, et al., 2008). Iossa et al. 
(2008) suggest that the European Union has to “take into consideration socio-environmental 
and food security impacts” (p. 14) in order to make the agreement beneficial to Senegal as 
well. Only then, the Senegalese may reconsider to renew the agreement with the EU.  
8.11.7 The EU’s Contributions in Senegal 
In exchange for fishing rights, the European Commission (2008) promised that Senegal and 
any other countries that sign a new fisheries partnership agreement with them would receive a 
wide range of benefits. According to the European Commission (2008), these benefits include 
improvements on fish stock management, surveillance and control of fishing fleets, and 
financial contributions (p. 3). In order to improve the management of fish stocks in the partner 
countries, fishing pressures need to be controlled, fishing operators need to act in compliance 
with the predetermined catch quotas, and catches must be constrained to sustainable levels. 
Thus, the European Commission (2008) would propose a set of rules and obligations that 
would prevent any countries under the FPA, including themselves, to excessively exploit the 
ocean and its resources in a carelessly and irresponsibly manner. Through these rules and 
obligations, the partner countries would be granted some of the necessary tools to achieve 
better management of their fish stocks, and monitor and control the catches not only from 
foreign fleets but national fleets as well. Furthermore, the agreement would not allow any 
fishing vessels to fish those stocks in which scientific evidence have proven to be in danger of 
extinction. Thus, the allowable catch will be entirely based on scientific advices and 
recommendations. According to the European Commission (2008), the allowable catches 
from the EU fishing fleets would be based on two main factors; (1) if the national fleets were 
not able to exploit these fish stocks themselves, and (2) if these fish stocks were proven by 
scientists to be a surplus for the national fleet.  
Moreover, through the agreement, effective monitoring systems would be introduced, and the 
partner countries would receive the necessary financial support in order to put these systems 
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into practice (European Commission, 2008). The monitoring and control programs would 
benefit the partner countries in such a way that they would acquire a better overview of the 
fish stocks as well as the fishing fleets in the area. From the information obtained by the 
assessment, better and probably more rational decisions would be made on how to manage the 
fish stocks and regulate the fleets in the future. Other necessary financial support would also 
be provided by the EU, e.g. “to the national government budget” (European Commission, 
2008, p. 3). In addition, the benefits of signing a fisheries partnership agreement with the EU 
include “economic value, i.e. direct creation of jobs […]” and “marketing of fishery products 
intended for African markets” (European Commission, 2008, p. 3).  
Since 2006, no fisheries partnership agreements have been signed between Senegal and the 
EU (European Commission, 2008; Iossa, et al., 2008; Stilwell, et al., 2010). However, 
according to the European Commission (2008), the EU has still been providing the fisheries 
sector in Senegal financial assistance, even though they are not compelled to lend any support 
to Senegal sine the FPA is no longer in effect. As a matter of fact, the European Commission 
(2008) claimed that the EU still “remains one of the biggest financial contributors to this 
sector” (p. 3). Most of these financial contributions are through the European Development 
Fund (European Commission, 2008). However, the EU is not the only contributor, but there 
are also other financial contributors as well. These include the African Development Bank, 
World Bank and the French Development Agency, in which contribute financially in order to 
reconstruct the fisheries sector in Senegal (European Commission, 2008). 
Over the years, the EU had been several times accused by NGOs and the international press to 
have overfishing not only the Senegalese waters but the majority of the West African waters. 
However, the European Commission (2008) claimed these accusations to be false and that 
their true intentions and actions were the total opposite of how they have been frequently 
portrayed in some of the reports and articles from NGOs and the press. The European 
Commission (2008) stated their objectives in Senegal as follows; “[…] the Commission is 
seeking to cut fishing effort and promote sustainable management of Senegalese stocks, while 
preserving the long-term economic and social activities that depend on this sector” (p. 4). In 
order to achieve these objectives and strengthened the Senegalese fisheries, the EU launched a 
€6 million program in 2007 to support the Senegalese Fisheries Ministry in their pursuit of 
their goals (European Commission, 2008, p. 3). The purpose of this program was to aid 
Senegal to implement systems to control and regulate its fisheries and improve its 
management of fish stocks. 
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Another program that aimed to support the Senegalese artisanal fishing was launched in 2000 
(Lefèbvre, 2003). This program was called “PAPA-SUD”. According to Lefèbvre (2003), the 
EU and the French Development Agency financed the PAPA-SUD together, in which 
accounted for €8,63 million. The EU contributed with 64% of the total financial support. The 
purpose of PAPA-SUD was to “invest in infrastructure with a view to improving access to 
unloading areas, improving working conditions across the whole sector (catching the fish, 
processing and distribution), strengthening quality and hygiene controls on fresh and 
processed products, improving distribution and artisanal processing methods, and, finally, 
increasing safety at sea” (Lefèbvre, 2003, p. 70). Thus, this program was no doubt beneficial 
for Senegal, but it is important to emphasize that PAPA-SUD as a program did not encourage 
the fisheries to increase their fishing efforts, i.e. the size of the catches, or cause further harm 
to the marine resources in Senegal (European Commission, 2008; Lefèbvre, 2003). Its sole 
purpose was to promote sustainable use of these resources and improve the industry and the 
coastal fishing communities as a whole. 
8.11.8 The EU Responds to the Accusations from NGOs 
The European Union’s trade policy had been met with a great deal of accusations and 
criticism from a number of NGOs (Griffin, 2008). Some of the accusations that were directed 
against the EU’s fisheries and trade policies, include depletion of fish stocks, undermining the 
food crisis (e.g. in Senegal), and force the local fishermen to immigrate illegally, which in 
many cases have devastating consequences (European Commission, 2008). 
However, the European Commission (2009c) indicated that these accusations are not always  
true, and stated that they “are based on a number of misconceptions” (p. 25). The European 
Commission recognized the fact that some of the areas in the West African waters are indeed 
overfished. However, they distanced themselves from any accusations of overfishing, and 
explained that the fishing pressure contributed by EU fleets had not accounted for more than 
20% of the total fishing pressure in the area (European Commission, 2009c, p. 25). As a 
matter of fact, the European Commission (2008) insisted that the industrial vessels in 
Senegalese waters did not catch more than 2-3% of the total fish caught under the period in 
which the fishing agreement was in effect (p. 1). Therefore, the EU fleets had not been 
playing a major role in depleting the fish stocks in the Senegalese waters as accused by 
NGOs, and neither have EU fishing operators under the FPA competed against traditional 
fishermen in Senegal during this period (European Commission, 2008). However, the 
European Commission (2008) cannot guarantee that other non-EU foreign fleets are 
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competing with the Senegalese small-scale fishing boats. Moreover, according to the FPA 
(EXPLAIN?), EU vessels were not allowed to operate within any of the West African coastal 
waters that was only intended for artisanal fisheries (European Commission, 2009c). This was 
the area known as the 12-mile zone from the coast. 
According to the European Commission (2008), the “Senegalese Fisheries directorate figures 
for large vessels currently fishing in Senegalese waters are: 7 Spanish pole-and-line tuna 
vessels; 4 French pole-and-line tuna vessels […]; 2 tuna seiners from Cape Verde; 1 
Gambian trawler; 4 Mauritanian trawlers […]” (pp. 1-2). This is in contrast to the 
Senegalese small-scale fishing, which accounted for between 10,000 to 15,000 pirogues in the 
same period (European Commission, 2008). From 2000 to 2003, the average catch from 
small-scale fishing amounted to 341,970 tons, which represented 87% of the total catch in 
Senegalese waters, i.e. including catches from foreign and national fisheries (European 
Commission, 2008, p. 2). The catches from both foreign and national vessels accounted for 
around 13% of the total catch in Senegal. In the same period, the average catch from EU 
trawlers accounted for 8,146 tons, which represented 2.07% of the total Senegalese catch (see 
table XX). Thus, the European Commission (2008) argue that “it is wrong to say that it is the 
European fleet – and only the European fleet – that is overfishing in Senegalese waters” (p. 
2). The table presented below is the catch figures for fishing vessels in the Senegalese waters. 
The numbers are in tonnes and tuna vessels are excluded from the table. 
Catch figures (in tonnes) in Senegal 
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Source: Senegalese Fisheries directorate, as adopted by, European Commission, (2008), “Rebuttal of NGO 
statements about the situation in Senegal: Is Europe really giving Senegal such a raw deal? Facts and figures”, 
pp. 2. 
Furthermore, in their attempts to attract employment from the rural areas to the urban areas in 
the coast, the majority of West African governments had carelessly made a great deal of effort 
into developing the inshore sector (European Commission, 2009c). In turn, this had led to an 
increase to such an extent that there was an overcapacity of artisanal fleets, which had caused 
excessive fishing pressure into the West African waters (European Commission, 2009c). It is 
further stated that the size of the national artisanal fleets may become larger than those of the 
EU (European Commission, 2009c). For instance in the case of Senegal, the small-scale 
fishing activities were not regulated by the government (European Commission, 2008). 
According to the European Commission (2008), Senegal had in several occasions been 
informed and warned about the dwindling fish stocks through scientific assessments, but still 
there were no rules or regulations that had been enforced by the government (European 
Commission, 2008). Consequently, the country now faces major environmental and economic 
problems, in addition to the increasing fuel prices (European Commission, 2008). Thus, the 
fishing opportunities have been significantly reduced for traditional fishermen in Senegal 
(European Commission, 2008). It is for these very reasons that some people have taken the 
advantage of the current situation in the country, and made money of those who are driven to 
such desperate actions as to migrate illegally to Europe (European Commission, 2008). Thus, 
the European Commission (2009c) argue that economic migration is not caused by 
overfishing, but in reality it is rather that “overfishing is a response to economic migration” 
(p. 25). 
On the subject of “Senegalization” of foreign vessels, which is a method used by foreign 
vessels in order to bypass the Senegalese government’s rules and regulations, the European 
Commission (2008) responded as follows: “the flagging rules for the Senegalese fleet are set 
by the Senegalese government, which has full sovereignty in this area” (p. 1). According to 
the European Commission (2008), Senegal, which is the flag state, has to take the full 
responsibility when it comes down to granting fishing fleets access to their waters as well as 
monitoring and controlling the fishing activities of these fleets (European Commission, 2008). 
This applies for all fishing vessels, both foreign and national. Furthermore, the European 
Commission (2008) stated that the EU has not the power to interfere with the rules and policy 
that has been enforced by the Senegalese government. Thus, it is further argued that no rules 
or laws had been broken by the European vessels, even if it is the case that they happen to 
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choose to flag their ships as Senegalese (European Commission, 2008). This is simply for the 
whole reason that the “current Senegalese rules allow this” (European Commission, 2008, p. 
1).  
Illegal migration is a subject that often appears in the international press and articles from 
certain NGOs. In many cases, it was frequently indicated that the root cause of the illegal 
migration was due to excessive overexploitation of fish stocks from EU fishing vessels. 
However, according to the European Commission (2008), these accusations could not be true 
for several different reasons. In the period between 2000 and 2003, the European trawlers 
only caught on the average 2.07% of total fish caught in Senegal, whilst the average catch 
from Senegalese pirogues or small-scale fishing accounted for around 87%. Given these 
figures, the EU vessels had not caught to the amount that is considered overfishing. 
Furthermore, the European Commission (2009c) insisted that the illegal immigrants to the 
Canary Islands in Spain were neither fishermen nor local people from the West African 
fishing communities. However, in another document, the European Commission (2008) 
admitted that some of the illegal immigrants were fishermen from Senegal, but they further 
argued that the vast majority were “the young unemployed from urban areas” (p. 4). In 
addition, the Senegalese coast is for many people a more attractive point of departure than the 
countries that are geographically closer to Europe (European Commission, 2008). Thus, there 
are also non-Senegalese people from other countries, who had also chosen to migrate illegally 
to Europe by departing from the Senegalese coast (European Commission, 2008). In other 
words, the Senegalese people were not the only ones that attempted to emigrate from the 
Senegalese coast, but there were also other kinds of people from other countries that for 
whatever reasons had arrived at the Senegalese coast in order to continue their illegal voyage 
into Europe. 
As regard to poverty and food security in the West African countries, the European 
Commission (2009c) agreed that these are important issues that needs to be addressed not 
only by the EU but also the West African governments. However, they refused to have taken 
any part in undermining the food security of these countries, and instead claimed that the 
EU’s FPA may have been the solution rather than the problem to the food crisis and poverty 
(European Commission, 2009c).  
On several occasions, certain NGOs had pointed out that the reason behind the non-renewal of 
the fisheries agreement was because the EU fishing vessels had singlehandedly depleted the 
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fish stocks in Senegal after years of plundering their waters (Iossa, et al., 2008). For this very 
reason, the Senegalese government refused to sign a new agreement in order to emphasize 
their concerns towards the fast-depleting stocks and the fisheries development dimension, 
which had been for the most part ignored by the EU (European Commission, 2008; Iossa, et 
al., 2008). However, the European Commission (2008) claimed that they have been 
misrepresented by these NGOs. Since 1980, much of the fish population in Senegal has 
considerably been decreased due to the increase in the Senegalese fisheries capacity 
(European Commission, 2008). After the four-year long partnership agreement with the 
European Union from 2002 to 2006, a renewal of the fisheries agreement had to be negotiated 
between the parties. During the negotiation process, the Senegalese government proposal 
suggested that the financial contribution from the EU would remain the same as in the 
previous signed agreement, while at the same time the fishing rights granted by the 
Senegalese government to the EU fishing vessels would be reduced by 60% (European 
Commission, 2008). Furthermore, the Senegalese government required that demersal fishing 
at the coast would be entirely excluded from the new agreement (European Commission, 
2008). On the other hand, the EU proposal suggested that some of their financial contribution 
to Senegal would be used to support the development of the Senegalese fisheries sector, but, 
however, this proposal was refused by the Senegalese government (European Commission, 
2008). Thus, during the negotiation process of a new fisheries agreement, the European 
Commission (2008) argued that they had “made every effort to negotiate a new agreement 
agreeable to both sides” (p. 3).  
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9.0 Theory of Ethics 
9.1 Just Institutions and the Original Position under a Veil of Ignorance 
When situations with ethical implications occur an important question may arise; “how is it 
possible to know that an institution is just and fair?” An answer to this question might not be 
sufficient if equality and the “golden rule” (i.e. “treat others as you would like to be treated”) 
as a part of justice are the only dimensions considered, when attempting to distinguish 
between just and unjust institutions. John Rawls (1972) suggests that one may have to 
imagine oneself participating in a panel of rules-makers “in the ‘original position under a veil 
of ignorance’ to derive at a set of basic principles of justice” (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 25). The 
panel members will be gathered in ‘the original position’ equipped with all the universal 
knowledge of human kind and the environment that people live in (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 164). 
This allow them to make rational choices in terms of equality and free choice, and, most 
importantly, to be able to come to an agreement of a set of justice principles (Falkenberg, 
1996).  
However, Rawls further suggests that the panel of rules-makers in the original position under 
a veil of ignorance will be given a random life where time and place are selected in a “lottery 
game” for the panel members’ undetermined life (Falkenberg, 1996). Thus, the panel 
members or the rules-markers do not know what kind of life he or she will live nor when or 
where he or she is going to live (Falkenberg, 2004). In other words are they “all ignorant of 
their future positions and will thus argue rationally for the best possible institutional 
arrangement” (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 25). Since everybody is in the same position, it will 
“force the participants to argue rationally and arrive at solutions they can live with, even in 
the worst position” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 164). Thus, the panel members do not know which 
person’s interests they will represent “under the veil of ignorance”, and they will live in utter 
ignorance until the veil is lifted and their fates and lives are determined by the lottery of life 
(Falkenberg, 1996). 
Falkenberg (1996) extends the theoretical framework of Rawls (1972) by suggesting that the 
panel of rules-makers will “(a) discuss and create a universal notion of the “GOOD;” and 
(b) decide on the ground-rules for society, and create the necessary institutions (laws, rules, 
norms, customs, conventions etc.) which, if followed, will achieve the notion of “GOOD” 
defined under (a)” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 164). Thus, to distinguish “just” institutions from 
institutions which are “unjust” depends on whether the institution promotes the “GOOD”. If 
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the institutions promote the “GOOD” then they are considered “just” institutions, and if they 
do not promote the “GOOD” then they are “unjust” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 164). Our behaviors 
should be governed by “just” institutions (Falkenberg, 1996). However, it is not always that 
simple due to our individual moral compasses which may not be ethical or in correlation with 
the definition of a “just” institution. Furthermore, individuals or organizations are considered 
ethical when they take actions accordingly to just institutions (Falkenberg, 1996). 
Extending Rawls’ framework even further, Falkenberg (1996) suggest three basic principles 
for the overall “GOOD” in order to test whether institutions are just or unjust. These three 
basic principles for the “GOOD” are; “1) survival 2) equality of moral value and 3) a 
distribution of index goods according to the max-min principle” (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 25). 
According to Falkenberg (1996), it is “assumed that the panel will order the principles 
lexically so that the first principle trumps the second which in turn overrides the third if 
necessary” (p. 170). This particular test for just institutions will be served as a useful tool to 
reveal whether institutions promote these principles or not. The institutions that promote these 
three principles are indeed just, and those which fail to do so are unjust and “should search 
for a different set of institutions that are more just and act accordingly” (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 
25). These tests of institutions will become very important when individuals and organizations 
are operating in developing countries where institutions often fail to adequately protect the 
people and the environment from harmful practices (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 25). 
9.2 Three Basic Principles for “The Good” 
9.2.1 Survival and Hand-Over 
The first principle that the panel members are going to seek out and deliberate has to be the 
most universal and fundamental principle. Falkenberg (1996) suggests that the panel members 
have to find “the most basic of all possible moral anchoring points” (p. 166) in order to 
discuss and create a universal notion of the overall “GOOD”. Moreover, he argues that life 
itself is hard to argue against, since it would mean to argue “in favor of non life or death” 
(Falkenberg, 1996, p. 166). Thus, the panel members have to take into consideration that 
whichever life that they will be assigned, in the life-lottery, is livable. To be assigned a life 
that is impossible to live, would be a too great risk to take for the panel members as they are 
still ignorant of their fates. Therefore, in their deliberation, the panel members have to 
consider the past, present and future generations of all the lives in the whole world 
(Falkenberg, 1996). This would lead to discussions about existential issues, which means that 
survival has to be the first basic principle for the overall “GOOD” (Falkenberg, 1996). 
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The minimum requirements for survival are sufficient “(a) nutrition; (b) health; and (c) a set 
of basic survival tools” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 166) or basic education, which survival would 
be impossible if these minimum requirements are not met. The principle of survival also 
includes “hand-over” which means that “each generation would have to hand-over the world 
to the next generation in an improved state” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 166). Today, the so-called 
“hand over”, i.e. an improved and a better world to the next generation, is of great 
significance. This is especially as the world population is rapidly increasing; 5 billion in 1987, 
6 billion in 1999 and recently it reached 7 billion in 2011 (United Nations, 2012). Thus, in 
accordance to the principle of survival, the world should be “able to sustain more rather than 
fewer people” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 166). 
In order to ensure the survival of future generations one has to be aware of the consumption 
level and resource utilization (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 25). However, Falkenberg (1996) argues 
that the minimum requirements for survival as well as the responsibilities of the improved 
hand-over to future generations may be “one of the weaknesses in our current institutional 
order” (p. 25). This may be for the reason that most of the important survival decisions on 
whether there will be sufficient resources available for future generations, are made by a part 
of the current generation in a small place and in a short time period (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 
166). According to Falkenberg (1996), “a just set of institutions would have to promote 
survival” (p. 167). Moreover, in their search for profits, currently existing institutions may 
ignore the consequences of their economic activities (e.g. pollution, overly consumption of 
natural resources), which may prevent survival of future generations. As long as the 
potentially negative consequences do not affect them here and now, they would be ignored 
until future generations realize that the world they live in was not handed over to them in an 
improved state. Thus, even those institutions that people currently perceive “as “just” may 
not promote survival – and we therefore need to discover which ones they are and seek to 
change them” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 167). 
9.2.2 Equal Moral Standing 
Falkenberg’s (1996) second principle for the “GOOD” is equal moral value for all people. As 
a part of the principle of equality, we can look at the “golden rule” where the focus of equality 
is present; “Do onto others as you would have them do onto you” or “treat others as you 
would like to be treated” (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 25). The core value of the principle of equality 
is that people should not discriminate other people by treating them differently based on 
political beliefs, gender, race, age, religion, appearance, language, nationality, ethnicity, 
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sexual orientation etc. (Falkenberg, 2004). Furthermore, people should have equal rights, 
equal opportunities, equal freedom and they should be treated equally before the law 
(Falkenberg, 2004). This means that one can and should not treat people differently when they 
have equal talent and motivation “when it comes to obtaining resources and entering different 
arenas like education, politics, employment, professions etc.” (Falkenberg, 2004, pp. 24-25). 
However, it is easily said than done as these problems are still present in developed countries. 
In accordance to Falkenberg (1996), there may be an exception to the principle of equal moral 
standing. If an individual encounters a situation where two people are about to drown, one of 
those two people are a family member while the other is a stranger, and that individual is only 
able to save one of them, is he or she allow to discriminate whom to save by choosing his or 
her immediate family member rather than the stranger? Falkenberg (1996) argues that the 
panel members may agree that “it should be allowed to discriminate in favor of one’s 
immediate family in certain cases (i.e. parents, siblings, and children)” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 
168), e.g. in the case of life or death as described above. This may be accepted by the panel 
members for the reason that the individual may have the role as a provider. This means that 
there might be a lot of people who depend on that particular individual as a provider, and, 
thus, it is a duty to provide for one’s own family members first. Falkenberg (1996) expects 
that the panel members will conclude that “the family unit is the best institution for 
reproduction, learning, socialization, care and nurturing of young and old, as well as for 
providing much needed survival tools” (p. 168). Furthermore, the same moral standing would 
probably be granted to all people outside the immediate family (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 168). 
The relationship between human beings and other species is something the panel members 
may have to consider in their deliberation in order to secure survival (Falkenberg, 1996). 
When it comes to the principle of moral standing of humans and other species, the panel 
would most likely put themselves at a higher moral standing relatively to other species as 
there are only humans in the panel (Falkenberg, 1996). Thus, animals and plants would be 
given a lower moral standing. This may contradict with the principle of survival where there 
is an assumption that the panel would ask each generation to hand over the planet in an 
improved state in which should be able to sustain more people rather than few. However, 
when there are more people in the world, then there are also more mouths to feed. In order to 
accommodate the increasing population, the survival of the human species is in some degrees 
dependent on the food that can be obtained from animals and plants. Thus, the survival of 
humans is determined by “the proper balance of the interdependence among the species”, 
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and “the relative moral standing given to fellow species would probably be higher than that 
which is typical today” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 168). 
Falkenberg (1996) suggests that “the question is not whether all species should have the same 
moral standing but rather how large the difference should be” (p. 168). The existence of 
other species may have a profound impact on humans in such a way that their extinction may 
threaten our survival. Thus, in order for humans to survive they not only have to make 
prudent use of other species, but they have to let other species survive within their 
environment as well. However, this means that they have to grant other species a higher moral 
standing than what is considered normal, and the difference between the moral standing of 
humans and their fellow species should not be that large considering their interdependency. If 
a generation is on the verge of failure to follow the principle of survival by handing over the 
planet to the next generation in a worse condition, then the only way to secure the survival of 
future generations is to change “the institutional arrangement that governs political and 
economic decisions” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 168). The objective is to transform the inadequate 
set of institutions to an interdependent and ecological set of institutions (Falkenberg, 1996). 
Falkenberg (1996) argues that “just institutions will enhance survival and grant equal moral 
standing to all persons, recognizing the interdependence between our own survival and the 
survival of other species” (p. 168).  
9.2.3 Maxi-Min for Index Goods 
The third and last principle for the “GOOD” is called the maxi-min principle which is based 
on the distribution of index goods within different institutional frameworks (Falkenberg, 
1996). Index goods are for instance “income, wealth, social basis for self respect, 
professional powers, and rights, etc.” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 169). According to Falkenberg 
(1996), when there is an unequal distribution of index goods occur between parties, then an 
agreement should be arranged to the benefit of the group which has the least advantage (p. 
169), i.e. “maximum to the group that has the least” (Rawls, 1972, in Falkenberg, 2004, p. 
25). Thus, the panel members will choose to abandon the set of institutions that undermines 
the maxi-min principle in favor of those that will “maximize the benefits of the least 
advantaged group” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 169). Behind their rational reasoning and decisions, 
there might be an underlying fear of being placed in the least favorable group after the veil 
has lifted. Thus, in the original position is where the panel members have the power to make a 
difference, and the choices made here would most likely be consistent with the maxi-min 
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principle, i.e. they would not risk to be assigned a life where all possibilities are limited  and 
life itself is difficult to sustain. 
The Max-Min Principle 
 
Source: Falkenberg, A. W. (1996), “A yardstick for justice and ethical evaluation of economic organizations”, 
Journal of Socio-Economics, 25(2), pp. 170. 
Based on the idea from Pogge (1993), Falkenberg (1996) suggests that the maxi-min principle 
could be explained through a figure. The figure consists of three different groups and six 
curves (a, b, c, d, e and f), which represents different institutional schemes. Moreover, the 
curves and lines indicate how the index goods are distributed between these three groups. 
Since the panel members in the original position would want the group that is worst off to be 
as well off as possible, they will select the set of institutions which will work in favor of the 
least advantaged group (Falkenberg, 1996). Thus, the main focus of the analysis will be on the 
group which has the least advantage, which in this case is group one. The figure indicates 
which of the three groups that is worst off by giving them unequal sizes. Through a close 
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observation one can see that group one is by far the largest group which also indicates that it 
is also the poorest. 
In order to satisfy the first principle of survival, a minimum amount of index goods is required 
as represented by institutional scheme “a” in the figure (Falkenberg, 1996). In the institutional 
scheme “b”, the index goods are distributed equally to all groups, which means that they will 
all receive the same amount of index goods regardless of whether they have earned it or not 
(Falkenberg, 1996). Falkenberg (1996) argues further that this will lead to a reduction of 
encouragement to perform well, since everyone will receive the same amount of index goods 
no matter how good their performances are. Without any incentives to perform well, everyone 
will be equally poor as experienced by those who lived under the communist regimes. In 
contrast to institutional scheme “b”, scheme “c” represents a slightly unequal distribution of 
index goods, which results in some degree of incentives to perform well (Falkenberg, 1996). 
Falkenberg (1996) argues that “the rational panel members will prefer “c” over “b” with a 
view to the possibility of ending up in group one” (p. 170), i.e. group one would be better off 
in institutional scheme “c” than scheme “b”. He further argues that even though there are 
some inequalities in the distribution of index goods, institutional scheme “d” would be 
preferred over scheme “c” for the same reason why scheme “c” is preferred over “b” 
(Falkenberg, 1996). However, institutional scheme “e” would not be preferred over scheme 
“d” due to its large inequalities in the distribution of index goods that hurts the least 
advantaged group (Falkenberg, 1996). In institutional scheme “f”, the first group would not 
even be able to sustain life itself due to the fact that curve “f” is below the line “a”. Thus, the 
panel members would not prefer this institutional scheme over any other schemes. Falkenberg 
(1996) stated that institutional scheme “f” “may in fact be the institutional scheme in effect 
today” (p. 170), i.e. a large part of the world population is worst off when it comes to 
distribution of index goods, while only a small group of people are better off through this 
institutional scheme.  
9.3 Basic Human Rights (direct from doc, consider revise) 
According to the United Nations Human Rights (1996-2012), “Human rights are rights 
inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status” (cited from the 1. and 2. line). 
This brings up one of Falkenberg’s principles for the “GOOD”, which is called the “equality 
of moral worth” (Falkenberg, 1996). This means that all people should have equal human 
rights without any form of discrimination as mentioned above. Unfortunately, there are still 
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some institutions which may violate the basic human rights by permitting harmful practices. 
Sharma (2008) defined human rights as follows; “rights which are essential to live as human 
beings – basic standards without which people cannot survive and develop in dignity. They 
are inherent to the human person, inalienable and universal” (p. 3). The definition provided 
by Sharma (2008) also reminds lot to Falkenberg’s (1996) third principle for “the good”. It 
also brings up the first principle for “the good”, which is about survival. Thus, human rights 
are rights that are important to survival as well. 
According to UNDP (2000), there are currently “some three quarters of the world lives under 
democratic regimes” (p. 1). Furthermore, it is argued that the elimination of discrimination, 
e.g. by gender, race, religion, ethnicity, has been in great progress (UNDP, 2000). The right to 
a proper education and basic health care have also been improved since the year of 1900, 
where over half of the world’s population was living under the colonial rule, and the right to 
vote was only possessed by a handful of people (UNDP, 2000). Since then major 
accomplishments has been recognized nationally and internationally both in terms of human 
rights and human development. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted back in 1948 and human rights were 
for the first time been acknowledged not as a matter of choice but as a global responsibility as 
well as an obligation that must be fulfilled (UNDP, 2000). Numerous of countries, both rich 
and poor, have ratified “all but one of the six core covenants and conventions on civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights” (UNDP, 2000, p. 1). These have been 
approved by approximately 140 countries. When it comes to the seven core labor rights 
conventions, only one has been disapproved whereas the rest of them have been approved by 
125 countries (UNDP, 2000). Many countries now “call for a more visionary commitment to 
building the institutions, laws and enabling economic environment to secure fundamental 
freedoms for all: all human rights, for all people in all countries” (UNDP, 2000, p. 1). In 
order to achieve and promote freedom to all people in all countries, one may have to include 
both new and old actors, such as individuals, non-governmental organizations, governments, 
policy-makers. With their resources let alone know-how and networking, the potential is of 
course huge. However, according to UNDP (2000), there is still a long way to go. 
In a world without any form of basic or universal human rights, there may be nothing to stand 
against harmful worldwide issues, such as slavery, apartheid, nuclear activities, genocide, 
child labor, forced labor, racism, torture, discrimination of women, terrorism, hunger, 
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malnutrition, poverty, and the lack of protection of civilians in armed conflicts etc. Thus, the 
freedom, dignity and human rights of the world population may have been deprived. It is 
therefore important to protect the framework of human rights in order to prevent these 
devastating and not least immoral issues from occurring in our civilized societies. However, 
in some cases in today’s world issues such as genocide in Darfur, human rights cannot reach 
those who need it the most due to the disagreements (e.g. lack of proof) in the committee of 
the United Nations. 
There are different suggestions of principles of human rights from well-known historical 
institutional frameworks such as the US Constitution (1789), the French declaration of human 
rights (1789) and the UN declaration on human rights (1948). In order to make these more 
adaptable in a perspective more useful for multinational corporations, Thomas Donaldson 
(1989, in Falkenberg, 2004) has developed a model of rights and duties based on Shue’s 
(1980, in Falkenberg, 2004) concept (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 26). 
According to Falkenberg (2004), the duties of a firm in Donaldson’s model “can be divided 
into three classes” (p. 26). These classes as shown in the model include (Donaldson, 1989, p 
81-86 as cited in Falkenberg, 2004, p. 26): 
a) “A firm shall not deprive anyone of certain rights.” 
b) “For a more limited set of rights, the firm should help protect people from having 
these rights deprived.” 
c) “We may have a duty to aid the deprived.” 
Donaldson argues that multinational corporations have a minimum set of duties at level “a” 
above to not deprive anyone of certain rights such as freedom of physical movement, 
ownership of property, freedom from torture, a fair trial, non-discrimination, basic education 
etc. (Donaldson, 1989 in Falkenberg, 2004). Furthermore, when there are limited set of rights 
at level “b”, i.e. also limited set of duties, then the multinational corporations in collaboration 
with the local authority should contribute to help protect people’s remaining rights 
(Donaldson, 1989, in Falkenberg, 2004, p. 26), i.e. such as freedom of speech and association, 
political participation, physical security etc. The multinational corporations do not have any 
clearly duties at the last level, “c”, but, however, “we may have a duty to aid the deprived” 
(Donaldson, 1989, in Falkenberg, 2004, p. 26). This means that they may have to aid the local 
community to promote survival by helping them to improve health services or build schools 
and hospitals. When there seems to be a conflict between economic profit maximization of 
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multinational companies and local peoples’ basic human rights, then the concern for basic 
human rights must always override business related activities and concerns. 
9.4 Utilitarianism 
Falkenberg (2010b) defines utility as follows: “something that you appreciate, something that 
you value, something that you like; a pleasure or a benefit” (p. 1). Velasquez (2006) defines 
utility as an “inclusive term used to refer to any net benefits produced by an action” (p. 61). 
Utilitarianism is a principle of morality that not only searches for maximized happiness for 
one person, a group or a nation, but for the greatest number of people at the micro, mezzo and 
macro levels, i.e. for “the whole sentient creation” (Falkenberg, 2010b, p. 1). By maximizing 
happiness for all people means that all pain and misery will also be minimized or removed. 
Utilitarianism explains how pleasure and pain could be measured “in order to calculate 
happiness” (Falkenberg, 1998, p. 5). Moreover, these explanations also include human 
behavior and people’s pursuit of their own interests as well as political recommendations 
(Falkenberg, 1998). According to Falkenberg (2010b), utilitarianism “is a consequentialist 
school of ethics focusing not on the motivation or the acts themselves, but on the outcome” (p. 
1). Thus, this means that utilitarianism favors the result of the actions that produces the 
highest possible benefits regardless of how they are produced, for instance by corruption, lies, 
manipulation, child labor or by other means which may be regarded as unethical. As long as 
happiness and flourishing are maximized for the whole sentient creation, the methods that are 
used to achieve these results may seem to be irrelevant in the utilitarian reasoning.  
From a utilitarian perspective, John Stuart Mill suggests that “…actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain 
and the privation of pleasure” (Mill, 1863-1871, pp 1119 as cited in Falkenberg, 1998, p. 5). 
Falkenberg (1998) argued that the utilitarian guidelines and reasoning may seem to be narrow, 
individualistic and short term. This is due to the fact that the utilitarian reasoning favors 
actions that promote the most happiness over those actions that produce less (Falkenberg, 
1998). Thus, individuals may be encouraged to work to promote their own short term 
interests. However, Mill further explains utilitarianism as follows; “…for that standard is not 
the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest happiness altogether…(happiness) 
secured to all mankind; and not for them only, but so far as the nature of things admits, to the 
whole sentient creation” (Mill, 1863-1871, pp. 1122-1123, as cited in Falkenberg, 1998, p. 5). 
This means that utilitarianism does not only concern maximum happiness for one particular 
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individual or group, but also for non-human beings such as animals, plants and trees (i.e. the 
environment) (Falkenberg, 1998). Thus, the greatest happiness principle promotes the greatest 
happiness for the whole sentient creation, as Mill has expressed it. In theory, one could say 
that one may decide to remove all basic freedom, human rights and justice from all people if 
the result of this action would be to achieve greater happiness for the whole sentient creation 
(Falkenberg, 1998; Velasquez, 2006). However, utilitarianism will then be in conflict with 
basic human rights and the principle of equality. Falkenberg (1998) and Velasquez (2006) 
suggest that whenever such conflict may occur, then basic human rights and justice should in 
many cases trump the utilitarian reasoning. Falkenberg (2004) argues further that “it is not 
right to abandon the equal rights principles even if one may profit from it” (p. 25). 
The principle of the greatest happiness from the utilitarian reasoning may lead to a cost-
benefit analysis (Falkenberg, 1998). Velasquez (2006) defines a cost-benefit analysis as an 
“analysis used to determine the desirability of investing in a project (such as dam, factory, or 
public park) by figuring whether its present and future economic benefits outweigh its present 
and future economic costs” (p. 63). To put it in another way, the cost-benefit analysis may be 
used to measure or calculate happiness altogether in terms of economic benefits. Hence, 
utilitarian reasoning is based on the benefits and costs that are produced through an action or a 
policy, i.e. “action or policy that maximizes benefits (or minimizes costs)” (Velasquez, 2006, 
p. 61). Velasquez (2006) argues that “the benefits of an action may include any desirable 
goods (pleasure, health, lives, satisfactions, knowledge, happiness) produced by the action, 
and costs may include any of its undesirable evils (pain […], sickness, death, dissatisfaction, 
ignorance, unhappiness)” (p. 61). According to Falkenberg (1998), the cost/benefit analysis is 
only useful to make ease of “decisions related to the efficient use of resources, but not when 
applied to issues of equity (justice and rights)” (p. 6). In order to improve productivity and 
the overall material well-being, efficiency is needed (Falkenberg, 1998). Efficiency may 
include purchasing power, “efficient use of raw materials in a production process or the 
degree to which a small investment can produce a great return for the owners” (Falkenberg, 
1998, p. 6). Falkenberg (1998) suggests that to measure quality of life, productivity is 
relevant. In the pursuit of efficiency one may ensure an efficient economy. Thus, this may 
contribute to provide a country and its citizens with enhanced education, schools, better 
hospitals, improved health services, etc. (Falkenberg, 1998). Falkenberg (1998) argues that 
“efficiency and equity are in this respect mutually supportive” (p. 6). There is a need for both 
efficiency and equity, i.e. rights and justice. However, sometimes they are in conflict with 
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each other. Thus, there are times when one must choose between either efficiency or equity in 
favor of the other, i.e. a trade-off between the two (Falkenberg, 1998). 
In the pursuit of our own happiness and  material well-being, children are in some cases being 
used to increase efficiency in the production of goods (Falkenberg, 1998). This is for the 
reason that they provide cheap labor to the production process. However, in doing so, 
Falkenberg (1998) argues that the basic rights and principles of justice may have been 
violated as some people are in pursuit of their own material well-being. Thus, if such 
circumstances do occur, where efficiency and equity are in conflict, one may have to promote 
rights and justice (equity) rather than following the utilitarian reasoning (efficiency). There is 
nothing wrong to achieve efficiency and improve our own material well-being as long as the 
human rights and justice are not violated (Falkenberg, 1998). According to Falkenberg 
(1998), “narrow utilitarian based measurements of material well being are insufficient 
indicators of quality of life” (p. 7). Thus, as far as quality of life in a country is concerned, 
material well-being measured by e.g.  GNP per capita, or by how many computers, mobile 
telephones, mp3-players or TV sets that are owned by its people proves to be insufficient and 
at times misleading. Falkenberg (1998) argues that “if half of the population in a country are 
without property, elementary justice and/or basic rights, and work for the other half of the 
population, one may score relatively high on average material well being, while the bottom 
half may not experience any quality at all” (p. 7). 
Furthermore, Falkenberg (2010b) suggests that political systems could also be seen in an 
utilitarian perspective. Assume that all people are allowed to vote for any candidate they wish 
to vote for in a fair election. Then people would most likely vote for the candidate that they 
perceive to be the best candidate to promote their well-being the most (Falkenberg, 2010b). 
According to Falkenberg (2010b), “a key ingredient in our well-being is food, and if we look 
at countries that have experienced famine, it does not often occur in democracies” (p. 2). If 
the politicians want to be reelected by the people, they would have to work to promote, for 
instance, food security. In the view of economics, the cost would be the votes of the people. 
By trading in the votes, they will presumably gain the benefits from the politicians. On the 
other hand, there is also a cost associated with the set of politics that the politicians represent. 
This cost will be in the form of realizing the benefits that are promised. In turn, these 
politicians will be reelected by the people. The benefit of being reelected is that they stay in 
power which is for their own interests. 
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9.5 Responsibility 
It is not always easy for a multinational corporation that operates in a less developed country 
to know when they are responsible for their activities. In this regard, it may be unreasonable 
to think that an organization is responsible for all of the problems that they encounter when 
operating abroad. Thus, Falkenberg (2004) suggests that individuals and organizations are 
responsible for their acts which they have committed or omitted. According to Tofler (1986, 
in Falkenberg, 2004) , individuals and organizations may be responsible if they are able or 
capable to respond to a problem, and for what they “have caused to happen” (Falkenberg, 
2004, p. 27). Furthermore, if MNCs find themselves in situations where they are capable to 
respond to a problem but for whatever reason choose to ignore and not to act, then they are 
considered responsible for the problem (Falkenberg, 2004). What is meant by the capability to 
respond to a problem is that multinational corporations may have the power or the “ability to 
change or influence peoples’ behavior” (Falkenberg, 2010a, p. 2) towards a given problem. In 
an article titled ‘Business’s Environmental Responsibility’, Des Jardins (1999) purposed that 
“business has a responsibility not to intentionally or negligently cause harm to others. When 
such harms do occur, business has a responsibility to compensate individuals who are 
harmed by its intentional or neglect acts” (Des Jardins, 1999, as cited in Eweje, 2006, p. 27). 
In addition, individuals and organizations are responsible or “under legal obligations to 
follow the law” (Falkenberg, 2004, p. 27). However, in some least developed countries the 
laws and regulations may fail to adequately protect the people and/or the environment and, 
thus, may not promote the “GOOD” which means that the institutions are “unjust”, i.e. 
organizational activities may be legal but it does not mean that they are ethical. Consider a 
business contract between a MNC and a less developed country where it includes unethical 
statements, e.g. child labor or poor working conditions. This may be legal in some less 
developed country, but it is not considered as an ethical act. Therefore, it may be a moral 
obligation (i.e. morally responsible) for an organization which operates in an inadequate 
institution to search to change these contract statements, if they have the power or the 
capability to do so. 
Similar to Donaldson (1989), DeGeorge (1993) proposes guiding principles for how MNCs 
should act abroad when they operate in countries with inadequate institutions. Unlike 
Donaldson, the principles that are proposed by DeGeorge are based on integrity, i.e. the 
‘principles of integrity’. DeGeorge believes that his seven guiding principles may be useful 
for MNCs that operate in countries with inadequate institutions. These include: 
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- MNC’s should do no intentional direct harm 
- MNC’s should produce more good than harm for the host country 
- MNC’s should contribute by their activity to the host country’s development 
- MNC’s should respect the human rights of their employees 
- To the extent that local culture does not violate ethical norms, MNC’s should respect 
the local culture and work with it and not against it 
- MNC’s should pay their fair share of taxes 
- MNC’s should cooperate with the local government in developing and enforcing just 
background institutions. 
(De George, 1993, p. 45-56, as cited in Falkenberg, 2004, p. 27) 
Falkenberg (2004) argues that the principles or perspectives from Donaldson and DeGeorge 
“are little less demanding on the MNC’s than the what would be the case if one were to 
require that institutions be just promoters of the three principles of the Good” (p. 27). 
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9.6 Analysis of the EU-Senegal Case 
9.6.1 Just Institutions 
The Senegalese waters are currently overfished. This means that most fish stocks are either 
overexploited or depleted. Foreign fleets of industrial trawlers are responsible for overfishing 
the fish stocks, which have led to more suffering for people that are already suffer from 
poverty and food crisis. In turn, there is a reduced quality of life for the local coastal 
population of Senegal. The foreign fleets of industrial trawlers originate from the European 
Union, Russia, China and Japan. The coastal waters of Senegal is overfished, the few fish 
catches are exported, the price for previously considered low-valued species are increasing, 
and competition between industrial and small-scale fisheries are fierce. In addition, the 
Senegal is struggling with domestic or national problems such as food security and poverty. 
Face with these domestic issues, life is difficult to sustain. Thus, in order to survive, many 
fishermen are forced to illegally migrate to Europe in search for a better life. Not every 
voyage to Europe ended in a successful way. In 2007, 31,000 West Africans risk their lives to 
migrate to Europe, and as much as 6,000 people either died or disappeared at sea. Those who 
got to Europe were arrested and deported back to their home countries with a substantial fine, 
which many find it difficult to pay due to poverty. 
While the Senegalese people are suffering from poverty and some are dying at sea, the 
Senegalese government is selling fishing licenses to foreign fishing nations in order for 
industrial trawlers to gain access to the Senegalese waters and make matters even worse for 
the population. Many of the industrial fishing fleets originate from the European Union. These 
fishing fleets are taken away what is most important for the Senegalese population to survive. 
Basically, they are catching fish and profit from it at the expense of other people’s lives, so 
that people in the Western world could have fish to eat. The European Union even went as far 
as to refuse having any responsibilities for what is happening to the population living in 
Senegal. 
Do the European Union and other fishing nations that operate in West African waters act in 
accordance to what have been defined as “just” institutions? Are they promoting the 
principles for “the good”? Clearly, the answer to these questions is ‘no’. Given that this 
discussion is based on John Rawls’ theory of “the original position under the veil of 
ignorance”, the panel members would most likely disagree with the actions made by the EU 
and other fishing nations. In this particular case, the EU, as an institution, is not promoting 
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what is considering “the good”, and, therefore, they are not “just” or fair. Actions made by 
these huge fishing nations are not accordingly to just institutions. Hence, they have failed to 
promote “the good” and thus they are not ethical. 
9.6.2 Three Basic Principles for “The Good” 
In this section, the three basic principles for “the good” are going to be used to test whether 
institutions are just or unjust.  It may not be sufficient to rely only on one single theory from 
John Rawls, i.e. theory of “the original position under the veil of ignorance”. Therefore, 
combining the previous theoretical framework with Falkenberg’s (1996) three basic principles 
for “the good” could be essential to test institutions for whether they are just or unjust. By 
testing institutions through the principles for “the good”, it is possible to see whether the EU 
promotes these principles or not. 
If the institutions do promote these three principles, then they are just. If they fail to promote 
these principles, then they are unjust. Adequate institutions are just institutions which will 
promote flourishing lives and quality of life in terms of justice (i.e. the three principles for the 
good), basic human rights and utilitarianism (i.e. maximized happiness). Conversely, 
inadequate institutions will fail to promote flourishing lives and all the above mentioned 
variables.  
9.6.2.1 Survival and Hand-Over 
The minimum requirements for survival is, according to Falkenberg (1996), nutrition, health 
and a set of basic survival tools. Yet, there is a huge problem with overfishing in the waters of 
West Africa. This problem not only brings harm to the environment, but it also prevents the 
population from proper nutrition and good health.  In this case, the EU has contributed to 
overexploit the West African coastal states’ natural resources. Governments in these coastal 
states may also play a major role in depleting fish resources in their own waters. The 
governments in Senegal and Mauritania are most likely driven by corruption (MRAG, 2005a). 
By allowing other fishing nations to access their waters for license fees, the governments in 
these countries may also have contributed to bring harm to their own people. Thus, instead of 
promoting survival in the current generation, they bring more harm to a community and a 
country that are already in a bad shape. Fish is a source of income for the Senegalese 
population, but more importantly it is also a source of food. Without a sufficient source of 
food, the Senegalese fishermen are forced to migrate to Europe in hope to find a better life 
and a brighter future. However, thousands of people die at sea in their voyage to Europe. The 
European Union has contributed with financial compensation to Senegal. However, 
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considering corruption in the Senegalese government, the people would never benefit from 
the financial aid. Thus, it appears that the EU tries to cover up the media’s and the NGO’s 
attention on the issue by giving the Senegalese government money.  
FAO (2001) considers the following five ethical values to be among the most important 
ethical values related to food and agriculture: (1) The value of food; (2) The value of 
enhanced well-being; (3) The value human health; (4) The value of natural resources; and (5) 
The value of nature. Food is one of the most basic forms of needs for human beings along 
with clothing, shelter, water and sleep. These primary or basic needs are at the most 
fundamental level in which are required to be met in order for any human beings to survive. 
This is shown by the well-known Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Thus, the survival of human 
beings is undoubtedly dependent on food, i.e. without food human beings will not be able to 
survive or even exist. Thus, fish and fish products produced and distributed from capture- and 
inland fisheries as well as from aquaculture are one of the major contributions made for the 
survival of human beings. This leads back to the introduction of the ‘Three Basic Principles’ 
suggested by Falkenberg (1996), particularly the principle of ‘survival and hand-over’.  
The first principle for “the good” also takes hand-over into consideration. Basically, the point 
is to hand over the planet earth to the next generation where it should be in an improved state. 
This means that one should ensure survival for future generations by handing over the world 
in a better state. However, the issue of overfishing is threatening the world’s natural resources 
and one of the most important sources of protein, which many people are dependent on. Thus, 
instead of handing over the world in an improved state to the next generation, it appears that 
this generation is rather handing over the world in a worse state. A world where major fish 
stocks are either overexploited or depleted, and where it may sustain less rather than more 
people, i.e. given that fish is an important source of food for current and future generations. 
Facing the issue of overfishing one may ask; “What happened to all the fish in the sea?” The 
answer to the question is; the current and previous generations have eaten them. Thus, it is 
evident that this is a case of overconsumption as well. 
What is done in the current generation will ultimately affect the next. However, it seems that 
the EU has ignored the consequences of their actions which consequently may affect future 
generations as well as the current generation. The world should be able to sustain more rather 
than fewer people, but overexploited marine resources in the West African waters, e.g. in 
Senegal, have led to losses of human lives among people who are most dependent on these 
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resources to provide for their immediate families and to survive. This is particularly 
concerning the case of EU-Senegal fisheries access agreements. Some people in Senegal are 
forced to risk their lives by attempting to migrate into Europe due to the lack of resources and 
means to survive, and the odds at the dangerous sea are not always in their favor. It seems that 
the current circumstances do not allow the world to sustain more people, and the both the 
coastal state and the EU member states fail to promote principle of survival. Thus, the 
institutions are unjust.  
The case of EU-Senegal is a great example of the weaknesses in our institutional order. It fails 
to meet the minimum requirement for survival and the responsibilities to hand over the world 
to future generations in an improved state are ignored. Whether there will be sufficient 
resources available for future generations is decided by the current generation, and it appears 
that this generation fails to do so. There will hardly be enough resources in the future, e.g. 
when considering the increase of world population and the current trend of overexploitation of 
fish resources. Moreover, there is a general lack of food security in e.g. the West African 
countries. 
As far as the level of consumption and the increasing demand for fish and fish products are 
concerned, one should be aware of how much is being consumed and the utilization of 
resources. For instance, when it comes to bycatch and discards, it seems that a great 
proportion of the catch is being discarded rather than being utilized, i.e. given that the 
proportion of the catch has low commercial value. Clearly, the search for profit outweighs the 
potential future consequences of the given economic activities. Fish resources are excessively 
consumed, and the consequences of this will carry on to future generations if nothing 
drastically is going to be done. In turn, overfishing may potentially prevent survival of future 
generations. Furthermore, the issue of overfishing does not only influence developing 
countries, such as those in West Africa, but it may also affect the EU member states. 
Unsustainable exploitation of fish resources will eventually lead to a significantly decrease in 
fish stocks, which in turn may lead to unemployment in the EU member states as well. It 
seems that the consequences of overfishing are not fully recognized by the general public and 
the consumers. Thus, it may appear that as long as the negative consequences do not in 
general affect the world population here and now, then it is alright to carry on the exploitation 
of fish stocks. The problem of overfishing may not be clear until it is too late, and our future 
generations may have to deal with the problems that this generation has failed to prevent. 
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Thus, it is crucial to seek and change those institutions that are unjust to the point where the 
principle of survival is promoted.  
On top of the excessive overexploitation of fish stocks from the EU and the Senegal’s 
corrupted government, IUU fishing also contributes to overfish the West African waters. This 
is adding even more pressure to the already overfished fish stocks in the West African waters. 
The ones that are going to suffer are those who are most dependent on the fish resources in 
order to survive, i.e. the local community and the fishermen. The amount of fish lost to IUU 
fishing is substantial as the annual loss is between 11 and 26 million tonnes (Agnew, et al., 
2009). This amount of losses is valued between $10 billion and $23.5 billion (Agnew, et al., 
2009). In the case of West-Africa, the amount of losses due to IUU fishing equals a quarter of 
the total fisheries export in the whole continent of Africa, and this amount of losses is valued 
at US$1 billion annually (High Seas Task Force, 2006). Furthermore, there is a significant 
correlation between the level of illegal fishing and the given governance (Agnew, et al., 
2009). What may be even worse is that the Senegalese government is corrupted, which means 
that there may be little or close to none incentives to combat IUU fishing. It may be the case 
that they are willing to adopt the different measures to combat IUU fishing, but, however, it 
does not mean that combating against IUU fishing is very effective in practice. Thus, it 
appears that Senegal and other West African countries may have a weak governance in which 
may lead to a higher vulnerability towards IUU fishing activities. In turn, this will influence 
the fishermen and their coastal communities. Furthermore, fish stocks are pressured and the 
environment damaged, which means that the survival for the coastal communities may be 
threatened. This is due to the fact that food security is threatened. This means that IUU fishing 
activities are undermining the first principle for “the good”, i.e. survival and hand-over. 
As far as the issue of bycatch and discards are concerned, it may also contribute to undermine 
the principle of survival. While Senegal is dealing with issues, such as scarce fish resources 
and reduced food security, many domestic and foreign industrial fishing fleets are discarding 
fishes of low commercial values for those of high commercial values. Clearly, such practices 
are undermining the principle of survival, since they contribute to serve as a hindrance 
towards proper nutrition and good health (i.e. the minimum requirements for survival), i.e. by 
throwing away some of the resources while the local communities are in dire need for food. 
By looking at the problem in this way, it seems that the practice of discarding is indeed a 
waste of resources. This is especially the case as there are people in the world who need these 
resources to survive. What could have been done in this case is to find different ways to better 
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utilize these resources, e.g. retain the catch despite its low commercial value and sell it in the 
local market at a reasonable price. However, it seems that certain regulatory measures, such as 
Minimum Landing Size (MLS) and Total Allowable Catch (TAC), are to some degree 
preventing this to happen. At the same time, regulatory measures are for preventing against 
overfishing of fish stocks and fishing of juveniles. In order to follow the rules, laws and 
regulations, some fishers may discard some proportions of the catch to avoid financial 
consequences and at the same time stay inside the pre-determined catch limit. Instead of 
discarding fish for the sake of avoiding some regulatory measures or for the reasons that the 
catch has a low commercial value, what is more important is to promote survival for the least 
advantaged groups. In order to promote survival, the minimum requirements for survival are 
to be met and those are e.g. nutrition and health. Thus, discarding of any edible catch is 
basically violating the principle of survival and hand-over. This is for the reason that the 
practice of discarding is destroying fish resources. At the same time, it is preventing other 
least advantaged groups, which are dependent of fish resources to survive, from utilizing the 
proportion of the catch in which are discarded. There are may be people who could make 
better use of the discarded catch, and the discarded catch could have been a contribution to aid 
countries that are struggling with issues of food security, i.e. under the assumption that all 
discarded fish are edible. 
9.6.2.2 Equal Moral Standing 
The second principle of “the good” is equal moral standing. In this case of the EU-Senegal 
fisheries access agreements, the question is not the relationship between human beings, but 
the relationship between human beings and other species should be considered. Naturally, 
human beings will put themselves at a higher moral standing relatively to other species, as far 
as the principle of moral standing of humans and other species are concerned. In this regard, 
other species, e.g. animals and plants, will be put in a lower moral standing than human 
beings. In the case of overfishing, it appears that fish and other marine animals are given a 
lower moral standing than human beings. If other species is granted a higher moral standing 
than human beings, then overfishing would not be a problem. Thus, the first principle of “the 
good” may be violated, i.e. the minimum requirements for survival and hand-over the world 
in an improved state are not promoted when the sea is overfished.  
As the sea is overfished, less fish resources are available, which in turn cannot provide 
sufficient nutrition and good health to the world population as a whole. There will be 
significant less food to provide for the world population. Thus, sustainable development is not 
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promoted. When sustainable development is not promoted, then the world may sustain less 
rather than more people. This is because there is not enough food or nutrition (i.e. one of the 
minimum requirements for survival) in order to sustain people. Thus, as the world population 
increases, the survival of the human species may be more dependent on other species (e.g. 
animals and plants) as food and a way to stay alive. In other words, if other species, such as 
fish, survive, then humans may also have a better chance to survive. Therefore, it is important 
to seek a balance between human beings and the other different species in order to promote 
survival. If survival of other fellow species is essential to secure the survival of human kind, 
then it is important to ensure survival of other species and the environment in which they are 
dependent on to survive. This also means that it is crucial to promote sustainable 
development. Overfishing is per definition undermining sustainable development, which in 
turns threaten the survival of human beings as well. According to Falkenberg (1996), “the 
relative moral standing given to fellow species would probably be higher than that which is 
typical today” (p. 168). It appears that the EU and other major fishing nations fail to ensure 
survival of fish species by overfishing the sea. This means that survival of future generations 
is no doubt threatened by overfishing. 
Fish is a source of food. If fish becomes extinct due to overfishing, then the survival of human 
beings is indeed threatened. For human beings to survive, they need food. Thus, this means 
that in order to ensure survival for current and future generations of human beings, they have 
to let other species to survive as well. Humans and other species are interdependent of each 
other in order to survive. In order to hand-over the world in an improved state rather than a 
worse state, and promote survival to future generations, current generation and future 
generations need to seek and change the current institutional arrangement to another set of 
institution. The new set of institutions should be able to recognize the interdependency 
“between our own survival and the survival of other species” (Falkenberg, 1996, p. 168). 
This is given that the institutional arrangement that needs to be changed governs all political 
and economic decisions (Falkenberg, 1996). Without recognizing the interdependency 
between the survival of human beings and the survival of other species, the gravity of the 
problem of overfishing is not recognized. The consequences at an extreme case are that future 
generations will not have the opportunity to further exploit fish resources in order to feed new 
people born into this world. There will simply be no fish left to eat. 
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9.6.2.3 Maxi-Min for Index Goods 
The max-min principle is the final principle for “the good”. Basically, the principle is based 
on distribution of index goods (e.g. income, wealth, rights). In today’s society, uneven or 
unequal distribution of index goods often occurs. In circumstances where unequal distribution 
of index goods occurs, then the benefits should be maximized to the least advantaged groups. 
In this way, the least advantaged groups will be supported. This is essential in the max-min 
principle. It is evident that, in the case of EU-Senegal, the least advantage groups are the local 
fishermen fishing in their pirogues. Thus, according to the max-min principle, the benefits 
gained from fishing activities in the EEZ of Senegal should be maximized for the groups of 
local fishermen.  
Basically, the corrupted Senegalese government is violating the max-min principle. They are 
enriching a small group (e.g. Europe) and leave the majority of its own people in poverty, i.e. 
worst off. The government encourages foreign fishing nations to fish in their waters, which 
means that they distribute index goods in an unequal manner in favor of the group that has the 
most advantage (e.g. the EU and the Senegalese government).  
However, in reality, the max-min principle is violated. Instead of fishing a reasonable and 
sustainable amount of fish from the Senegalese waters, the EU overexploits and depletes the 
fish stocks in Senegal. Thus, they prevent the local fishermen not only from catching fish in 
their own waters, but the EU also contributes to prevent them from surviving. Basically, the 
EU is reaping the profits by exploiting the fish stocks in Senegal at the expense of its local 
fishermen. These fishermen are poor and they have to catch their own fish in order to survive. 
Not only does fish a source of food to these fishermen, but fish is also a source of income. 
Furthermore, most of the people cannot afford to by other types of meat, because there are no 
fish left to catch and to sell. Thus, the sources of protein available for these fishermen are very 
limited. As fish stocks are decreased, life itself may prove to be difficult to sustain.  
Furthermore, the Senegalese government did not make an effort to aid its own population out 
of a food crisis. Instead, they are selling fishing license to other foreign fishing nations to fish 
in their own waters. By doing so, they also contribute to prevent their own people from 
surviving. Thus, both the Senegalese government and foreign fishing nations are undermining 
the max-min principle. In this regard, the distribution of such goods may not always seem 
‘fair’. According to FAO (2001), it is recognized in both formal ethical systems and ethical 
practice that every single person in the world should have the rights to food. This means that 
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it is necessary in every society to provide food to those who are not able or capable to provide 
it themselves for whatever reason, e.g. those who can ill-afford to provide less than three 
meals a day in a family. FAO (2001) claims that failing in doing so is considered injustice or 
an unethical act. This point of view bears similarities to Falkenberg’s (1996) third basic 
principle for ‘the Good’, which is called the ‘max-min principle’. According to Falkenberg 
(1996), one has to seek and change the current institutions in favor of those that will 
“maximize the benefits of the least advantaged group” (p. 169). 
Overall, the EU and the Senegalese government have failed the test. The EU operates in a less 
developed country in which evidently has inadequate institutions. The government is unable 
to adequately protect its own people as well as the fish stocks and the environment from harm. 
The institutions are therefore unjust and it is encouraged that they have to seek to promote a 
different set of institutions that are just and act accordingly. 
9.7 Basic Human Rights 
As pointed out in previous sections, small-scale fisheries are no doubt important to secure the 
human rights of fishworkers and the fishing community. The importance of small-scale 
fisheries is in several aspects. Sharma (2008) suggests that in order to support the 
communities, one may also secure the human rights in these communities. In turn, this may 
also serve as a countermeasure against harmful developments, in which may undermine or 
deprive the fishing community of their rights to “a decent life and livelihood, and in retaining 
their cultural diversity and identity” (Sharma, 2008, p. 5). 
There was a time where the coastal land and its resources were primarily used by fisheries 
(Sharma, 2008). However, in the past few decades, the coastal lands have encountered a 
growing competition, which could be seen as a threat to the fishing community. These include 
“the creation of special economic zones, construction of ports and harbours, industrial 
aquaculture, including mariculture operations, tourism, real estate development and 
speculation, mining and oil and gas exploration, and even conservation-related activities” 
(Sharma, 2008, pp. 5-6). Other threats to the fishing community and the coastal habitats may 
include damming of rivers, pollution to the sea, destruction of habitats etc. (Sharma, 2008). 
According to Sharma (2008), the consequences  of such developments may be devastating as 
the quality of life in the both coastal and inland fishing communities may deteriorate and the 
threat of eviction may also arise. Furthermore, Sharma (2008) argues that the harmful 
developments which threats the fishing communities may completely remove the people off 
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their settlements and occupational spaces. Moreover, the communities’ access to different 
water bodies, such as the river, the sea, bays and inland water bodies, may be disrupted. 
According to Sharma (2008), “losing land adjacent to fishing grounds for small-scale fishing 
communities is closely linked to loss of culture, identity, livelihood and dignity” (p. 6). Thus, 
in order to secure the rights of small-scale fishing communities, there is a call for an “effective 
management of coastal/wetland resources within a sustainable framework” (Sharma, 2008, p. 
6). In this sense, the State (the duty-bearer) needs to include policies that may promote and 
secure both inalienable and customary rights for the people in the fishing communities, i.e. 
both the coastal and inland communities (the citizens). In turn, the rights of the fishing 
communities’ lands, which may have been used for fisheries-related activities (e.g. building 
boats, processing, drying fish), may be kept safe (Sharma, 2008). However, the given State 
(the duty bearer) is not the only part that needs to secure its people’s (citizens) rights, but the 
communities as a whole need to participate in fisheries management programs as well. As 
Sharma (2008) stated it; “It is as important that the rights of fishing communities to 
participate in coastal/wetland management programmes as rightsholders, and not as one 
among many stakeholders, is recognized” (p. 6).  
As far as the access rights to fisheries resources are concerned, the problems are continuously 
growing. Some of these include, for instance, fierce competition between industrial trawlers 
and small-scale traditional and artisanal fishermen, destructive and harmful fishing methods 
(e.g. dynamiting, bottom trawling), and pollution in the sea (Sharma, 2008). Thus, domestic 
small-scale fishermen have expressed their needs to be able to secure access rights to their 
own domestic fisheries resources (Sharma, 2008). In their proposal, Sharma (2008) claims 
that the fishworkers “have emphasized collective, community-based access and management 
regimes that foster equity and sustainability, that are suited to the socio-cultural ethos of 
small-scale communities, and that recognize natural resources of bays, seas, rivers and 
inland water bodies as common heritage” (p. 6). In this context, Sharma (2008) argues that it 
is important to distinguish and draw the attention towards the conflict between the small-scale 
fishworkers’ demands of preferential access right to the fishing resources, “and some of the 
current rights-based approaches to fisheries management that often promote private property 
rights in fisheries, to deal with the problem of ‘open access’” (p. 7). The case of Iceland 
provided by Mathew (2008) may have demonstrated this particular problem. In this context, 
two Icelandic fishermen were concerned about right-based approaches that are used in 
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fisheries management may have violate human rights (Mathew, 2008). This is particularly the 
case when it comes to the fishworkers’ rights to a decent livelihood.  
Even though conservation and management of marine resources are important in order to 
achieve sustainable fisheries in the long term, one should always first of all take into account 
the needs of people and the communities. Thus, small-scale fisheries should not only be 
viewed solely as an economic activity, but other aspects of small-scale fisheries should also 
be taken into account. This may include their “unique cultures, knowledge systems, social 
institutions and beliefs” (Sharma, 2008, p. 9). Sharma (2008) argues that the culture and the 
institutions as well as the knowledge systems are currently weakened. Thus, there is a need to 
adopt different measures in order to protect the rights of the fishing communities. Although, it 
is very important to support and secure cultural values and social norms in which are held by 
the fishing communities, one should be aware of and take into account that some existing 
values and norms may discriminate against certain individuals or groups (Sharma, 2008). In 
this regard, these individuals and groups may have their rights deprived. For instance, fishing 
communities in some countries may exclude women from important decision making 
processes (Sharma, 2008).  
According to the CCRF from FAO, Article 6.4 states as follows; “Conservation and 
management decisions for fisheries should be based on the best scientific evidence available, 
also taking into account traditional knowledge of the resources and their habitat, as well as 
relevant environmental, economic and social factors” (FAO, 2011a, p. 15). Thus, it is 
necessary to consider the interaction between the fisheries and the ecosystem as well. 
Furthermore, Article 12.12 in the CCRF encourages States to “investigate and document 
traditional fisheries knowledge and technologies, in particular those applied to small-scale 
fisheries, in order to assess their application to sustainable fisheries conservation, 
management and development” (FAO, 2011a, p. 73). 
9.8 Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism is a morality principle that seeks to maximize happiness for the whole sentient 
creation. This means that every single person in the world or the greatest number of people 
should have their happiness maximized. In order to maximize happiness, everything that is 
considered the opposite of happiness should be minimized, i.e. pain and misery. In the case of 
EU-Senegal, maximized happiness would mean that the greatest number of people in the 
world would have their need for fish and fish products met. The utilitarian reasoning does not 
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care how happiness is produced as long as it is maximized for the whole sentient creation. 
Thus, the utilitarian reasoning disregards, for example, corruption in the Senegalese 
government. Furthermore, it does not matter even though the world fish population is 
depleted. The methods of how to achieve happiness are irrelevant. Furthermore, it also 
disregards whether the methods are ethical or not. It is the outcome and the results which are 
relevant under the utilitarian reasoning. As argued by Falkenberg (1998), the reasoning of 
utilitarianism appears to be narrow, short-term and individualistic. Take for example IUU 
fishing. Under the utilitarian reasoning, IUU fishing may be not wrong as long as it 
maximizes happiness for a great number of people. The methods of how it provides fish and 
fish products to the world population are irrelevant. Under such reasoning, individuals, who 
are engage in IUU fishing activities, are encouraged to continue promoting their short-term 
interests. 
However, utilitarianism seeks to maximize happiness for the whole sentient creation. This 
means that it does not only concerns happiness for human beings, but other fellow species 
(e.g. animals, planets and trees) are also taken into account. Thus, fish as a species should also 
be taken into account as happiness is maximized for the whole sentient creation, i.e. human 
beings as well as other fellow species. Basically, it does not matter if all basic freedom, 
human rights and justice is removed as long as it promotes happiness for the whole sentient 
creation. However, it would not be very practical in a complex world as utilitarianism may be 
in conflict with the principle of equality and human rights. In addition, it cannot maximize the 
happiness for the fish stocks concerned, since overfishing is basically threatening their 
survival. In this case, all fishermen in Senegal would have their basic human rights deprived. 
Thus, Falkenberg (1998) and Velasquez (2006) suggest that basic human rights and justice 
should always trump the utilitarian reasoning whenever they are in conflict. Thus, it is not 
right to abandon human rights and justice even when one have the possibility to profit from 
overfishing or from engaging in IUU fishing activities. 
Clearly, the EU and other fishing nations that operate in the Senegalese waters are acting 
selfishly in pursuit of profit maximization. The people of Senegal are suffering while there are 
minimum efforts made in order to aid those in need. Even if what has been stated by the EU is 
the truth, they cannot reject the fact that they are fishing in the Senegalese waters and, by 
doing so, contribute to overfish their waters, which in turn have a negative influence on the 
local population. It is evident that the EU fails to promote happiness for the whole sentient 
creation, i.e. they rather promote the opposite of happiness which is pain and misery to the 
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people living in Senegal as well as the fish stocks concerned. In accordance to Stuart Mills’ 
theory of utilitarianism, the EU is wrong as they promote the reverse of happiness. Thus, it is 
hard to argue that the EU as well as the other fishing nations is acting accordance to the 
utilitarian principle. Their actions are clearly at the expense of the Senegalese people’s pursuit 
for happiness. 
9.9 Responsibility 
It may prove to be difficult to know who is responsible for overfishing in the case of EU and 
Senegal. Whoever have caused overfishing to happen in the West-African waters are indeed 
responsible. This means that if the EU and other foreign fishing nations have caused 
overfishing in West African waters, then they are responsible for their acts. Furthermore, they 
are responsible if they are able or capable to respond to a problem (i.e. overfishing). This 
means that the EU and other foreign fishing nations as well as the Senegalese government are 
responsible if they are able or capable to respond to the problem of overfishing, but for 
whatever reason choose not to act. In the case of EU-Senegal, the EU had the capability to 
respond to the problem of overfishing but it appears that they rather choose to ignore it.  
The EU and other fishing nations are obligated to follow the given law where they operate. 
However, the laws and regulations in Senegal may have failed to adequately protect the local 
fishermen and its fishing communities as well as the marine environment. Thus, the law and 
regulations in Senegal do not promote “the good”, and, therefore, the institutions are unjust 
and inadequate. In such situations, the EU and other fishing nations may have a moral 
obligation to seek and change the institutions that are inadequate and unjust, i.e. given that 
they have the power and the ability to do so. 
In the West African waters, the EU should, according to DeGeorge, do no intentional direct 
harm and produce more good than harm for the host country. However, it seems that they 
have promoted the opposite of good for the host country (Senegal) and inflict direct harm for 
the local fishing community by overfishing their waters, which contributes to reduce food 
security for the Senegalese population. The EU has, however, contributed to the host 
country’s development by granting them financial compensation. However, the financial 
compensation may have not been used for the benefit of the people living in Senegal. This is 
due to the fact that the government is corrupted. This means that they have not made the effort 
to develop and enforce just institutions in the host country.   
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10.0 Conclusion & Recommendations 
The conclusion drawn from the thesis is also the recommendations for how to promote 
sustainable development for fisheries. 
In order to promote sustainable development for small-scale fisheries in Senegal, a “human 
rights approach” needs to be adopted. The main objective is to establish a cross-sectoral 
partnership with e.g. NGOs, MNCs and government departments to improve the well-being of 
people in the local fishery communities. By doing so, illiteracy, ill health, lack of access to 
resources, and the lack of civil and political freedoms will hopefully be removed (FAO, 
2010a). Institutions should promote rights to food, rights to a good health, justice and decent 
working conditions for people working in small-scale fisheries in Senegal. It should be an 
obligation. In this way, local fishermen may have an increased incentive to participate in 
resource management. Overfishing will not be perceived as an immediate threat, unless these 
current issues are removed and the livelihoods of the fishing communities are improved. 
Increased responsible fishing could lead to poverty reduction and food security for Senegal 
and other West African countries. Thus, the human rights approach needs to be strengthened.  
Economic and social sustainability require that fish stocks are productive and a healthy 
ecosystem. This means that fish stocks have to restore their productivity, and, in order to do 
this, fishing activities need to be reduced, catches have to stay within the MSY, IUU fishing 
has to be eliminated and bycatch and discards reduced. This means that fish catches and fish 
capacity need to be controlled by national, regional and international institutions. This 
requires that the institutions are just and fair. Furthermore, the economic and social rights of 
both fishers and fishworkers need to be secured, and sustainable management of marine 
resources should be promoted. 
As far as international trade is concerned, the rules of trade should be arranged so that the 
fishing communities could benefit from exporting. The exported fish prices should be 
increased. However, this requires that international fish trade does not negatively influence 
the local fishing communities’ rights to a proper livelihood and nutrition. This is consistent 
with the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF), Article 11.2.15. 
As regard to the discard problem, the strategies to solve this problem are to either reduce 
discards or to increase the utilization of bycatch. It is difficult to recommend any specific 
measures to combat discards of fish due to the lack of information. Thus, the first 
recommendation is to collect and gather information before any management measures are 
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suggested. In this case, it is important to gather information about whether the bycatch is 
sustainable or non-sustainable. If the bycatch is sustainable, then the fish population is not at 
risk of being declined. However, if the bycatch is unsustainable, then it requires immediate 
actions. Methods to gather information on bycatch and discards are e.g. implementing 
observer programs. Further actions against bycatch and discards are e.g. to adopt a ‘no-
discard’ approach. This is the most sustainable solution for fisheries management in the long-
term. However, this will depend on the country under investigation. Furthermore, selective 
fishing gears should be promoted, and fishing activities should be based on scientific advice 
that is provided by experts. Small-scale fisheries are considered more selective than large-
scale fisheries. Thus, in this case, small-scale fisheries are more sustainable. Moreover, 
technological development of fishing gears should be considered. Destructive fishing gears 
and non-selective bottom trawling should be prohibited. 
The recommended action to combat IUU fishing is to strengthen and improve the governance. 
That is the law, rules and regulations. However, the UNEP (2002) suggests that existing 
regulations must be enforced before one may consider implementing and imposing new 
regulations. Moreover, it is important to improve monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) 
of the sea in order to mitigate IUU fishing activities. There is also a need to implement 
measures to reduce the economic incentives to engage in IUU fishing. This would be in the 
form of increased sanctions and penalties, so that the benefit of engaging in IUU fishing is 
less than the cost of being caught. It is further required that an international cooperation is 
established across governments, organizations and consumers. For example, consumers could 
demand for a confirmation on where the fish products originate from. The supply chain 
network has to be transparent and the products need to be traceable. This would serve as a 
hindrance for IUU fishing products from entering the international markets. In order to 
eliminate the problem of transshipment, it is essential to make such acts illegal through 
international law and national legislations. Similarly, information about IUU fishing needs to 
be gathered.  
The EU and other fishing nations that operate in the West African waters are no doubt facing 
ethical dilemmas. The trade-off between profit maximization and ethics proves to be a 
difficult choice for these fishing nations. Minimum efforts have been made to ensure that 
fishing operations are ethical, i.e. actions that promote justice, happiness and flourishing for 
the local communities and the population as a whole. It appears that the EU and other fishing 
nations that operate in the Senegalese waters have failed the test of just institutions. Thus, 
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these institutions are inadequate, unjust and unfair. This means that they have to seek and 
change current institutions in favor of those that promote adequate and just institutions. Based 
on the findings, the EU and other fishing nations should either exit or find ways to promote 
what is just.  
Is there a glimpse of hope for the future of the fishing industry? There is still hope for the 
fishing industry to take action, but it requires that it is taken immediately. If the problem of 
overfishing is not yet fully recognized, then it seems that the process of promoting sustainable 
development may come a little bit too late. By the time major fisheries in the world are 
operating sustainably, there may not be much left in the ocean. Many fish species will be 
extinct or at best depleted to the point where it will take decades for them to replenish.  
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